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Preface 
 
Last year, we presented the book “Accountability 2008: papers from master theses”. The 
book contained eleven papers. Each paper was based on a thesis in the field of Accounting, 
Auditing and Control, on which these students received a Master’s degree in Economics & 
Business from the Erasmus School of Economics in 2008. 
 
We intended this book to be the beginning of an annual book series. The fact that you are 
now reading the preface of a second volume shows that this intention seems to become 
reality. In fact, we are confident that these two volumes are really the beginning of a 
series of books with papers of master theses in accounting. We have at least three reasons 
to be this confident. 
 
First, we believe that the two purposes of starting this book series will remain as important 
in the future as they are now. These two purposes are first, to provide a wider audience 
for theses that deserve that, and second, to offer some help to current and future master 
students in the streams of Accounting & Finance or Accounting, Auditing, and Control in 
writing their theses by presenting “good practices” from earlier theses. 
 
Second, as last year, the students who were invited to submit a paper for this year’s 
edition, without any exception, were all very enthusiastic to contribute to this book. Even 
though they had already finished their master theses and received their master’s degree, 
they were still willing to put in additional effort to turn their thesis into a paper that 
should not exceed 7.000 words. The fact that (almost) all contributors succeeded to not 
only do that but also before the deadline, shows that this book is seen as a good 
opportunity for students to disseminate the results of their master theses to a wider 
audience. 
 
Third, despite the economic crisis, we found some sponsors for this book, which is 
promising for the future!  
 
This year’s edition contains thirteen papers, two more than last year. The majority of 
these papers deal with Financial Accounting, some with Management Accounting, and one 
paper deals with ICT aspects around management information systems. As such, the book 
reflects the diversity of topics and fields covered by the Accounting, Auditing & Control 
section of the Erasmus School of Economics. Additionally, this book also reflects the 
diversity in approaches to empirical research. But the common factor in all these papers is 
that they all serve as “good practices”. We hope you enjoy reading them. 
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Accounting Conservatism and Earnings 
Management in the Banking Industry 
The effect of discretionary loan loss provisions on conditional 
accounting conservatism in the United States banking industry for 
the period of 2002 to 2007 
 
John Molenaar1 
 
Executive summary 
Previous studies have examined the relation between accounting conservatism and 
earnings management. Those studies conclude that accounting conservatism reflected in 
earnings is explained mostly by the accrual component of earnings instead of the cash flow 
component (Roychowdhury and Watts, 2006 and Pae, 2007). To measure earnings 
management, the accrual component of earnings is often used. Because of the different 
nature of accruals at financial firms, in prior research, financial firms were not included 
into the samples (Pae, 2007, p. 688). This research introduces an approach to examine this 
relation for banks. The findings indicate that US bank managers use their discretion over 
loan loss provisions (large accruals for banks) to manage earnings and influence conditional 
accounting conservatism into the managements’ desired direction. 
 
For a full text copy of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5447. 
 
1. Introduction 
This research will introduce an approach to examine the relation between accounting 
conservatism and earnings management for banks. It provides empirical evidence about 
the contribution of bank managers’ discretionary accounting practices to conditional 
accounting conservatism. This research should answer to the question whether earnings 
management in the banking industry is counterbalanced by accounting conservatism. 
Therefore, the research question is: 
What is the association between conditional accounting conservatism and earnings 
management for the banking industry? 
                                             
1 John Molenaar graduated cum laude at the department of Accounting, Auditing and Control and is currently working as 
accountant at Grant Thornton. He is grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from supervisor E.A. de Knecht RA.  
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Moreover, this is an attempt to shed additional light on the accounting choices of bank 
managers related to accounting conservatism and earnings management. This could be an 
issue of empirical interest for this particular moment. The research could provide new 
insights into the period towards the economic crisis and the role of banks in this particular 
situation. 
 
This article starts in section 2.1 with the content of the term accounting conservatism in 
general and in the banking industry. Section 2.2 explains the theory behind earnings 
management. Section 2.3 presents an explanation of the relation between accounting 
conservatism and earnings management. Finally section 2 ends with prior research designs 
to measure conservatism and earnings management (section 2.4). The hypotheses are 
presented in section 3. The research design and methodology is presented in section 4. In 
order to answer the main research question, section 5 will provide empirical result and the 
research analysis. Finally, in section 6, the conclusions will be presented and the 
limitations and suggestions for further research will be commented. 
 
2. Prior literature 
2.1 Accounting conservatism 
Accounting conservatism is defined by Watts (2003, p. 208) as;”the differential verifiability 
required for recognition of profits versus losses. Its extreme form is the traditional 
conservatism adage: ‘anticipate no profit, but anticipate losses’”. This means that 
earnings are recognized when they are realized while losses are recognized immediately.  
 
Accounting conservatism could be divided into unconditional accounting conservatism and 
conditional accounting conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2005, p. 269-270). Unconditional 
accounting conservatism is referred to as ex-ante or news-independent. In this case, the 
book value of net assets is understated due to predetermined aspects (adopted accounting 
methods and policies) of the accounting process; this is why unconditional conservatism is 
also called balance-sheets conservatism. Conditional accounting conservatism is ex-post or 
news-dependent or also referred to as earnings conservatism. Conditional accounting 
conservatism refers to the application of accounting methods and policies that recognize 
bad news in earnings on a timelier basis that good news. Pae (2007, p. 684) explains the 
difference with two examples: 
 “Unconditional accounting conservatism include the immediate expensing of advertising 
and research and development expenditures, and the historical cost accounting for 
positive net present value projects (…) conditional accounting conservatism include the 
application of the lower of cost or market rule for inventory, the impairment test of long-
lived assets, and the asymmetric treatment of contingent losses versus contingent gains”. 
 
To investigate the use of conservatism empirically, the theoretical three-links framework 
(Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and Ohlson, 1995 and Nichols and Wahlen, 2004) of linking 
accounting earnings to share prices could be used. The theory assumes that current 
accounting earnings provide information to develop expectations about future accounting 
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earnings. These current and expected future accounting earnings determine expected 
future dividends. Finally, the share price consists of the present value of all expected 
future dividends. This framework links theoretically, accounting earnings to firm value.  
 
Basu (1997, p. 3) uses this framework to link accounting earnings with share prices in order 
to measure conditional accounting conservatism. He interprets conservatism as accounting 
earnings reflecting 'bad news' (measured by negative stock returns) more quickly than 'good 
news' (measured by positive stock returns). Consequently, he documents that bad news in 
earnings are recognized on a timelier basis than good news. Pope and Walker (1999, p. 54) 
extend Basu’s observations by developing new measures of conservatism by examining both 
earnings before extraordinary items and after extraordinary items.  
 
Nichols et al (2008) investigate the subject of implications of conditional conservatism in 
bank accounting. Consistent with Liu and Ryan (1995, p. 78), Nichols et al. (2008, p. 90-91) 
use loan loss provisions relative to changes in non-performing loans as a measure for 
conservatism at banks. Several dimensions of loan loss accounting at banks reflect banks’ 
credit risk management, which is an important element for the profitability. Moreover, 
loan loss accounting has a material effect on income statement items and on the balance 
sheet and captures a substantial degree of management estimations. Consequently, 
looking at loan loss accounting should be the way to investigate preferences for 
conservatism, according to Nichols (2008, p. 91).  
 
2.2 Earnings management 
Ronen and Yaari (2008, p. 26) present a formal definition2 of earnings management: 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”. 
 
In previous literature, earnings management is also referred to as accounts manipulation. 
Accounts manipulation is mainly due to the desire of management to influence the wealth 
transfers between the various stakeholders (Stolowy and Breton, 2004, p. 6). Stolowy and 
Breton describe a model (2004, p. 7-8) in which possibilities of wealth transfers between 
several stakeholders are outlined. The stakeholders involved in this model are the company 
itself, society, fund providers and managers. Depending on the actions of the manager, the 
firm or the manager benefits from the wealth transfer.  
 
Previous studies regarding earnings management at banks measure earnings management, 
consistent with conservatism, via loan loss provisions (single accounting item approach) 
because these are relatively large accruals for commercial banks3 (Ahmed et al., 1999, p. 
2). Beaver and Engel (1996, p. 178) divide loan loss accounting in a discretionary and 
                                             
2 Derived from Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368). 
3 Accruals are a measure for earnings management. 
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nondiscretionary part. They find that the discretionary part of loan loss provisions is 
positively related to earnings, which means that banks do use loan loss provisions to 
manage earnings. Cornett et al. (2006, p. 10-11) conclude that, as the level of bad loans 
increases (= non-discretionary), managers do not record discretionary loan losses because 
it would decrease the bank’s income even more, which implies bank managers to use 
discretionary loan loss provisions to manage earnings. Another implication for earnings 
management is that the use of discretionary loan loss provisions to increase earnings is 
significantly related to the fraction of shares owned by the banks managers. 
 
2.3 General relation between accounting conservatism and earnings management  
According to Watts (2003), opportunistic financial reporting is counterbalanced by 
accounting conservatism. Regarding information asymmetry, there is a need for verifiable 
accounting reports. Given the asymmetric information and payoffs between several parties 
involved, conservatism should, in theory, aid in efficient contracting between the firm and 
its stakeholders. Pae (2007, p. 685) explains that due to higher litigation costs, managers 
have incentives to understate earnings by expediting the recognition of bad news rather 
than good news. Management’s discretion over accruals in that case leads to an increase in 
the level of accounting conservatism. On the other hand, the bonus incentive for managers 
leads to postponing or hiding bad news to achieve their bonus-plan goals. This will 
decrease the level of earnings conservatism. Consequently, in theory, the relation between 
earnings management and accounting conservatism is that opportunistic financial reporting 
is counterbalanced by accounting conservatism. 
 
García Lara et al. (2005) investigate empirically the effects of earnings management on 
accounting conservatism directly. This relation is measured using the Basu (1997) model to 
measure conservatism and the Jones (1991) model to measure earnings management by 
partitioning total accruals in discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006) study the relation between conditional accounting conservatism and 
earnings management also by investigating the role of accruals on the asymmetric 
timeliness of the recognition of gains and losses. They conclude that there is a major role 
for accounting accruals in recognizing gains and losses more timely, so before actual cash 
flow is realized and that, consistent with Basu (1997), accrued loss recognition is more 
prevalent than accrued gain recognition. 
 
Pae (2007, p. 685) explains that, on one hand, managers have incentives to understate 
earnings by expediting the recognition of bad news and on the other hand, the bonus 
incentive is to postpone or hide bad news that will decrease the level of conditional 
conservatism. He tests empirically the impact of earnings management on conservatism. 
Pae (2007, p. 685) decomposes total accruals into non-discretionary (expected) and 
discretionary (unexpected) components and examines the relative contribution of 
expected and unexpected accruals to conditional accounting conservatism. Pae’s results 
suggest that conditional accounting conservatism is primarily linked to the discretionary 
(managed) part of accruals rather than non-discretionary (unmanaged) accruals. 
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2.4 Prior research designs 
2.4.1 Measuring accounting conservatism 
Basu (1997, p. 290) measures conditional accounting conservatism by using the asymmetric 
standards for the verification of losses and gains which causes bad news (negative stock 
returns) to be more reflected in current earnings than good news (positive stock returns). 
 
Nichols et al. (2008, p. 110-111) examines conservatism in the banking industry using loan 
loss provisions. Loan loss provisions are accrued expenses that are estimates of changes in 
expected future losses in the loan portfolio due to credit risk. Loan loss provisions reduce 
the net loans on the balance sheet and these loan loss provisions consequently increases 
loan loss allowances (which reflect the total amount of expected future loan losses).  
 
Nichols et al. (2008, p. 111) state that the asymmetric timeliness of news reflected in 
earnings changes is traced to conservatism in several earnings components. Change in net 
income is decomposed in two parts: (1) change in earnings before loan loss provisions and 
(2) change in loan loss provisions. The focus of the regression analysis is on the persistence 
of change in loan loss provisions. An indication for conditional conservatism is that bad 
news about credit losses is assumed to have lower persistence and good news should have 
higher persistence. 
 
2.4.2 Measuring earnings management 
Because accruals are relatively large items that are subject to management’s discretion, 
according to Healy (1985), and McNichols (2000), accruals are often used as a measure of 
earnings management. To measure earnings management, the development of accruals 
over a particular period is investigated. If management uses its discretion over accruals, 
for example, by overstating its accruals in the first period, the second period should, due 
to the nature of accruals, present a correction on this by a significant decrease in accruals.  
 
A generally used approach in earnings management literature is the Jones model. 
Conceptually, total accruals (TACC) are decomposed into non-discretionary (NDACC) and 
discretionary accruals (DACC). The difference between total accruals and non-
discretionary accruals is the discretionary component. In other words, discretionary 
accruals are the prediction error in the Jones (1991) accruals model. 
 
Jones uses a two-step approach. First, a cross-sectional regression is performed for total 
accruals (TACC). Total accruals (TACC) are measured as the change in non-cash working 
capital plus depreciation and amortization4. Jones then regress total accruals on the 
change in sales and property, plant and equipment. 
(1) TACCt/TAt-1 = β0 (1/TAt-1) + β0 (∆REVt/TAt-1) + β2 (PPEt/TAt-1) + εt 
                                             
4 TACC = ∆(CA-CASH) - ∆(CL-CBORR) – (DEP+INT). CA is total current assets, CASH is total cash and equivalents, CL is current 
liabilities, CBORR is borrowings repayable within 1 year, DEP is depreciation, and INT is amounts written off intangibles. 
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Where TA is total assets, ∆REV is the change in revenue and PPE is property, plant and 
equipment. ∆REV and PPE control for the non-discretionary part of total accruals since 
those items are associated with changes in operating activity and level of depreciation. 
 
The second step is to use these industry-year parameter estimates from the previous 
equation (1) to divide the total accruals into a discretionary part (DACC) and a non-
discretionary part (NDACC). Non-discretionary accruals (NDACC) are the predicted part of 
total accruals and discretionary accruals (DACC) are the residual resulting from this 
regression. 
(2) DACCt = TACCt/TAt-1 - NDACCt 
(3) DACCt = TACCt/TAt-1 – [B0 (1/ TAt-1) + B1 (∆REVt /TAt-1) + B2 (PPEt/ TAt-1)] 
B0, B1 and B2 are the industry-year parameter estimated in regression (1). 
 
According to prior literature, bank’s earnings changes could be decomposed into changes 
in earnings before loan loss provisions and changes in loan loss provisions. Since loan loss 
provisions have a relatively large discretionary impact on earnings, loan loss provisions is 
used to measure earnings management (Nichols et al., 2008, p. 111).  
 
Ahmed et al. (1999, p. 11-12) regress loan loss provisions, amongst others, on changes in 
non-performing loans divided by average loans outstanding and earnings before taxes and 
loan provisions divided by average total asset, because these are relatively 
nondiscretionary components, following the approach of Nichols et al. (2006, p. 113). By 
doing this, the discretionary components of loan loss provisions can be distilled. Because 
loan loss provisions have a discretionary part, which is subject to management’s 
estimations and judgments (Liu and Ryan, 1995, p. 80), earnings management can be 
measured by examining the relation between earnings and loan loss provisions. 
 
2.4.3 Measuring the relation between accounting conservatism and earnings 
management 
Pae (2007, p. 686), Garia Lara et al. (2005, p. 704) and Roychowdhury and Watts (2007, p. 
10) expect, according to Basu (1997), the asymmetric standards for the verification of 
losses and gains to cause bad news (negative stock returns) to be more reflected in current 
earnings than good news (positive stock returns). This principle is expressed in the 
following regression (Basu, 1997): 
(4) Et / Pt-1 = α + βRt + ηD + γRtD + εt 
Et is annual earnings per share, Pt-1 is the beginning-of-fiscal-year market value of equity, 
Rt is concurrent stock returns, and RtD is an indicator variable that equals one if Rt is 
negative and zero if Rt is positive. According to the Basu (1997) model, β measures the 
response of earnings to positive returns, while (β + γ) measures the response when returns 
are negative. As stated before, conservatism means that earnings reflect 'bad news' more 
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quickly than 'good news' implying that (β + γ) > β, which means that γ > 0. Basu (1997) 
calls γ the asymmetric timeliness coefficient.  
 
Pae (2007, p. 686-687) and García Lara et al. (2005, p. 706-708) state that the relative 
contribution of earnings components or the relative contribution of expected (non-
discretionary) and unexpected (discretionary) accruals to conditional accounting 
conservatism, reflected in earnings, could be inferred by substituting earnings components 
for Et in regression (4). In this case, respectively CFt for cash flows, ACCt for accruals, or 
non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. By doing this, the effect of earnings 
management can be determined since accruals is the measure for earnings management, in 
particular discretionary accruals. These non-discretionary and discretionary accruals are 
estimated from the Jones (1991) model. 
 
The differential timeliness of earnings and earnings components is estimated by a 
regression of earnings and its components, cash flows and its accruals (expected and 
unexpected), on concurrent stock returns (Pea, 2007, p. 691). The level of conditional 
accounting is measured by the coefficient estimate γ, which indicates the timeliness of 
earnings and its components, between bad news and good news. Earnings management is 
measured by the ratio of γ for accruals and discretionary accruals to earnings. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
After the previously enumerated and explained theory and empirical literature, hypothesis 
regarding the relation between conditional accounting conservatism and earnings 
management can be developed. 
 
As commented in the previous section, Basu (1997) uses the rate of stock returns to find 
evidence of the existence of accounting conservatism reflected in earnings at non-financial 
US firms. He documents that bad news in earnings are recognized on a timelier basis than 
good news. Extending this conclusion to the banking industry results in the expectation of 
existence of earnings conservatism in the banking industry as well. Moreover, Nichols et al. 
(2008) concludes that banks use conditional conservatism as well. This hypothesis is 
strengthened by the conclusion of Nichols at al. (2008) that publicly traded banks exhibit a 
greater degree of conditional accounting conservatism. This implies a greater chance of 
concluding existence of conservatism at publicly traded banks. 
 H1:  
 Conditional accounting conservatism does exist in the banking industry. 
Beatty et al. (1995, p. 249) finds that the discretionary part of loan loss provisions is 
positively related to earnings, which means that banks do use loan loss provisions to 
manage earnings. On the other hand, Watts (2003) states that, to achieve efficient 
contracting a demand exists for verifiable accounting reports. Based on the asymmetric 
information and payoffs between several contracting parties, the use of accounting 
conservatism should aid in efficient contracting between the firm and its stakeholders. 
Consequently, there is a need to limit opportunistic (biased) reporting by firms. 
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Pae (2007, p. 685) explains that due to higher litigation costs, managers have incentives to 
understate earnings by expediting the recognition of bad news than good news which leads 
to an increase of the level of accounting conservatism. The bonus incentive for managers 
leads on the other hand to postponing or hiding bad news to achieve their bonus-plan 
targets that decrease the level of earnings conservatism.  
 
Since earnings management is measured via discretionary loan loss provisions, the 
hypothesis regarding the relation between earnings management and earnings 
conservatism is that opportunistic financial reporting using loan loss provisions is 
counterbalanced by accounting conservatism. 
 H2:  
Discretionary loan loss provisions do not contribute to conditional accounting conservatism 
reflected in earnings. 
 
4. Research design 
In this section, the methodology used for the empirical part of this research is presented 
and explained. The first part will introduce the type of research. Then the research model 
is explained. Finally, the data sample used for this research is presented. 
 
4.1 Type of research 
According to Baarda and de Goede (2001, p. 90) an examination-based, or also as referred 
to evaluative research, should be performed to research with the previously described 
objective. Because, to investigate expectations and relations between different concepts, 
the expectations should be tested by comparing related theory and empirical data. This 
means that, to begin with, expectations should be expressed in one or more hypotheses. 
These hypotheses are based on related theory and previous (empirical) literature (Baarda 
and de Goede. 2001, p. 91). During the research, the hypotheses are tested with empirical 
data. The aim is to investigate whether the hypothesis are true or false. Based on the 
comparison of the hypothesis with empirical data conclusions can be drawn. Verschuren en 
Doorewaard (2007, p. 292) state that examination-based research is often used for 
empirical investigation. According to them, this kind research is quantitative because 
particular numerical relations are being investigated, also referred to as statistical 
research. Therefore, statistical methods should be used in order to conclude whether the 
hypotheses are empirically significant5. 
                                             
5 Statistical significant means that the probability that your conclusions are based on coincidence is lower that 1%, 5% or 10% 
(Baarda and de Goede, 2001, p. 371). 
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4.2 Research model 
4.2.1 Conditional accounting conservatism 
To determine the existence of the conditional conservatism reflected in earnings, the Basu 
(1997) model is used, consistent with García Lara et al. (2005) and Pae (2007). Conditional 
accounting conservatism (according to Basu 1997) is the timeliness of earnings with respect 
to stock returns and is inferred based on the regression in the previous sections: 
(1) Et / Pt-1 = α + βRt + ηD + γRtD + εt 
As explained before, the β parameter measures the response of earnings to positive 
returns, while (β + γ) measures the response when returns are negative. Conditional 
conservatism, consistent with García Lara et al. (2005) and Pae (2007), is interpreted as 
earnings reflecting 'bad news' on a timelier basis than 'good news'. This means that the 
coefficient estimates for bad news (β + γ) should be higher than the coefficient for good 
news β. This implies that if earnings conservatism exists, γ should be greater than zero6. 
Consequently, γ is the asymmetric timeliness coefficient. 
 
To measure the association between conditional conservatism and earnings management 
the Basu (1997) model will be used again (García Lara et al., 2005 and Pae, 2007) but loan 
loss provisions (LLP) is distilled as a separate earnings component (Nichols et al., 2008, p. 
111). In order to measure the association between that earnings component which is 
expected to be managed, the disentangling loan loss provisions are necessary. This 
component is, according to previously described literature, the loan loss provisions. The 
regression to measure the contribution of the loan loss provisions component to level of 
conditional accounting conservatism is the following.  
(2) LLPt / Pt-1  = α + βRt + ηD + γRtD + εt 
Consistent with Pae (2007, p. 691-692) and the content of the previous paragraph, the 
degree of conditional earnings conservatism is measured by γ, the difference in timeliness 
of earnings, or its components, between bad news and good news.  
 
4.2.2. Earnings management 
According to the Jones model (1991), to disentangle the effect of earnings management a 
cross-sectional regression on the total loan loss provisions (LLP) will be executed. In the 
first step, total loan loss provisions (LLP) are estimated, consistent with Nichols et al. 
(2008, p. 113-114), by the following regression model: 
(3) LLPt = β0 + β1NPLt + β2NCOt + β3LLAt + β4HOMPt + β5CAPRATt + εt 
NPL are the non-performing loans and NCO is the net charge-offs. LLA is loan loss 
allowances, HOMP is the homogeneous loans (family loans plus consumer loans), and 
                                             
6  If (β + γ) > β, then γ > 0. 
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CAPRAT is the tier one risk based capital ratio7. According to Nichols et al., (2008, p. 114) 
managers’ expectations of loan losses (which are reflected in loan loss provisions) are 
based on delinquent loans (NPL). Loan loss provisions are also related to loan charge-offs 
(NCO), which are realized loan losses.  
 
According to Ryan (2007), it is expected that high LLAt imply lower loan loss provisions 
because of over-reservation. Liu and Ryan (2006) state that banks with higher HOMPt have 
lower loan loss provisions because; “banks recognize provisions for these types of loans in 
the first year using statistical methods to estimate future loan losses, resulting in lower 
provisions later in the lives of these loans”. In order to absorb potential loan losses, banks 
with greater credit risk in the loan portfolio maintain higher capitalization levels, implying 
a positive relation between CAPRATt and LLPt. These last three variables (LLAt HOMPt, and 
CAPRATt) are included to control for differences in expected loan loss provisions across 
banks (Nichols, 2008, p. 114). 
 
Because it is assumed that, on average, there is no earnings management in the industry as 
a whole, for the second step following the Jones (1991) model, these industry-year 
parameter estimates from equation (3) are used to divide the LLP into a discretionary part 
(DLLP) and a non-discretionary part (NDLLP). NDLLP is the predicted8 part of LLP and DLLP 
is the residual resulting in this regression: 
(4) NDLLPt = B0 + B1NPLt + B2NCOt + B3LLAt + B4HOMPt + B5CAPRATt  
(5) DLLPt = LLPt - NDLLPt 
 DLLPt = LLPt – [B0 + B1NPLt + B2NCOt + B3LLAt + B4HOMPt + B5CAPRATt] 
B0, B1, B2,, B3,, B4 and B5 are the estimated parameters in the regression (3).  
 
4.2.3 Conditional accounting conservatism and earnings management  
To determine the ratio of the part of the conditional accounting conservatism that is 
explained by the discretionary component of the loan loss provisions (DLLP) and the part 
explained by the non-discretionary part of the loan loss provisions (NDLLP), an analysis will 
performed on the differential timeliness parameter NDLLP and on DLLP (regression 6 and 
7).  
(6) NDLLPt = α + βRt + ηD + γRtD + εt 
(7) DLLPt = α + βRt + ηD + γRtD + εt 
This last step is to measure the contribution of earnings management to conditional 
accounting conservatism. On the next page, in the figure an overview is presented of the 
structure of this research.
                                             
7 The capital ratio is the percentage of a bank's capital to its risk-weighted assets. 
8 Predicted by regression (3). 
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4.3  Data sample 
The data used in this research will come from data of annual stock returns, accounting 
earnings, and loan loss provisions of 218 listed1 banks in the United States for the period of 
2000 to 2007. Datastream provides the data of annual stock prices. For the other data, the 
Bankscope database is used. Bankscope contains financial information of over 28,000 banks 
worldwide and captures balance sheet data and income and expenses as well as ratios and 
other annual financial data. 
 
Table 4.1 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Full Sample - 1.962 Observations      
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation First Quartile Median Third Quartile 
MV 3.486,51 20.487,14 88,35 196,34 608,41 
R 0,094 0,307 -0,086 0,062 0,241 
E 0,076 0,041 0,059 0,072 0,091 
LLP 0,019 0,030 0,006 0,011 0,022 
Notes:     
MV =  Market value of common equity.    
R = Annual stock returns for the fiscal year.    
E =  Net income deflated by beginning-of-the-year market value of common equity MV. 
LLP =  Loan loss provisions deflated by beginning-of-the-year market value of common equity 
(MV)
Panel B: Full Sample - 1.962 Observations      
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation First Quartile Median
Third 
Quartile 
LLP 87,42 707,94 0,80 2,28 6,88 
NCO 81,82 632,06 0,43 1,48 5,80 
HOMP 10.458,30 58.232,12 419,37 833,04 2.287,32 
NPL 89,88 628,86 1,41 4,20 13,79 
LLA 168,10 1.014,57 5,00 10,40 30,49 
TL 10.292,14 57.243,53 536,72 1.033,90 2.725,93 
TA 21.470,26 138.273,65 650,57 1.244,90 3.260,55 
CAPRAT 12,20 3,81 10,20 11,60 13,00 
Notes: All in mln. $  
LLP = Loan loss provisions.   
NCO = Net charge-offs.   
HOMP = The amount of consumer loans.   
NPL = Non-performing loans.   
LLA = Loan loss allowances.   
TL = Total liabilities.   
TA =  Total assets.   
CAPRAT = The Tier 1 Capital ratio.    
 
                                             
1  According to Nichols et al. (2008, p. 113) public banks use greater conditional accounting conservatism. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Conditional accounting conservatism 
Conditional accounting conservatism is measured by the difference in timeliness of 
earnings between bad news (negative stock returns) and good news (positive stock 
returns). This is expressed by the coefficient estimate on RtD, which is γ. Table 1 presents 
the regression results of this measure. 
Table 5.1 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
 Basu measure  
Dependent variable γ Sig.
E -0,124 0,000
Notes:   
E = Net income. 
As presented in the table, γ the mean differential timeliness estimate of earnings (E) from 
the regression is -0.124, which is significant at the 0.01 level. This indicates that the 
timeliness of bad news, represented as negative stock returns, is less than the timeliness 
of good news, represented in positive stock returns. Because γ is smaller than zero, 
accounting earnings reflect bad news less quickly than good news, which means that bad 
news is recognized in earnings on a less timely basis than good news. Consequently, the 
conclusion would be that US banks were not conservative in the period of 2000 to 2007 and 
the first hypothesis should be declined. There is no conditional accounting conservatism in 
the banking industry in the period 2000 to 2007. 
 
Because loan loss provisions is the earnings component that is expected to be managed, 
measuring the association between the conditional conservatism and earnings 
management, loan loss provisions are disentangled. The Basu (1997) model is re-run but 
accounting earnings (E) is substituted by its component loan loss provisions (LLP). 
Table 5.2 
Asymmetric timeliness of loan loss provisions 
  Basu measure  
Dependent variable γ Sig.
LLP -0,020 0,068
Notes:   
LLP = Loan loss provisions. 
Again, γ is smaller than zero that means that loan loss provisions reflect bad news less 
quickly than good news. Consequently, the conclusion would be that in the researched 
period, US banks were not conservative regarding their loan loss provisions.  
 
The non-conservative accounting policies can also be pointed out in the development of 
loan loss provisions in the period 2000 to 2007. 
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Table 5.3 
Development of loan loss provisions 
Year Average LLP Average NPL LLP / NPL
2000 55 76 0,724
2001 95 98 0,969
2002 107 119 0,899
2003 78 97 0,804
2004 66 81 0,815
2005 84 67 1,254
2006 83 71 1,169
2007 180 148 1,216
Notes:   
LLP = Loan loss provisions. 
NPL =  Non-performing loans. 
 
Figure 5.1 
Development of loan loss provisions 
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Figure 5.2 
Development of loan loss provisions  
related to non performing loans 
 
As presented in table 3 and in figure 1, in 2007 the average loan loss provisions 
significantly increased. This is an indication that the reported loan loss provisions in 
previous years were too low and that there was a need to correct for that in 2007. Another 
indication for earnings management, as shown in figure 2, is that in the period of 2000 to 
2004, the average reported provisions where less than 100% of the average non-performing 
loans. This trend reversed in the period of 2005 to 2007 where the average reported loan 
loss provisions where more than 100% of the non-performing loans, which is again an 
indication for a correction on the previous period. These corrections are an indication for 
earnings management as referred to by McNichols (2000) and explained in section 2. 
 
Because of using earnings management this non-conservative behaviour is expected. In the 
next sections, the influence of earnings management will be further investigated. 
 
5.2 Discretionary loan loss provisions and conditional accounting conservatism 
To disentangle the effect of earnings management the Jones model (1991) is used in order 
to determine which part of loan loss provisions is non-discretionary and which part is 
discretionary (managed). To recall the regression formula to estimate loan loss provisions: 
LLPt = β0 + β1NPLt + β2NCOt + β3LLAt + β4HOMPt + β5CAPRATt + εt 
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Table 5.4 
Parameter estimates of LLP 
Variable   Coefficient Sig.
Constant B0 -28,715 0,036
NPL B3 0,38 0,000
NCO B1 0,673 0,000
LLA B4 -0,135 0,000
HOMP B2 0,003 0,000
CAPRAT B5 1,516 0,152
Notes:    
NCO = Net charge-offs. 
HOMP =  Consumer loans. 
NPL =  Non-performing loans. 
LLA =  Loan loss allowances. 
CAPRAT =  The Tier 1 Capital ratio. 
Table 4 shows the parameter estimations of LLP resulting from the regression. According to 
the Jones (1991) model, these estimations determine what LLP should be, non-
discretionary, not managed. This means that the discretionary, managed, part of LLP is the 
difference between the reported LLP and the estimated LLP from the regression. According 
to this regression and its estimated parameters, the amount of non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions can be expressed in the following formula: 
NDLLPt = -28,715 + 0,38*NPLt + 0,673*NCOt - 0,135*LLAt + 0,003*HOMPt + 1,156*CAPRATt  
Next, an analysis will be performed on the non-discretionary loan loss provisions and the 
differences between the reported loan loss provisions. 
In table 5, the average reported loan loss provisions (LLP) and the non-discretionary loan 
loss provisions (NLLP), resulting from the Jones regression, are presented. 
Table 5.5 
Reported and non-discretionary 
loan loss provisions 
    Average
NDLLP  93,46
LLP  87,42
DLLP  6,04
Notes:   
NDLLP =  Non-discretionary loan loss provisions. 
LLP =  Loan loss provisions. 
DLLP = Discretionary Loan loss provisions. 
Table 5 shows that the average reported loan loss provisions are lower than the 
expectation of loan loss provisions based on the regression (NDLLP). Consequently, because 
the reported loan loss provisions are lower than they should be this is an indication for not 
being conservative as well. Consequently, the conclusion, in accordance with the previous 
section, is that banks manage loan loss provisions downwards. This downward manipulation 
is not conservative. 
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5.3 Timeliness of discretionary and non-discretionary loan loss provisions 
By decomposing loan loss provisions into discretionary and non-discretionary components, 
earnings management would be reflected in discretionary loan loss provisions. Earnings 
management could be understatement of expenses and overstatement of gains but 
unnecessary overstatement of expenses and understatement of gains as well. 
 
An analysis is done on the differential timeliness parameter NDLLP and DLLP to determine 
the which part of conditional accounting conservatism is explained by the discretionary 
(managed) component of loan loss provisions (DLLP) and the part explained by the non-
discretionary (unmanaged) part of loan loss provisions (NDLLP).  
Table 5.6 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings, loan loss provisions and 
non-discretionary and discretionary loan loss provisions 
 Basu measure
Dependent variable γ Sig.
E -0,124 0,000
LLP -0,020 0,068
NDLLP 0,120 0,002
DLLP -0,140 0,001
Notes:   
E =  Net income. 
LLP =  Loan loss provisions. 
NDLLP =  Non-discretionary loan loss provisions. 
DLLP =  Discretionary loan loss provisions. 
Table 6 shows that 16% (-0,020/-0,124) of the differential timeliness of earnings with 
respect to earnings is explained by the loan loss provisions component of earnings. The rest 
of the table shows averages of the differential timeliness estimates of the non-
discretionary (NDLLP) and discretionary parts of loan loss provisions (DLLP). Consistent 
with Pae (2007, p. 692), the sum of the differential timeliness of non-discretionary and 
discretionary loan loss provisions is the differential timeliness of loan loss provisions.  
 
The average differential timeliness of discretionary loan loss provisions is -0,140. This 
indicates that discretionary loan loss provisions reflect bad news less quickly than good 
news, which means that bad news is recognized in discretionary loan loss provisions on a 
timelier basis than good news. The average differential timeliness of non-discretionary 
loan loss provisions is 0,120, which means that bad news is recognized in non-discretionary 
loan loss provisions on a timelier basis than good news. This all indicates that the part of 
loan loss provisions managers have discretion over, is managed into a non-conservative 
direction. The part of loan loss provisions managers cannot use their discretion is 
conservative. Consequently, the second hypothesis should be accepted; earnings 
management does not contribute to conservatism but is decreases conservatism. 
 
Summarizing, when loan loss provisions are decomposed in a discretional and in a non-
discretional part, the discretional part is managed non-conservative and in the non-
discretionary part, conservatism is practiced. According to section 6.1.2 in 2007, the 
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average amount of loan loss provisions significantly increases. In the next section will be 
investigated what the influence of this increase is to the level of conservatism in the year 
2007. 
 
5.4 The year 2007 
As presented in table 7, γ the mean differential timeliness estimate of earnings (E) from 
the regression is 0.142, indicating that the timeliness of bad news for 2007 is higher than 
the timeliness of good news. This means that for 2007, in contrary to the average of period 
2000 to 2007, bad news is recognized in earnings on a timelier basis than good news. The 
conclusion for 2007 would be that US banks were conservative in that particular year. This 
is consistent with the expectations of section 7.1.2 which presented that the amount of 
loan loss provisions significantly increased in 2007 in order to correct for non-conservative 
accounting practice in the period before. 
Table 5.7 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings, loan loss provisions and 
non-discretionary and discretionary loan loss provisions 
 Basu measure
Dependent variable γ Sig.
E 0,142 0,502
LLP 0,073 0,505
NPLLP 0,033 0,828
DLLP 0,040 0,742
Notes:   
E =  Net income. 
LLP =  Loan loss provisions. 
NDLLP =  Non-discretionary loan loss provisions. 
DLLP =  Discretionary loan loss provisions. 
The rest of table 7 shows the earnings component loan loss provision decomposed into 
discretionary and non-discretionary part. 51,4% (0.073/0.142) of the differential timeliness 
of earnings is explained by the differential timeliness of loan loss provisions. For LLP, γ is 
now greater than zero that means that also loan loss provisions reflect bad news more 
quickly than good news in 2007. Consequently, for LLP the conclusion for 2007 would also 
be that US banks were conservative regarding their loan loss provisions.  
 
The average differential timeliness of discretionary loan loss provisions for 2007 is 0,040. 
This means that bad news is recognized in discretionary loan loss provisions on a timelier 
basis than good news. The average differential timeliness of non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions is now 0,033, consequently in 2007 bad news is recognized in non-discretionary 
loan loss provisions on a timelier basis than good news.  
 
The above results of 2007 indicates that the part of loan loss provisions managers have 
discretion over, is in 2007, in contrary with the period 2000 to 2007, managed into a 
conservative direction. The part of loan loss provisions managers cannot use their 
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discretion is conservative as well. Consequently, the conclusion would be that due to non-
conservative behaviour, which is practiced by using earnings management regarding loan 
loss provisions, US bank managers had to correct for that in 2007 where the average 
amount of loan loss provisions increased significantly. This resulted in a conservative year 
2007. These results and conclusions are consistent with the conclusions of McNichols (2000) 
and as explained in section 2. 
 
6. Conclusions, limitations and recommendation for further research 
6.1 Conclusions 
Conditional accounting conservatism is measured by the difference in timeliness of 
earnings between bad news and good news. The results of previously performed research 
indicates that the timeliness of bad news, represented as negative stock returns, is less 
than the timeliness of good news, represented in positive stock returns. The conclusion 
was that US banks were not conservative in the period of 2000 to 2007. In other words, 
there was no conditional accounting conservatism in the banking industry in the period 
2000 to 2007. 
 
Loan loss provisions are the earnings component that is expected to be managed. 
Therefore, in order to measure the association between the conditional conservatism and 
earnings management, loan loss provisions are disentangled and measured in relation with 
conditional accounting conservatism. The results show that loan loss provisions reflect bad 
news less quickly than good news. This means that US banks were not conservative in the 
period of 2000 to 2007 regarding their loan loss provisions.   
 
By decomposing loan loss provisions into discretionary and non-discretionary components 
(NDLLP), earnings management would be reflected in discretionary loan loss provisions 
(DLLP). The analysis on the differential timeliness parameters NDLLP and DLLP determined 
which part of conditional accounting conservatism is explained by the discretionary 
(managed) component of loan loss provisions and the part explained by the non-
discretionary (unmanaged) part of loan loss provisions.  
 
The average differential timeliness of discretionary loan loss provisions indicated that 
discretionary loan loss provisions reflect bad news less quickly than good news, which 
means that bad news is recognized in discretionary loan loss provisions on a timelier basis 
than good news. The average differential timeliness of non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions is indicated that bad news is recognized in non-discretionary loan loss provisions 
on a timelier basis than good news. Consequently, the conclusion is that the part of loan 
loss provisions managers have discretion over, is managed non-conservative direction and 
the part of loan loss provisions managers cannot use their discretion is conservative.  
 
This conclusion is strengthened by the findings in the development of loan loss provisions 
in the period 2000 to 2007. In 2007, the average loan loss provisions significantly increased 
which indicated that the reported loan loss provisions in previous years were too low and 
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that there was a need to correct for that in 2007. Another indication for earnings 
management is that in the period of 2000 to 2004, the average reported provisions where 
less than 100% of the average non-performing loans. This trend reversed in the period of 
2005 to 2007 where the average reported loan loss provisions where more than 100% of the 
non-performing loans, which is again an indication for a correction on the previous period. 
This reversion is an indication for earnings management as referred to in theory and 
empirical literature. 
 
Investigating the year 2007 separately, indicates that the part of loan loss provisions 
managers have discretion over, is in contrary with the period 2000 to 2007, managed into a 
conservative direction. The part of loan loss provisions managers cannot use their 
discretion is conservative as well. This means that due to non-conservative behaviour, 
which is practiced by using earnings management regarding loan loss provisions, US bank 
managers had to correct for that behaviour in 2007. This resulted in a conservative year 
2007.  
 
According to the previous findings, the main research question could be answered. The 
main research question was, according to the introduction: 
What is the association between conditional accounting conservatism and earnings 
management for the banking industry? 
When loan loss provisions are decomposed in a discretional and in a non-discretional part, 
the part of loan loss provisions managers have discretion over, is managed into a non-
conservative direction. The part of loan loss provisions managers cannot use their 
discretion is conservative. Consequently, the conclusion is that US bank managers use their 
discretion over loan loss provisions to manage earnings and influence conditional 
accounting conservatism into the managements’ desired direction. 
 
6.2 Limitations and recommendation for further research 
This research examines the relation between accounting conservatism and earnings 
management. Consistent with prior research, loan loss provisions are used to measure 
earnings management because of the relatively large discretionary approach that is due to 
estimations of bank managers. During the recent credit crisis, banks played an important 
role by valuating their assets at fair value. Afterwards, it can be concluded that this fair 
value approach might not have been sufficient to present a true and fair view of the 
financial situation of the particular banks. Consequently, a limitation of this research could 
be the use of loan loss provisions to measure earnings management regarding banks. As 
seen in the results of this research, earnings components other than loan loss provisions 
could influence conservatism as well. The development of the credit crunch can put its 
light on other methods of earnings management used by bank managers. An example could 
be the use and valuation of special purpose vehicles. Moreover, financial instruments, in 
particular the qualification of these instruments, could be a method of earnings 
management used by bank managers as well. Nevertheless, identifying earning 
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management regarding the credit crunch is still very difficult. Many institutions do not 
have a proper explanation for what have happened and how it could have happened.  
 
Therefore, further research can build on the possible limitation of using loan loss 
provisions as a measure of earnings management. New measures can be developed, maybe 
determined after the credit crunch is finished and it is clear what other methods bank 
managers used to manage earnings, causing the credit crisis. 
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Earnings Management in the Banking 
Industry 
 
The consequences of IFRS implementation on discretionary use of 
loan loss provisions 
 
Renick van Oosterbosch1 
 
Executive summary 
Prior research suggests that banks have an incentive to smooth income through loan loss 
provisions (LLPs), but there has been no research on the effects of IFRS implementation on 
this. Using a sample of European banks and a single-stage regression that models the non-
discretionary part of LLPs and tests for income smoothing I examine first whether the level 
of earnings management by banks through loan loss provisioning has decreased since the 
IFRS-adoption. And second, whether loan loss disclosure requirements are negatively 
related to banks’ income smoothing. Results show that the level of earnings management 
has indeed decreased since IFRS adoption. However, evidence suggests that detailed 
disclosure requirements regarding loan loss accounting do not deter bank managers from 
using LLPs to their discretion for income smoothing. 
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5611. 
 
1. Introduction 
Banks and other financial institutions are often excluded from earnings management 
research because their characteristics differ fundamentally from other firms (Peasnell, 
Pope and Young, 2000). There have been previous empirical studies investigating earnings 
management by banks though. These studies have focused on loan loss provisions (LLPs) as 
a tool for earnings management. LLPs are a relatively large accrual for banks and therefore 
have a significant impact on earnings. The purpose of these provisions is to adjust banks’ 
loan loss reserves to reflect expected future losses on their loan portfolios. Yet bank 
                                             
1 This paper is based on my master thesis, completed in 2009 as part of the master Accounting Auditing & 
Control at Erasmus University Rotterdam. Special thanks go out to Dr. Y. Wang for supervising my thesis, and 
co-reader Drs. C.D. Knoops for additional support. Currently I am working as an associate at 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Rotterdam Assurance. 
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managers also have incentives to use these loan loss provisions to manage earnings (Ahmed 
et al., 1999, p. 2). To date though there have not been any studies investigating the 
effects of IFRS adoption on the level of earnings management by banks using loan loss 
provisions. IFRS was introduced in the European Union in 2005 to improve transparency and 
comparability of financial statements, and for banks specifically, detailed disclosures on 
loan losses are required under IFRS. The main research questions of this paper are derived 
from this: 
‘What is the effect of the adoption of IFRS on the level of earnings management by 
banks?’ 
 
And: 
‘What is the effect of loan loss accounting disclosure requirements on the level of 
earnings management by banks?’ 
 
This research contributes to accounting literature in a number of ways. First of all, to my 
knowledge this study is the first of its kind that investigates the effects of the adoption of 
IFRS on earnings management by banks in specific. Secondly, I distinguish between publicly 
listed and unlisted privately owned banks. Incentives to engage in earnings management 
through loan loss provisioning can differ between listed and unlisted banks, and unlisted 
banks also face less regulatory pressure (Anandarajan et al., 2007). My research controls 
for these differences among banks, while most other researches include only listed banks. 
And finally, I have constructed a measure of disclosure requirements regarding loan loss 
accounting. This measure ranks the required disclosures regarding loan losses of the 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in the various countries contained in the 
sample, as well as IFRS and US GAAP. Such a measure did not exist before. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: incentives for banks to manage earnings, prior 
literature and consequences of IFRS for banks will be discussed in section 2. In section 3 I 
will present my research hypotheses and research design. The results of this study and an 
analysis of these results will be discussed in section 4, and finally a summary is included in 
section 5. 
 
 
2. Earnings management incentives, IFRS for banks and prior literature 
2.1 Earnings management incentives for banks 
To measure earnings management a number of approaches can be taken: 
 The first approach attempts to identify discretionary accruals based on the relation 
between total accruals and hypothesized explanatory factors. Models using this approach 
are referred to as total accrual models (for example the Healy model [1985] and Jones 
model [1991]). 
 The second approach to test for earnings management is to model a specific accrual. In 
empirical research using specific accrual models, the focus is often on a specific industry, 
where a single accrual or a set of accruals is sizeable and requires substantial judgment. 
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 The third approach is to observe the behaviour of accruals around a specific 
benchmark. This approach examines statistical properties of earnings to identify behaviour 
that influences earnings. 
Considering the nature of the research, the specific accrual approach is most suitable for 
my research. This is because I am focusing on a single industry characterized by industry-
specific accruals. Banks and other financial institutions are often excluded from samples in 
earnings management research, since their financial reporting environments differ from 
those of industrial firms. They have fundamentally different accrual processes that are not 
likely to be captured well by total accrual models (Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2000, p. 
318). 
 
In accounting literature, the focus of empirical studies on earnings management by banks 
is on loan loss provisions (LLPs). Loan loss provisions (LLPs) are a relatively large accrual 
for commercial banks and therefore have a significant impact on earnings and regulatory 
capital of banks. The purpose of these provisions is to adjust banks’ loan loss reserves to 
reflect expected future losses on their loan portfolios. 
 
However, bank managers also have incentives to use these loan loss provisions to manage 
earnings and regulatory capital as well as to communicate or ‘signal’ private information 
about future prospects (Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas, 1999, p. 2). In this paper I focus on 
loan loss provisions as a tool for managing earnings, and not as a tool for capital 
management or signaling future-oriented information. 
 
In general, reduced volatility is assumed to represent lower risk. Because less volatile 
earnings are a fundamental predicate for stable stock prices, managers are given an 
incentive to use LLPs for earnings management (Anandarajan, Hasan and McCarthy, 2007, 
p. 362). This gives rise to the assumption that the discretionary part of LLPs is used by 
bank management as the main instrument for earnings management in the form of income 
smoothing. Low levels of non-discretionary current earnings are expected to be an 
incentive for managers to decrease the (discretionary part of the) loan loss provision, in 
order to artificially increase earnings, while high levels of non-discretionary current 
earnings are expected to encourage managers to increase the loan loss provision, in order 
to smooth these higher earnings (Collins, Shackelford and Wahlen, 1995, p. 268). 
 
Also, since the Basel Accord (Basel I), implemented in Europe in 1992, which harmonized 
minimum capital adequacy regulations and changed the structure of the capital adequacy 
ratio, loan loss reserves are no longer part of the numerator of the capital adequacy ratio 
which banks have to maintain (Anandarajan, Hasan and Lozano-Vivas, 2005, p. 56). This 
eliminated the costs for banks associated with managing earnings through loan loss 
provisions2. This leads to the assumption that under the Basel Accord, banks are more 
aggressive in managing earnings through the loan loss provision.  
 
                                             
2 Before, decreasing the loan loss provision to inflate earnings resulted in lower loan loss reserves, which in 
turn had a negative effect on the required capital adequacy ratio, resulting in costs. 
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From the above it can be concluded that bank management has the incentive to manage 
earnings through discretionary use of loan loss provisioning. Lobo and Zhou (2001, pp. 18-
19) conclude in their research that firms with higher quality of disclosure3 tend to engage 
less in earnings management than firms with lower disclosure quality. This leads to the 
assumption that disclosure quality related to LLPs (more published information on LLPs) is 
negatively related to earnings management by banks. In other words, the higher the 
disclosure quality of LLPs, the less bank management will manipulate earnings. 
 
2.2  Prior literature 
There has been quite some research on earnings management by banks using the loan loss 
provision. In early studies by Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) and Ma (1988) it was concluded 
that banks used LLPs as long-term mechanisms to smooth earnings. In these studies total 
LLPs were used as the dependent variable. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) focused on the 
behaviour of LLPs as a function of banks’ income and other measures of business conditions 
that are likely to affect the quality of loan portfolios. Ma (1988) showed that LLPs are 
actually not strongly related to the actual quality of loan portfolios, but that management 
tends to raise LLPs in periods of high operating income and vice versa. 
 
Studies that followed divided LLPs into non-discretionary and discretionary components, 
and focus on the discretionary components as an instrument for earnings management. 
These studies do, however, not agree on the question to what extent the loan loss 
provision is used for earnings management. 
 
Collins, Shackelford and Wahlen (1995) find that banks do use LLPs as a tool for earnings 
management. They follow a bank-by-bank approach and found that approximately two-
thirds of the banks in their sample of U.S. banks used LLPs for income smoothing purposes. 
Hasan and Hunter (1999) examine the efficiency of LLP decisions of bank managers and 
explore the relationship between efficient LLP decision-making and any relevant factors 
that could explain any inefficiency. For their sample of Spanish banks, they find that there 
is considerable inefficiency in loan loss decision-making. Bhat (1996) also concludes that, 
for his sample of US banks, there is a strong relationship between LLPs and earnings. He 
finds that banks characterized by low growth, low book-to-asset ratios, high loans-to-
deposit ratios, high debt-to-asset ratios, low return on assets, high loan loss provisions-to-
gross loans ratios and low assets are likely to smooth earnings. Also, his analysis indicates 
that the stock market perceives the income smoothing behaviour of banks. 
 
There are also studies that find evidence that banks do not use LLPs as an earnings 
management/income smoothing tool. These studies are Wetmore and Brick (1994), Beatty, 
Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) and Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999). Wetmore and 
Brick (1994) find that bank managers, when determining LLPs, consider past loan risk, loan 
                                             
3 In this study a firm’s disclosure score is based on a weighted average of analysts’ assessments of 1) annual 
published information, 2) quarterly and other published information and 3) investor relations and related 
aspects. 
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quality deterioration, foreign risk and economic circumstances, and they do not consider 
off-balance sheet exposure or changes in loan composition. Yet they note that the absence 
of income smoothing may be due to the circumstances in their sample period, namely the 
LDC (less-developed-country) debt crisis (as loan loss provisions were high for this period 
due to this crisis). Beatty et al. (1995) find only a small statistic relation between earnings 
and LLPs, providing virtually no evidence that loan loss provisions are used to manage 
earnings (Beatty et al., 2009, p. 254). Ahmed et al. (1999) find that earnings management 
is not an important driver of loan loss provisions, but that loan loss provisions reflect 
meaningful changes in the expected quality of banks’ loan portfolios. 
 
Wall and Koch (2000) state that these differences in findings between studies are due to 
different sample selections and the use of different time periods being examined. They 
conclude though that the available evidence clearly suggests that banks have an incentive 
to use loan loss accounting to help manage reported earnings (Wall and Koch, 2000, p. 12). 
Anandarajan et al. (2005, p. 58) note that some of the studies mentioned here, besides 
checking for earnings management using just LLPs, also examined whether banks used 
other components of financial statements together with LLPs. Examples of these are 
Beatty et al. (1995) and Collins et al. (1995), which also studied whether strategic timing 
of realized gains and losses were used as tools for earnings management. Overall, 
Anandarajan et al. (2005) conclude that the results of the different studies on earnings 
management through manipulation of LLPs are conflicting. 
 
More recent research by Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2006) concludes though that 
discretionary loan loss provisions are related to earnings management. They find that, for 
their sample of U.S. bank holding companies, first, discretionary LLPs are positively 
related to a bank’s unmanaged cash flow returns, capital ratios, and asset size. Second, 
they are negatively related to a bank’s non-discretionary LLPs and market-to-book ratios. 
And third, the use of discretionary LLPs to manage earnings is significantly related to the 
fraction of shares owned by the bank’s CEO, the fraction of shares owned by all directors, 
the existence of CEO/chair duality and the CEO’s pay-for-performance sensitivity (Cornett 
et al., 2006, pp. 20-22). This is consistent with management using discretionary LLPs to 
manage earnings. 
 
Based on these studies I conclude that there is strong evidence that LLPs do function as a 
tool for earnings management by banks, because more (and more recent) studies seem to 
find evidence consistent with this. Also, the incentives for bank managers to smooth 
income though LLPs are clearly present. 
 
2.3  IFRS for banks 
For banks, the adoption of IFRS has introduced some new standards which are especially 
important to banks: IAS 30, IAS 32 and IAS 39 (and currently IFRS 7). This gives rise to the 
question how the introduction of IFRS in banks’ financial statements affects earnings 
management through loan loss provisioning. 
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According to IAS 30.43, banks are required to provide detailed information about loan 
losses.4 This information includes the manner of which the provisions and losses on 
uncollectible loans are determined, mutations in the course of a provision during the 
period covered by the financial statement (additions, write-offs of uncollectible loans and 
the collections on write-offs) and the aggregate amount of the provision at balance date 
(Moison, 2007, pp. 1333-1334). In other words, very specific information on loan losses is 
required under IFRS, also with regard to individual classes of loans instead of aggregate 
amounts. 
 
Based on this, loan loss provisions would be a less effective tool for earnings management 
by a bank’s management, according to Pérez, Salas and Saurina (2006), for the Spanish 
situation. They tested for earnings management at banks in Spain, which has a very 
detailed set of rules governing LLPs, and found that despite this, management has used 
LLPs for earnings management. They conclude that the adoption of IFRS is a step forward 
in the direction of a more principle-based approach, which might be the only option left 
for accounting standard setters to counter management using LLPs to their discretion. 
Detailed disclosure might be useful to achieve this (Pérez, Salas and Saurina, 2006, p. 25). 
 
To date there has not been any empirical research on this, so this remains to be seen. In 
general it can nonetheless be expected that increased disclosure requirements under IFRS 
will lead to a decrease in earnings management. There have been empirical studies 
investigating the association between disclosures and earnings management. Lobo and 
Zhou (2001) have examined the relationship between disclosure quality for a sample of 
U.S. companies and found a significant negative relationship between corporate disclosure 
and earnings management, indicating that firms that disclose more tend to engage less in 
earnings management and vice versa. They find that flexibility offered by minimum 
disclosure requirements is used by management to exercise discretion over earnings. 
Lapointe, Cormier, Magnan and Gay-Angers (2005) test this relationship for a sample of 
Swiss firms (using a self-constructed measure of quality), and show that firms applying 
Swiss GAAP FER use provisions and depreciation to smooth earnings, but that this relation 
is reduced for firms with high disclosure quality. Moreover, they show that Swiss firms 
applying IFRS or US GAAP (with more extensive disclosure requirements) exhibit less 
smoothing than firms applying Swiss GAAP FER. 
 
Based on these researches, I expect to find that increased disclosures regarding LLPs under 
IFRS have lead to less earnings management by banks, because of an inverse relationship 
between disclosure quality and earnings management. 
 
                                             
4 Under IFRS 7, similar disclosures are required. 
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3. Hypotheses and research design 
3.1 Hypotheses development 
The purpose of loan loss provisions is to adjust banks’ loan loss reserves to reflect 
expected future losses on their loan portfolios. These provisions can have significant 
effects on the reported earnings, as they are a large accrual for banks. Additionally, 
reduced volatility in earnings is in general assumed to represent lower risk. Therefore, 
bank managers have an incentive to smooth earnings through the discretionary part of 
LLPs, because less volatility in earnings is a fundamental foundation for stable stock prices 
(Anandarajan et al., 2007). Low levels of current earnings provide an incentive for 
managers to decrease loan loss provisions, in order to artificially increase earnings, while 
high levels of current earnings are expected to encourage managers to increase loan loss 
provisions (Collins et al., 1995). The goal of this practice is to smooth earnings, as reducing 
earnings variability means reducing perceived risk, because variability in earnings is a key 
indicator of risk. Bank management will want to show earnings that are in line with 
expectations (smooth) because of this (Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Mathieu, 2004), as 
shareholders will require a higher risk premium for increased perceived risk due to 
earnings variability. 
 
First, I will test for earnings management using LLPs for the pre-IFRS period for my sample. 
Based on the above arguments, I expect to find existence of earnings management through 
income smoothing, illustrated by a positive relationship between LLPs and earnings before 
taxes and LLPs (higher earnings would equal higher LLPs and vice versa). My first 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: Pre-IFRS, banks use loan loss provisions to manage earnings. 
 
IFRS requires detailed disclosures on loan losses, leading to the expectation that, contrary 
to the general evidence on the effect of IFRS on earnings management, for the case of the 
banking industry, IFRS will reduce earnings management. As explained, higher earnings 
variability means higher perceived risk and required risk premiums, which provides an 
incentive for bank managers to smooth income through LLPs. When more information on 
loan loss accounting is available, it is expected that the incentives for discretionary use of 
LLPs for income smoothing will be reduced or eliminated. Share- and stakeholders would 
be able to detect earnings management more easily, so management is less likely to 
engage in earnings management (Lobo and Zhou, 2001). On this expectation I base my 
second hypothesis: 
 
H2a: IFRS adoption in 2005 leads to a decrease in earnings management by banks using 
loan loss provisions. 
 
Consistent with hypothesis 2a, I expect that banks that either did not adopt IFRS per 2005, 
or have adopted IFRS before this transition date (early adopters), will not show a change in 
earnings management using LLPs during this period. Hypothesis 2b is based on this: 
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H2b: Banks that did not adopt IFRS in 2005 do not exhibit a significant change in earnings 
management using loan loss provisions since then. 
 
As stated above, the expectation of a decrease in earnings management using LLPs by 
banks is based on increased disclosures under IFRS. Founded on the expectation that share- 
and stakeholders of a bank would be able to detect earnings management more easily 
when more information on loan losses is disclosed, it can be anticipated that when 
disclosure requirements increase (which was the case resulting from IFRS adoption for 
banks in various countries) earnings management through income smoothing will decrease. 
 
Based on this, I expect to find a negative relationship between disclosure requirements 
regarding loan loss accounting and earnings management by banks. My third hypothesis is 
derived from this expectation: 
 
H3:  LLP disclosure requirements are negatively related to earnings management by banks 
using loan loss provisions. 
 
3.2 Sample selection 
In my sample I include banks from European countries where IFRS was adopted starting 
2005, in accordance with EU IAS regulation, so a difference in accounting standards can be 
observed for these banks during the transition period (a shift from local GAAP to IFRS). As 
a second condition, I select banks from countries that adhere to the Basel Accord (refer to 
section 2.1: I expect a higher level of earnings management for banks in Basel countries). 
 
These selection criteria result in a selection of banks from the following countries: 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. Switzerland also adheres to the Basel capital accord, therefore Swiss 
banks are included in the control sample, except when they show a change in accounting 
standards (from either Swiss GAAP FER or US GAAP to IFRS) between 2004 and 2005. 
 
Data is acquired from the Bankscope (Bureau van Dijk) database. The original sample for 
these ten countries consisted of 10.237 banks, but after selecting the relevant data for the 
research model, the final selection includes 914 banks. Of these 914 banks, 850 are 
unlisted banks and 64 are listed. Together, the total sample of 914 banks accounts for a 
total of 1382 firm-year observations. 
 
The total number of firm-year observations is distributed among two samples. The first is a 
sample of banks that have switched from their respective local GAAPs to IFRS so a change 
in accounting standards can be observed in 2005. Consistent with hypothesis 2a, I expect 
to observe a decrease in earnings management from 2005 and on for this sample. The 
second sample consists of banks where no change in accounting standards in 2005 can be 
observed. These banks are either early adopters of IFRS, or have not switched to IFRS in 
2005 because they were not required to do so under EU Resolution no. 1606/2002. This is 
either because they do not prepare consolidated financial statements, or are not publicly 
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listed. If they are privately owned, they did not switch to IFRS voluntarily in 2005. This 
sample of banks will be used as a control sample, as I expect no significant change in 
earnings management from 2005 and on for these banks, consistent with hypothesis 2b.  
 
3.3 Research design 
To test for earnings management, usually accruals are disentangled into accruals over 
which management has discretion (which can be used to manage earnings) and accruals 
over which management does not have discretion. Therefore often a two-stage analysis is 
chosen when researching earnings management through the use of LLPs, which separates 
the discretionary part of the accrual from the non-discretionary part in the first stage. In 
the first stage the non-discretionary part of LLPs is modelled and the residual from this 
stage, which represents the discretionary part, is used in the second stage as the 
dependent variable. However, this approach has a big disadvantage, namely that it 
systematically underestimates the absolute value of the regression coefficients in the 
second stage (Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Yang, 2005, pp. 13-14). To counter this, I will 
conduct my research using a single-stage regression analysis, following Kanagaretnam et 
al. (2005). In this model, there are three proxies for the non-discretionary component of 
LLPs: first, loan charge offs during the year. Second, the loan loss allowance or reserve at 
the beginning of the year. And third, the change in non-performing loans during the year. 
 
The empirical model is shown in the following equation: 
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Where: 
tLLP    = Loan loss provision for year t; 
tLCO    = Net loan charge-offs for year t; 
1−tLLA   = Loan loss allowance or reserve at the end of year t-1; 
tNPLΔ   = Change in non-performing loans during year t, measured by  
the non-performing loans for year t minus the non-performing loans for year t-1; 
tEBTP   = Earnings before tax and loan loss provisions for year t; 
tLISTED   = Dummy which denotes 1 for listed banks and 0 otherwise; 
tt LISTEDEBTP *  = Interaction of tEBTP  with type of bank. 
All variables (except tLISTED ) are deflated by year t beginning total assets. The expected 
signs of the coefficients are indicated above the equation. 
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If banks use loan loss provisions for earnings management (to smooth income), as I expect, 
the coefficient 4β  for the variable tEBTP  will be positive and significant, illustrating a 
positive relation between earnings and loan loss provisions. 
 
The model also controls for differences between publicly and privately owned banks. The 
dummy variable tLISTED  is introduced for this purpose. This control variable reads 1 for 
publicly listed banks and 0 for unlisted banks. Owners provide incentives to management 
to generate these returns (based on average performance over a short amount of time) 
through bonuses. This type of performance measure is more common for listed banks than 
for unlisted banks (Anandarajan et al., 2007, pp. 363-364). Managers of privately owned 
banks have can have different goals than managers of publicly owned banks, due to the 
fact that they face less regulatory supervision and pressure to produce smooth earnings. 
The above implies that listed banks on the other hand have greater incentives to engage in 
income smoothing. To reflect this prospect, the coefficients 5β  and 6β  are expected to 
be positive. 
 
To test hypothesis 1 I will run this model for the main sample of banks for the pre-IFRS 
period (years 1995 to 2004). As mentioned, I anticipate that banks will have used LLPs to 
manage earnings before IFRS so 4β  is expected to be positive. 
 
After this, the model is amended to include interaction terms between the earnings 
management proxy tEBTP  and a dummy variable measuring IFRS-compliance ( tIFRS ; 
which denotes 1 for observations post IFRS-adoption and 0 for observations pre IFRS-
adoption): tt IFRSEBTP * . 
 
I will test hypothesis 2a by running the model for the main sample for the years 1995-2008, 
so including both pre- and post-IFRS time periods. When earnings management has in fact 
declined after IFRS adoption, according to expectations, the coefficient on the interaction 
term between earnings before taxes and LLPs and IFRS should be negative, while the 
coefficient on tEBTP  should be positive. This would indicate less earnings management 
using LLPs by banks post-IFRS compared to pre-IFRS. 
 
Also, to test hypothesis 2b, the model will be ran for the years 1995-2008 (pre- and post-
IFRS periods) for the control sample. Comparison of the coefficients on earnings before 
taxes and LLPs and the interaction term of tEBTP  with IFRS should, according to 
expectations, not result in a significant difference in earnings management levels between 
the two periods. 
 
Finally, the model from equation (1) is amended to include interaction terms between the 
earnings management proxy tEBTP  and a self constructed disclosure score, measuring 
GAAP disclosure scores regarding loan loss provision accounting, tDSCORE : A dummy 
variable which denotes 1 for observations from high LLP-disclosure GAAPs for year t, 2 for 
observations from mid LLP-disclosure GAAPs, and 3 for observations from low LLP-
disclosure GAAPs. 
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To test hypothesis 3, the model from equation (3) will be ran for the total sample (so 
including banks from both the control as the main sample) for all years (1995 to 2008). 
According to hypothesis 3, higher LLP disclosure requirements are expected to be related 
with lower earnings management through LLPs. Therefore the interaction term between 
the variable  tEBTP  and tDSCORE  is included. For lower disclosure GAAP-bank 
observations a higher level of earnings management is expected than for mid- and high-
level disclosure GAAPs. Therefore, the coefficient on this interaction term is expected to 
be higher/more positive than 4β  (the earnings management coefficient for the total 
sample), as a stronger relationship between LLPs and earnings before taxes and LLPs is 
predicted for banks reporting under lower disclosure GAAP (which have a higher disclosure 
score). The used classification of different GAAPs is given in table 1 included on the next 
page. 
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Table 1 
GAAP Classification 
  
Panel A: DSCORE = 1 
GAAP / Country code Elaboration 
IFRS According to IAS 30 (IFRS 7), detailed information about loan losses is required, 
including the manner of which the provisions and losses on uncollectible loans are 
determined, mutations in the course of a provision during the period covered by the 
financial statement (additions, write-offs of uncollectible loans and the collections on 
write-offs, also on an individual loan class level) and the aggregate amount of the 
provision at balance date. 
US GAAP Similar to IFRS according to SFAS 5 and 114, but under SEC Industry Guide also 
detailed formats for analyses required to be disclosed in the annual statements are 
provided. 
France (FR) Similar to IFRS under ‘Règlement n° 02-03’ of the  CRC. 
Italy (IT) Similar to IFRS. Under Circular 263, detailed requirements are issued for loan loss 
provisioning and detailed disclosures are required in the annual statements. 
Sweden (SE) Similar to IFRS. Under old impairment rules (before 2002), no detailed information 
was required. Due to lack of data for this period the focus is only on 2002 and on, as 
the Swedish FSA introduced new requirements based on IAS. 
United Kingdom (GB) Similar to IFRS, requiring separate disclosure of specific and general provisions and 
movements during the period (including write-offs and recoveries) under the BBA 
SORP and Companies Act 1985. 
  
Panel B: DSCORE = 2 
GAAP / Country code Elaboration 
Netherlands (NL) Under RJ 600, details on LLPs and additions or write-offs during the year have to be 
disclosed, but this only curtails aggregate amounts rather than individual loan class 
amounts. 
Spain (SP) Under Circulars 4/1991 and 4/2004, similar to the Italian situation, requirements for 
setting aside LLPs are complex and detailed. Disclosure requirements are less detailed 
than IFRS. 
Switzerland (CH) Aggregate LLP amounts and movements during the year have to be disclosed under 
Circular 08/02. Individual amounts only have to be disclosed if material. 
  
Panel C: DSCORE= 3 
GAAP / Country code Elaboration 
Belgium (BE) Under the ‘Koninklijk besluit op de jaarrekening van kredietinstellingen’ no specific 
disclosures on LLPs are required (other than aggregate amounts). 
Germany (DE) No specific LLP disclosure requirements. Just credit risk disclosures are required 
under GAS 5-10. 
Luxembourg (LU) Similar to Belgian GAAP, under the law of june 17, 1992 and Circulaire 01/32 CSSF. 
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4. Results and analysis 
4.1 Evidence on pre-IFRS earnings management using LLPs 
First, I test whether pre-IFRS, banks used LLPs to manage earnings (hypothesis 1). The 
results are presented in table 2 below. 
 
Table 2 
Coefficients – Main sample pre-IFRS 
  B Std. Error t-statistic Sig. 
(Constant) 0,000   0,001 -0,096 0,924
LCOt 0,743 *** 0,044 17,059 0,000
LLAt-1 0,010   0,012 0,874 0,383
CHNPLt 0,192 *** 0,037 5,165 0,000
EBTPt 0,079 *** 0,023 3,518 0,001
LISTEDt -0,001   0,007 -0,081 0,935
EBTPt*LISTEDt -0,104   1,513 -0,069 0,945
Adjusted R-squared = 0,781       
***  = Coefficient is significant at a 1% level   
**  = Coefficient is significant at a 5% level   
*  = Coefficient is significant at a 10% level     
 
The coefficient on tEBTP  is positive and significant, which indicates income smoothing by 
banks using LLPs during the pre-IFRS period. Hypothesis 1 is therefore supported. The 
coefficient on tt LISTEDEBTP *  is not in line with expectations (this was thought to be 
more positive than tEBTP ), as it was anticipated that listed banks exhibit more earnings 
management. However, this coefficient is not at all significant. This is due to the very 
limited number of observations for listed banks in the sample. 
 
4.2 Evidence on pre- and post-IFRS differences in earnings management using LLPs 
Second, I test for differences between earnings management using LLPs pre and post IFRS-
adoption. The results regarding hypothesis 2a (main sample) are presented in table 3 
below. This sample contains banks which have switched from local GAAP to IFRS in 2005, 
so for which a decrease in earnings management is expected after IFRS adoption. 
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Table 3 
Coefficients – Main sample pre/post-IFRS 
  B Std. Error t-statistic Sig. 
(Constant) -0,002 *** 0,001 -3,893 0,000
LCOt 0,131 *** 0,020 6,427 0,000
LLAt-1 0,088 *** 0,009 10,352 0,000
CHNPLt 0,092 *** 0,012 7,481 0,000
EBTPt 0,286 *** 0,019 15,322 0,000
LISTEDt 0,002   0,007 0,299 0,765
IFRSt 0,003 *** 0,001 4,805 0,000
EBTPt*LISTEDt -0,360   1,572 -0,229 0,819
EBTPt*IFRSt -0,169 *** 0,023 -7,505 0,000
IFRSt*LISTEDt -0,008   0,007 -1,101 0,271
EBTPt*IFRSt*LISTEDt 0,792   1,572 0,504 0,615
Adjusted R-squared = 0,519       
***  = Coefficient is significant at a 1% level   
**  = Coefficient is significant at a 5% level   
*  = Coefficient is significant at a 10% level     
 
The coefficient on tEBTP  is positive and significant, indicating the presence of income 
smoothing for the total main sample, but the coefficient on tt IFRSEBTP *  is negative and 
also significant. This indicates a decrease in earnings management after IFRS adoption, in 
line with expectations. Hypothesis 2a is therefore supported. 
 
The coefficient on tt LISTEDEBTP *  is not in line with expectations as it is negative, 
which would mean a lower level of earnings management for listed banks, but this result is 
not significant. The coefficient on ttt LISTEDIFRSEBTP **  is in accordance with 
expectations, as it is higher than the coefficient on tt IFRSEBTP * , but again not 
significant. 
 
The results regarding hypothesis 2b (control sample) are presented in table 4 on the next 
page. This sample contains banks which have not switched from local GAAP to IFRS in 2005 
(either early or non-adopters of IFRS), so for which a no change in earnings management is 
expected. 
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Table 4 
Coefficients – Control sample pre/post-IFRS 
  B  Std. Error t-statistic Sig. 
(Constant) -0,002   0,005 -0,404 0,688
LCOt 0,244 * 0,137 1,785 0,082
LLAt-1 0,061   0,042 1,445 0,156
CHNPLt 0,332 *** 0,075 4,408 0,000
EBTPt 0,602   1,138 0,529 0,599
LISTED 0,003   0,005 0,612 0,544
IFRS 0,002   0,005 0,447 0,657
EBTPt*LISTEDt -0,691   1,203 -0,574 0,569
EBTPt*IFRSt -0,556   1,139 -0,489 0,628
Adjusted R-squared = 0,325     
***  = Coefficient is significant at a 1% level   
**  = Coefficient is significant at a 5% level   
*  = Coefficient is significant at a 10% level     
 
The coefficient on tEBTP  is positive and significant, indicating the presence of income 
smoothing for the total control sample, but the coefficient on tt IFRSEBTP *  is negative. 
This indicates a decrease in earnings management after IFRS adoption, decrease in 
earnings management between the pre- and post-IFRS period (these results are not 
significant though). Hypothesis 2b would be rejected, but it has to be noted that the 
control sample for the pre-IFRS period only contains early adopters and for the post-IFRS 
period only non-adopters. A decrease in earnings management would then not be in line 
with expectations, as an increase would be expected. 
 
The coefficient on tt LISTEDEBTP *  is not in line with expectations as it is negative, 
which would mean a lower level of earnings management for listed banks, but this result is 
also not significant. 
 
Overall, the results on the tests of hypothesis 2b are almost all insignificant and no real 
conclusion can be drawn, also because of the different nature of the sample pre- and post-
IFRS adoption. No data for the post-IFRS period was available for the early adopters which 
are in the control sample, and vice versa, no data for the pre-IFRS period was available for 
the non-adopters in the control sample. This means that for the control sample, it is not 
really possible to draw a conclusion regarding the difference in earnings management pre- 
and post-IFRS. 
 
4.3 Evidence on the relation between loan loss disclosure requirements and earnings 
management using LLPs 
Finally, I test the relation between earnings management using LLPs and loan loss 
disclosure requirements, for both the main sample and control sample and both pre- and 
post-IFRS periods (hypothesis 3). The results are presented in table 5 on the next page. 
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Table 5 
Coefficients – Total sample pre/post-IFRS 
 B Std. Error t-statistic Sig. 
(Constant) 0,000  0,002 0,105 0,917
LCOt 0,175 *** 0,018 9,546 0,000
LLAt-1 0,085 *** 0,009 9,954 0,000
CHNPLt 0,101 *** 0,012 8,233 0,000
EBTPt 0,324 *** 0,123 2,625 0,009
DSCOREt 0,000  0,002 -0,087 0,931
EBTPt*DSCOREt -0,156  0,122 -1,277 0,202
DSCOREt*LISTEDt -0,005 *** 0,001 -9,052 0,000
EBTPt*DSCOREt*LISTEDt 0,375 *** 0,023 16,617 0,000
Adjusted R-squared = 0,496   
***  = Coefficient is significant at a 1% level   
**  = Coefficient is significant at a 5% level   
*  = Coefficient is significant at a 10% level     
 
The coefficient on tEBTP  is positive and significant, indicating the presence of income 
smoothing for the total sample. The coefficient on tt DSCOREEBTP *  is negative. The 
disclosure score is measured as 1 for banks in high disclosure GAAPs, 2 for mid and 3 for 
low disclosure GAAPs. Since more earnings management is expected for banks in higher 
ranked disclosure GAAPs, the coefficient on tt DSCOREEBTP *  was anticipated to be 
higher than the coefficient on tEBTP , which is not the case. This would mean that higher 
disclosure requirements do not deter banks for managing earnings through LLPs. Hypothesis 
3 would then be rejected, as there is no support for a negative relationship between 
disclosure requirements and earnings management using LLPs. This result is not significant. 
The coefficient on ttt LISTEDDSCOREEBTP **  is in line with expectations though, as it is 
higher than the coefficient on tt DSCOREEBTP * , and also significant, indicating higher 
levels of earnings management for listed banks. 
 
4.4 Analysis and conclusions 
First of all, I found evidence that, as hypothesized, before the adoption of IFRS in 2005, 
banks from the Basel-countries within the European Union used loan loss provisions to 
smooth their earnings. Bank managers have an incentive to smooth income through loan 
loss provisions because less volatility in earnings is assumed to represent lower risk and 
therefore is a fundamental foundation for stable stock prices. I also distinguished between 
publicly listed and unlisted privately owned banks, as the incentive for earnings 
management is stronger for listed banks than for unlisted banks. Results show that prior to 
IFRS, listed banks did not exhibit higher levels of earnings management, contrary to 
expectations. However, this result was not significant. 
 
The introduction of IFRS in 2005 meant that banks have to provide detailed disclosures on 
loan losses in their annual statements. I hypothesized that when more information on loan 
losses is available, it can be expected that that the incentives for discretionary use of loan 
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loss provisions for income smoothing by bank managers will be reduced. Evidence shows 
that, according to expectations, the adoption of IFRS indeed lead to a decrease in the 
level of earnings management for my sample of banks. Moreover, the results also showed 
that listed banks exhibited higher levels of earnings management after the IFRS-adoption. 
This result was not significant. 
 
It was hypothesized that the control sample containing voluntary adopters and non-
adopters of IFRS would not show a significant change in the level of earnings management 
before and after the introduction of IFRS in 2005. However, the results also showed a 
decrease in earnings management between these two periods, contrary to expectations, 
but this result was insignificant. 
 
The first main research question of this paper is: 
‘What is the effect of the adoption of IFRS on the level of earnings management by 
banks?’ 
Based on the evidence I have discussed, it can be concluded that the effect of the 
adoption of IFRS in 2005 was a decrease in the level of earnings management by banks 
using loan loss provisions. 
 
To explore the relation between disclosure requirements and earnings management using 
loan loss provisions further, I constructed a measure of disclosure requirements regarding 
loan loss accounting. This measure ranks the required disclosures regarding loan losses of 
the generally accepted accounting principles in the various countries contained in the 
sample, along with IFRS and US GAAP. As discussed earlier, it was hypothesized that higher 
disclosure requirements would lead to lower levels of earnings management. The evidence 
on this did not indicate that there was such a negative relationship between loan loss 
disclosure requirements and earnings management through loan loss provisioning. This 
result was insignificant. Subsequently, results significantly showed that that listed banks 
exhibit higher levels of earnings management using loan loss provisions than unlisted 
banks, in line with expectations. 
 
The second main research question of this paper is: 
‘What is the effect of loan loss accounting disclosure requirements on the level of 
earnings management by banks?’ 
Based on the results I have discussed, it cannot be concluded that higher disclosure 
requirements regarding loan loss accounting lead to lower levels of earnings management 
by banks using loan loss provisions. Evidence suggested that higher disclosure requirements 
on loan losses do not deter bank managers from using loan loss provisions to their 
discretion for income smoothing purposes. This result is not significant. 
 
Finally, there are some limitations to this study that have to be mentioned. This study 
focuses only on loan loss provisions as an income smoothing instrument. Other forms of 
earnings management and other instruments besides loan loss provisions that might be 
used by banks to manage earnings are not taken into account. Also, the pre- and post-IFRS 
time periods included are not equal, and the post-IFRS period covers much more 
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observations as a lot of data was missing in the Bankscope database especially for the pre-
IFRS period. Additionally, most of the observations were ranked with a high disclosure 
score when testing the third hypothesis. A more reliable and significant conclusion might 
have been obtained if the sample had contained more banks ranked with a mid or low 
disclosure score. And finally, this study considers only required loan loss disclosures under 
various accounting standards. Therefore, possible voluntary loan loss disclosures by banks 
and consequently the actual disclosures (as opposed to the required disclosures) are not 
taken into consideration. 
 
Further research could focus on these limitations and besides this, Basel II and the credit 
crunch also provide interesting subjects for further studies. The new Basel capital 
framework requires additional disclosure requirements, also on loan loss accounting, and is 
currently in the implementation process. Future research focusing on the credit crunch 
might conclude that due to bad loan problems and losses on investments the incentive for 
bank managers to smooth income may fade away. Furthermore, during any crisis, the 
perceived risk by share- and stakeholders will be higher by definition, and stock prices will 
be less stable, again reducing incentives to practice earnings management. 
 
 
5. Summary 
In literature, earnings management by banks is studied using specific large accruals for 
banks, namely loan loss provisions (LLPs). The purpose of these provisions is to adjust 
banks’ loan loss reserves to reflect expected future losses on their loan portfolios. Bank 
managers have an incentive to smooth earnings through the discretionary part of LLPs, 
because less volatility in earnings is a fundamental foundation for stable stock prices 
(Anandarajan et al., 2007). Most and more recent studies have found evidence for this. 
 
The goal of the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the 
European Union since 2005 was to improve transparency and comparability of financial 
statements. The adoption of IFRS has introduced some new standards which are especially 
important to banks: IAS 30, IAS 32 and IAS 39 (and currently IFRS 7). The effect of these 
standards on loan loss accounting by banks is that banks are required to provide detailed 
information regarding loan losses in their annual reports. This leads to the expectation 
that, contrary to the general evidence on the effect of IFRS on earnings management, for 
the case of the banking industry IFRS will reduce earnings management. However, there 
has not been any empirical research supporting this. This study is the first of its kind in 
that sense. 
 
To investigate the effects of the IFRS adoption on income smoothing practices through loan 
loss provisioning, I select a sample of banks from the Basel countries in the European Union 
(Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom). Data is used from years 1995 to 2004 for the pre-
IFRS period and 2005 to 2008 for the post-IFRS period. The sample contains both listed and 
unlisted banks. 
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It is first of all hypothesized that prior to IFRS-adoption, banks in the sample used loan loss 
provisions for earnings management. Second, it is predicted that due to detailed loan loss 
accounting disclosure requirements under IFRS, earnings management using loan loss 
provisions will decrease for the main sample, as previous studies have shown that 
disclosures and earnings management are negatively related. Subsequently, for the control 
sample of non- and early-adopters of IFRS it is anticipated that there will be no significant 
change in the level of earnings management. And finally, is hypothesized that loan loss 
disclosure requirements in the various countries included in the sample are negatively 
related to the level of earnings management exhibited by banks. To test this I construct a 
measure of disclosure requirements regarding loan loss accounting. This measure ranks the 
required disclosures regarding loan losses of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) in the various countries contained in the sample, as well as IFRS and US GAAP. 
 
The evidence shows that prior to the adoption of IFRS, banks used loan loss provisions to 
manage earnings, in accordance with expectations. The effect of the adoption of IFRS in 
2005 was a decrease in the level of earnings management by banks using loan loss 
provisions, also consistent with expectations. The control sample shows a similar decrease 
in the level of earnings management, contrary to expectations, but this result is not 
significant. 
 
Further, based on the evidence, it cannot be concluded that higher loan loss accounting 
disclosure requirements lead to lower levels of earnings management by banks using loan 
loss provisions. The results suggest that higher disclosure requirement do not deter bank 
managers from using loan loss provisions for income smoothing purposes (this result is 
insignificant). 
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Accounting Conservatism in Transitional 
Economies 
 
 
Evidence of the influence of institutional factors in Eastern Europe 
 
 
Paulina Kowalczyk1 
 
Executive summary 
Prior research shows that accounting conservatism exists in mature economies. However 
there is not too much research about accounting conservatism in transitional economies. 
This paper analyses the influence of institutional and political factors on accounting 
conservatism in Eastern European countries which have already joined the European Union. 
I researched the levels of unconditional and conditional conservatism in Eastern Europe 
and compared them with Western European results. I did not find evidence that there is 
conditional conservatism in Eastern Europe. My research shows that there was conditional 
conservatism only in Poland during the analyzed period. I found significant evidence 
proving my expectations regarding the influence of the quality of law, securities law and 
the risk of expropriation on conditional conservatism. 
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5781.  
 
1. Introduction 
Most of the post-communist European countries have already joined the European Union. 
What is important is that the European Union intends to harmonize accounting regulations 
across member countries by implementing International Accounting Standards. However, 
prior research proves that the differences remain despite common regulations due to 
political and institutional factors specific to certain countries. 
Conservatism in accounting has been researched for many years. The results regarding 
Western European countries and the United States prove the existence of conservatism in 
accounting. In contrast to the West, not all post-communist countries were subjects of the 
research and institutional factors which can influence conservatism are not fully explored 
in the case of these countries. The objective of the research is: 
 
                                             
1 This paper is based on my master thesis, completed in 2009 as part of the master Accounting Auditing & Control at 
Erasmus University Rotterdam under supervision of Dr. Y. Wang, reviewed by Dhr. Rob van der Wal. Since September 2009 
I have worked as an Associate in PricewaterhouseCoopers. In the future I am going to continue an academic carrier. 
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To analyze conservatism in accounting in post-communist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, which are members of the European Union and to identify institutional factors 
which have an influence on conservatism in these countries 
 
The main research question is:  
Is there accounting conservatism in Eastern Europe? 
 
The research sub-questions are as follows:  
• Does accounting conservatism differ across Eastern Europe? 
• Do institutional factors influence accounting conservatism in Eastern Europe?  
• Did the transitional process influence accounting conservatism in Eastern Europe?  
 
My research contributes to prior research for a couple of reason. First of all Eastern 
European countries are rarely the subject of an analysis, secondly I used the Basu model in 
my analysis, third I explored the influence of institutional factors on accounting 
conservatism in this region. The results of this paper are important for all users of financial 
reporting to give them the possibility to assess the quality of accounting figures, especially 
in debt and management employment contracts. I found evidence that there is 
unconditional conservatism in both analyzed regions but it is higher in Western Europe than 
Eastern Europe. The results for conditional conservatism show that there is no 
conservatism in Eastern Europe (excluding Polish observations) but there is in Western 
Europe. Three Eastern European countries were analyzed in detail and I found that only in 
Poland for the whole analyzed period there is conditional conservatism. I found evidence 
proving my expectations regarding the influence of the quality of law on conditional 
conservatism, security law and risk of expropriation. I found significant evidence, which 
contradicted my expectations regarding transitional progress and tax burden; however I 
found reasons justifying these outcomes. I did not find significant evidence regarding my 
hypothesis about the influence of equity market exposure. 
 
2. Accounting conservatism  
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) define accounting conservatism as a situation when on `average 
book value is lower than market value. Basu (1997) defines conservatism as the 
incremental timeliness of bad news recognition over good news recognition. Basu (1997) as 
news means returns; he justifies it, by saying that in an efficient market, stocks 
incorporate all available information immediately. He assumed that the response of 
earnings  to bad news is quicker than its response to good news. Givoly and Hayn (2000) 
examine conservatism from the point of view of changes in earnings, cash flows and 
accruals; they give another definition of conservatism based on the characteristics of a 
conservative reporting system, which tends towards the early and full recognition of 
unfavourable events in the financial statements and the delayed and gradual recognition of 
favourable events, and then conservatism can be measured by skewness or the variability 
of the earnings distribution. Givoly and Hayn (2000) also use another approach in 
measuring conservatism which is based on features of accruals. They explain that accruals 
tend to reverse, when there is a period, when income exceeds (is lower than) cash flow 
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and is followed by a period, when income is lower than (exceeds) cash flow. Conservatism 
takes place, when negative accruals tend to persist over time in stable companies. This 
measure is based on the definition of conservatism, in which the accounting system results 
in “slower revenue recognition, faster expense recognition, lower asset valuation and 
higher liability valuation”, this definition incorporates elements of earnings conservatism 
(revenue and income) and balance sheet conservatism (assets and liabilities).  
 
3. Literature review  
3.1 The existence of conservatism and trends 
One of the most important papers from the field of conservatism in accounting is “The 
conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings” of Basu (1997). First of 
all Basu proved that the regression coefficient is higher for a sample which included 
observations with negative unexpected returns than positive ones, it means that earnings 
is more timely in recognition of publicly available “bad news” than “good news”. Basu 
(1997) examines also conservatism from accruals point. He found out that regression 
coefficient for bad news is higher for earnings than for CFO, but for good news there is no 
difference between R2’s, which is consistent with accounting conservatism incorporated in 
accruals. The next issue which Basu (1997) examines is the persistence of earnings. He 
proved that negative earnings have a higher tendency to reverse in the future than positive 
earnings. Basu (1997) also examines one of the reasons why there is an increase in the 
level of conservatism. He analyzed the relationship between auditors’ liability and the 
coefficient of bad news and good news with earnings, and he finds that there is a 
relationship between this correlation and the level of auditors’ liability. He founds that in 
periods of higher liability exposure for auditors there is higher a coefficient between bad 
news and earnings, and the coefficient between good news and earnings in the last period 
of high legal liability.  
Givoly and Hayn (2000) widely prove that there was conservatism in accounting during the 
analyzed period. First of all they found out that in the early period (1966-1980) the 
companies generated slightly positive net accruals, and since 1982 net accruals have been 
negative. Accumulation of negative non-operating accruals is consistent with an increase in 
reporting conservatism over the last several decades. The other groups of measures like 
the earnings-return measures indicate an increase of conservatism overtime. The earnings 
distribution is negatively skewed in most of the examined periods and there is no similar 
phenomenon in cash flows. The negative skewness of earnings confirms the existence of 
conservatism and an increase of the skewness, which means an increase in conservatism 
over time.  
 
3.2 International differences  
The research of Giner and Rees (2001) focuses on three close European countries Germany, 
France and the UK. They found that the strongest conservatism was in the UK and then in 
France and Germany. However all three countries express an association of bad news with 
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returns which is much stronger than good news and returns. The differences between these 
three countries are however not significant.  
Ball et al. (2000, 4) extend previous studies by going beyond just comparing different 
accounting regimes but focusing on institutional factors. Ball et al. (2000) study 
international differences between Australia, Canada, UK, USA, France, Germany and 
Japan. Ball et al. (2000) show that in common law countries with a so called shareholder 
orientation there are stronger incentives for conservatism, on the other hand code law or 
stakeholder oriented countries are characterized by less conservative accounting. They 
found out that in code law countries there is less conservatism then in common-law 
countries.  
Garcia Lara and Mora (2004) find that  both balance sheet and earnings conservatism 
practices exist in all countries examined, but there are significant differences in 
conservatism between countries. The market-to-book ratio in the UK is significantly 
different from the other countries. In all analyzed countries there is a significantly faster 
recognition of bad news in earnings with respect to good news. Lara Garcia and Mora 
(2004) indicate that the United Kingdom is the most extreme example in Europe (common-
law-based country), which shows greater earnings conservatism than other analyzed 
countries 
Raonic et al. (2004) focused on a different group of companies. They take for their analysis 
all companies across Europe which have been listed on more than one capital market 
between 1987-1999 (366 firms and 3 724 firm-year observations) using Basu model to 
measure conditional conservatism. The three factors considered are: equity market 
exposure and regulatory environment. Raonic et al. (2004) conclude that capital market 
pressure and regulatory impact each appears to lead to more conservative accounting. 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) analyzed the period between 1999-2001. They analyzed 38 
countries. They used the Basu model in their research incorporating legal and institutional 
factors as dummy variables. Bushman and Piotroski (2006) find out that in the strong 
judicial system countries bad news is recognized faster than in countries with lenient  
judicial systems. Secondly, they find that strong public enforcement aspects of securities 
law slows recognition of good news in earnings relative to firms in countries with weak 
public enforcement aspects. In contrast, the private enforcement aspects of securities law 
have no impact on conservatism. Less conservatism in accounting is observed in countries 
with greater political involvement and a high risk of expropriation of assets by the state 
and high state ownership of enterprises 
Evidence regarding one of the countries of Eastern Europe can be found in Jindrichovska 
and McLeay (2005). Jindrichovska and McLeay used the Basu model to measure 
conservatism in the Czech Republic. They did not find proof for the existence of 
accounting conservatism in the Czech Republic. This phenomenon Jindrichovska and 
McLeay explain due to economic transition and regulatory conditions that limit market 
influences on accounting behaviour.  
The most recent paper about Eastern European countries is “Reliability of earnings figures 
and conservatism in transitional economies” by Martikainen and Tilli  (2007). The results of 
the research show that in Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Latvia and 
Slovakia there is conservatism at a significant level. Conservatism in the Czech Republic 
and Ukraine is insignificant. The research also shows that joining the EU has a significant 
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positive influence on loss recognition, it means EU members are more conservative than 
non-EU ones. They also researched the influence of the transition process. They found out 
that those countries in which progress in the transition process is more thoroughly 
developed express higher conservatism, at the significant level. 
 
4. Hypotheses and research design 
4.1 Hypotheses development 
H1: There is unconditional conservatism in post-communist countries  
Capitalism has existed in post-communist countries for almost twenty years. During this 
period these countries were able to create institutional frameworks similar to Western 
European countries. All these changes allow it to be said that Eastern European countries 
have already created mechanisms typical for a market economy and that is why I can claim 
that unconditional accounting conservatism takes place in Eastern European countries.  
 
H2: Conditional and unconditional conservatism is stronger in Western-European countries 
than in post-communist countries  
Despite big progress made by post-communist countries in the transition process, full 
transformation from a command market to a free market economy cannot be done within 
such a short period of time. The market economy tradition in Western countries was built 
over decades, and it is not possible to repeat the same process in such a short time. On top 
of that, some countries like Slovenia or the Slovak Republic did not go through the 
transition process so fast. consequently it was expected that accounting in post-communist 
countries is less conservative than in Western European countries.  
 
H3: There are differences in the level of conditional conservatism in Eastern European 
countries  
Taking into account individual countries, it is reasonable to say that the countries despite 
a common communist tradition are different due to differently executed transition 
process. Countries had different approaches towards carrying out the transformation 
process. The Czech Republic was the quickest in privatization of state-owned enterprises. 
Poland chose a more gradual method of privatization, while Hungary tried to attract 
outside investors, which could buy state-owned enterprises. Beside their different ways of 
carrying out the transitional process, different factors like the size of capital markets, 
regulatory frameworks, and tradition (Polish accounting was relatively flexible already 
before 1990) can also determine dissimilar levels of conservatism in Eastern European 
countries. Based on the progress in the transitional process, regulatory framework, and the 
size of capital markets, I can expect that  conservatism would be expressed the most in 
Poland and the lowest level of conservatism should take place in the Czech Republic.  
 
H4: Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in the countries with more progress in the 
transitional process  
Progress in the transitional process as shown in various analyses differs greatly (source 
European Bank of Development and Reconstruction, Structural Change Indicators, 
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http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm ). This can have an 
influence on accounting practices, since countries, which went faster through transitional 
process have an approach more similar to Western countries, which means that they could 
demonstrate a higher degree of conservatism.  
 
H5: Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in the countries with higher market 
exposure  
Strong market exposure of companies is connected with the risk of litigation by investors. 
Companies which are listed on capital markets are exposed to litigation in the event that 
they mislead investors. Then, managers are especially cautious about their accounting 
policy. It is expected that higher market exposure causes a higher level of conservatism in 
accounting.  
 
H6: Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in countries with a strong legal system  
I could expect that the extent that the legal/judicial system is conducive to the use of 
enforceable contracts, there will be higher conservatism, due to a need for verifiable 
accounting figures by contracting parties. The role of the judicial system is to maintain the 
enforceability of contracts. This means that countries with a stronger judicial system 
(which lead to the use of accounting numbers in formal contracts) are characterized by a 
higher demand for conservative reporting. 
 
H7: Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in countries with strong securities laws  
Regulatory bodies are exposed to public judgment, which is more unfavourable in the 
event of overstatement of accounting numbers than understatement. Then regulatory 
bodies tend to create laws which encourage conservatism. Furthermore, the costs of strong 
security law (which regulates relations between market players) are smaller than 
individual contracts, thus security law responds to contracting incentives. The last, strong 
security law is connected with some non-criminal penalties but also criminal ones (if it is 
built into the framework of national law), this causes accounting to be even more 
conservative. All these reasons lead me to believe that I should expect that the quality of 
security law is connected with level of accounting conservatism.  
 
H8: Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in countries, where there is a high risk of 
expropriation  
It is claimed, that government aims to control enterprises due to market imperfections 
such as monopoly power, to provide employment and subsidies. The state wants to control 
poor performing companies for the benefit of the greater society. I expect that the 
relation between risk of expropriation and conservatism is positive, so the higher level of 
this risk signifies a higher level of conservatism in accounting.  
 
H9: Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in countries with strong tax regimes  
It was expected that companies in countries with high tax burdens, in order to avoid tax 
payment will exercise conservatism. In this case I can state the above hypothesis should be 
true. It is understandable that companies want to avoid paying taxes. In order to diminish 
the value of income taxes, companies try to underestimate earnings which is characteristic 
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of conservatism. On the other hand, the situation of post-communist countries is a little 
bit different, because tax authorities in these countries have a strong position and try to 
prevent these kinds of practices in companies. This opposite stream in the tax regime of 
post-communists countries could result in  the relationship between tax regimes and 
accounting conservatism to be opposite to what I expect. 
 
4.2 Research design 
In the first stage, unconditional and conditional conservatism are measured in Western 
European countries and post-communist countries as by two pooled samples. The sample of 
Western Europe consists of companies from France and Germany. For post-communist 
countries observations from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Poland were taken to do the computation. The Basu model and market-to-book ratio are 
measures, which were used in this research.  
 
Accounting conservatism in Eastern Europe. Comparison with Western Europe  
In the first stage, two measures of conservatism are used: Basu model and market-to-book 
ratio.  
The model of Basu is used in order to measure earnings conservatism.  
NIt=α0 + α1DRit + β0Rit + β1R*itDRit+εit (1) 
NI it – accounting income (income before extraordinary items) 
Rit - the return of firm i over the 12 months (Pt-P t-1)/Pt-1 
 
 
DRit =  1 if Rit <0 
  0 otherwise 
 
Measures of conservatism from the regression 1(Givoly and Hayn, 2000, 293): 
• β1 – incremental response to bad news relative to good news, conservatism when 
β1>0,  
• (β0 +β1 )/ β0  the relative sensitivity of earnings to bad news compared with their 
sensitivity to good news, conservatism when ratio >1 
• Rb2/Rg2 where Rb2 - R2 power of regression in periods of bad news (negative 
returns); Rg2 - R2 power of regression in periods of good news ( positive returns), 
conservatism  when the ratio >1 
In order to measure balance sheet conservatism there is used market-to-book ratio.  
MTB= MV/BV 
MV- market value represented by market capitalization  
BV- book value represented by shareholders equity  
The market-to-book ratio is calculated based on aggregated amounts of market and book 
value, where market value is sum of market capitalization of all companies in sample and 
book value is a sum of shareholder’s equity of all companies in sample. MTB>0 indicates 
the accounting conservatism.  
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Influence of institutional factors on conservatism  
The Influence of institutional factors on conservative accounting is measured by the 
incorporation of these variables into the Basu model as a dummy variable. The following 
model is constructed according to Bushman and Piotroski (2006) research.  
 
After incorporating an institutional factor the Basu model is as follows: 
NI= β1 +β2Rit + B21CCD Rit + β4RitD + β41CCD RitD 
 
After transformation, the above equation is as follows 
NI= β1 +(β2 + B21CCD) Rit + (β4 + β41CCD) RitD 
 
CCD- represents any institutional factor: transition process (TRANSP), equity market 
exposure (EQMEXP), legal system (LAW), security law (SECLAW), risk of expropriation 
(PTECON) and tax burden (TAX).  
 
Similar to Bushman and Piotroski (2006), in their research the focus will be on recognition 
of good and bad news in CCD countries relative to non-CCD countries, so the B21 + β41 are 
of great importance.  
When β21 ≠0 the speed of good news recognition differs in CCD countries relative to non-
CCD countries 
When β41 ≠ 0 incremental speed of bad news recognition relative to good news recognition 
differs for CCD countries to non-CCD countries 
 
In the model there are incorporated the institutional settings. Proxies are based on ratings 
provided by European Bank of Development and Reconstruction and World Bank in its 
annual reports. 
I have analyzed the influence of following factors on conservatism in accounting: 
• transitional process (TRANSP)  
• equity market exposure (EQMEX)  
• regulatory environment (law enforcement) (LAW)  
• security law (SECLAW)  
• political economy (PTECON)  
• tax regime (TAX). 
 
The data for research were extracted from World Scope and Thomson Financial database 
for the period 1994-2008. Market capitalization was taken as a market value (WS.YR END 
MARKET CAP ) which is Market Price-Year End * Common Shares Outstanding, book value is 
represented in database by common equity (TF.Total Common Equity common 
shareholders' interest in a company), the accounting earnings (NI) are income before 
extraordinary items (WS.IncomeBefExtraItemsAndPfdDiv- Net Income Before Extraordinary 
Items And Preferred Dividends), and dividends per share (WS.DividendsPerShare). All 
accounting variables are scaled by beginning market value of the company (WS.YR END 
MARKET CAP). Stock returns (Rit) are computed as ((Pit+Divit)-Pit-1)/Pit-1.  
Market-to-book ratio  
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All companies with missing values are excluded from the research. The number of 
observations is very low at the beginning of the analyzed period for Eastern European 
countries. The reason is that at the beginning of 90’s securities markets were not 
developed and some stock exchanges were recently established in post-communist 
countries. The number of observation for the period 1994-2008 in Eastern European 
countries is 3.003 and in Western European countries 20.901. 
Basu model  
The structure of the sample is determined by the size of the capital markets of the 
analyzed countries. According to market capitalization (World Development Indicators 
online database), the biggest securities market is in Poland. Budapest and Prague’s stock 
exchanges are similar in the size, and the capital markets with the smallest market 
capitalization are in Slovakia, Slovenia and Lithuania. This goes together with the structure 
of the sample. There are 2.161 observations for three Eastern European countries for the 
period 1994-2008. The data are dominated by Polish companies, which represent 60% of 
observations. The rest of the countries have the following shares: 18% Czech Republic, 17% 
Hungary, 0,6% Lithuania, 2% Slovakia and 2% Slovenian companies. Because of the 
dominance of Polish companies, a reestimation is provided of models excluding Polish 
observations. There are 18.673 observations for Germany and France for the period 1994-
2008 
 
5. Results and analysis 
Estimations of accounting conservatism across regions and countries  
My research shows that in the Western European region conservatism is stronger than in 
Eastern Europe for the analyzed period which confirms hypothesis 2 “Conditional and 
unconditional conservatism is stronger in Western-European countries than in post-
communist countries” (regarding the part about unconditional conservatism, later on 
evidence is provided about conditional conservatism). The results also show that my 
expectations about hypothesis 1 are true, there is unconditional conservatism in Eastern 
Europe. The results show also that between the three analyzed countries, Poland has the 
highest market-to-book ratio, the next one is Hungary and at the end the Czech Republic.  
Table 1 presents the outcome of the analysis regarding conditional conservatism NI=β1 + 
β2Rit + β3Dit + β4RitD for the Western European countries and Eastern European countries.  
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Table 1. Association between earnings and returns in Western and Eastern Europe  
β2, β4 and adjusted R2 presents the results derived from the following model NI=β1+ β2Rit + β3Dit + β4RitD, for country-year 
observations for years indicated in the first column. R2 bad and R 2 good are derived from the models, where bad news 
(negative returns) are regressed on accounting income and good news (positive returns) are regressed on accounting income. 
In the last column there is presented number of observations. The values of the first row of each region in the second and 
the third column present the unstandardized coefficients; values in brackets in the second row are the t-statistics.  
 
 Period β2 β4 Adj. R2 
[%] 
(β2+β4))/
2 
R2 bad R2 good N 
Western Europe 
0.021*** 0.309*** 10.9 15.71 0.089 0.006 18673 1994-2008 
(7.390) (28.801)      
0.012*** 0.292*** 11.9 25.33   9462 1994-2001 
(3.790) (22.872)      
0.035*** 0.310*** 10.4 9.86   9211 2002-2008 
(6.927) (17.754)      
Eastern Europe 
0.050*** 0.182*** 9.5 4.64 0.035 0.032 2161 1994-2008 
(6.110) (4.840)      
0.069** 0.325*** 10.1 5.71   787 1994-2001 
(2.478) (4.554)      
0.048*** 0.084 9.3    1374 2002-2008 
(6.012) (1.879)      
Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia 
0.115*** 0.037 5.1    855 1994-2008 
(3.128) (1,069)      
0.103** -0.040 4.1    426 2002-2008 
(2.631) -(0.296)      
 
* significant on the level of 10% confidence level  
** significant on the level of 5% confidence level  
*** significant on the level of 1% confidence level  
 
There is evidence that the asymmetric timeliness of earnings (measured by the β4 
coefficient) is stronger in Western European countries than in Eastern European countries 
at the 1% significance level. Results derived in this section regard hypothesis 2: 
“Conditional and unconditional conservatism is stronger in Western-European countries 
than in post-communist countries”. Both types of conservatism show a higher level in 
Western Europe. The market-to-book ratio is higher for Western Europe than for Eastern 
Europe in the Basu model’s results I conclude that Western Europe’s accounting is more 
conservative than Eastern Europe’s accounting. In fact, there is no evidence indicating 
accounting conservatism in Eastern Europe, when I exclude from a sample Polish 
observations.  
I mentioned in my objectives that I want to use two measures of accounting conservatism 
in order to check if the chosen methodology influences the results, and secondly if there 
are differences in the levels of conditional and unconditional conservatism in the analyzed 
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regions. Although results derived from the period 1994-2008 are similar, when I divide my 
sample in two periods, the results are opposite. The market-to-book ratio is higher for 
Eastern Europe than for Western Europe in the second period and results for the Basu 
model are opposite; the conditional conservatism was higher in Western Europe than in 
Eastern Europe for the second period. These opposite results I can explain due to a biased 
measure of the market-to-book ratio (Givoly and Hayn (2000). I think that the results of 
the market-to-book ratio in the second period for Eastern Europe are biased by growth 
opportunities. That is why the Basu model is a better measure of accounting conservatism.  
 
After analysing Eastern Europe as a whole sample, it is interesting to explore countries 
individually. The number of observations for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland allow 
me to conduct research separately for these countries. Table 2 reveals the outcome. 
 
Table 2. Association between earnings and returns in Eastern European countries 
β2, β4 and adjusted R2 presents the results derived from the following model NI=β1+ β2Rit + β3Dit + β4RitD, for country-year 
observations for periods indicated in the first column. R2 bad and R 2 good are derived from the models, where bad news 
(negative returns) are regressed on accounting income and good news (positive returns) are regressed on accounting income. 
In the last column the number of observations is presented. The values of the first row of each region in the second and the 
third column present the unstandardized coefficients; values in brackets in the second row are the t-statistics.  
 Period β2 β4 Adj. R2 
[%] 
(β2+β4))/
2 
R2 bad R2 good N 
Czech Republic 
0.169** 0.123 4.1 - 0.007 0.018 391 1996-2008 
(2.220) (0.580)      
Hungary 
0.072*** 0.046 12.9 - 0.013 0.046 373 1994-2008 
(2.880) (0.720)      
Poland 
0.032*** 0.178*** 12.4 6.56 0.038 0.029 1304 1994-2008 
(4.261) (4.507)      
* significant on the level of 10% confidence level 
** significant on the level of 5% confidence level 
*** significant on the level of 1% confidence level 
 
Comparing Eastern European countries, the first finding is that the timeliness of accounting 
earnings is the highest in Hungary (Adj R2). Secondly, the incorporation of good news into 
earnings is the highest for the Czech Republic and the lowest for Poland (β2). Further on, 
only in Poland there is evidence at the 1% significance level that there is asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings. The results for Hungary and the Czech Republic are insignificant; it 
means that there is no evidence of asymmetric timeliness for earnings. The relative 
sensitivity of earnings to bad news compared with their sensitivity to good news is higher 
than 1 in Poland (the calculation is not provided for the Czech Republic and Hungary, since 
the coefficients are not significant), and the last measure of conservatism: the relation of 
the power of the regression in periods of bad news (negative returns) to the power of the 
regression in periods of good news (positive returns) is higher than 1 only in the Polish 
case. I believe that there are two main drivers of the results obtained in Table 2. This is 
the way of handling the transitional process used by post-communist Eastern European 
countries and the tax regulations in these countries. The results for the beginning of the 
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analyzed period are determined by the first driver. In the Czech Republic a lack of an 
institutional framework around the securities market, which developed very quickly, is a 
reason for the lack of conservatism at the beginning of the period in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary. Poland had a different attitude. This country firstly developed regulations 
based on western standards, which some criticized for overambitious goals, because they 
were difficult to attain for companies which recently started to learn about capital 
markets (OECD 1998). However, it was probably the most important reason why there was 
accounting conservatism in Poland and not in Hungary or the Czech Republic. Nowadays, 
the security market’s regulations have also improved in Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
The results from the Czech Republic are similar to those found in a paper by Jindrichovska 
and McLeay (2007). They also found evidence that there is no asymmetric timeliness in 
earnings. The reasons for these particular results are seen in the transitional nature of the 
Czech market and restrictive tax regulations, which diminish incentives for conservatism. 
It is worthwhile to note that the Czech Republic has the highest coefficient of stock 
returns (good news), which indicates that the timeliness of earnings is the highest in this 
country. This can indicate that strict tax requirements reinforce the incentives of 
companies to recognize all events in a timely manner. The specific Czech regulations 
regard limitations on provisioning, depreciation and deferred taxation. Companies that do 
not fill the requirements (e.g. reduce their tax base) can also face penalties (Jindrichovska 
and McLeay, 2007). The results for Poland are in accordance with the paper of 
Jermakowiacz and Gornik-Tomaszewski (1998), who researched the relation of stock 
returns and earnings. They found out that this relation is similar to the mature markets 
and the results are comparable to the research conducted on the US market by Easton and 
Harris (1991). The lack of evidence of conservatism in the Czech Republic, even when I 
take more recent periods into analysis, is driven by a very strict tax system in this country. 
Overall, I can conclude that in Eastern Europe the main drivers of conservatism are 
institutional settings (like taxes and securities market regulations). In these countries the 
costs of establishing adequate regulations by market players are too high (it was hoped 
that regulations would be established by players in the Czech Republic; this was a mistake 
and the government realised that this is its role to establish a legal framework and 
regulatory bodies at the end of 90’s). The results regarding Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic confirm hypothesis 3: “There are differences in the level of unconditional and 
conditional conservatism in Eastern European countries”. These countries, despite their 
common communist past, differ in the level of conditional conservatism, and these 
differences result from the diverse way of handling the transitional process and 
establishing regulations. Poland is the most conservative country while there is a lack of 
evidence for the existence of conditional conservatism in the Czech Republic.  
 
 57
Table 3. Evidence on the influence of legal and political institutions on the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings in Eastern Europe 
The following table presents select coefficients and test statistics of estimations from the model 
NI=β1 + β2Rit  + β3Dit + β4RitD + β11CCD + β21RitCCD+β31Dit CCD + β41DRitCCD 
The sample holds observations from Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia available for period 
1994-2008. In the first rows unstandardized coefficients are presented, the second rows provide t-statistics.  
 
 Good news Incremental bad news sensitivity  
  β2 β21 β4 β41 Adj R2 
TRANSP 0.086*** -0.067*** 0.369*** -0.328*** 10.20% 
 (5.355) -(3.421) (5.675) -(3.875)  
EQMEXP 0.045 -0.064 0.242 -0.026 7.60% 
 (1.091) -(0.827) (1.671) -(0.574)  
LAW 0.038*** 0.028 0.041 0.284*** 8.10% 
 (3.815) (1.032) (0.743) (3.234)  
SECLAW 0.044 -0.003 0.314 -0.153 7.50% 
 (0.425) -(0.032) (1.313) -(0.630)  
PTECON 0.029*** 0.069*** 0.097* 0.199** 8.80% 
 (2.962) (2.569) (1.866) (2.217)  
TAX 0.075*** -0.058*** 0.369*** -0.344*** 9.10% 
  (5.357) -(3.147) (5.790) -(3.992)   
 
 
*** significant on the level of 1% confidence level 
** significant on the level of 5% confidence level 
* significant on the level of 10% confidence level 
 
Table 3 provides evidence about the relation of institutional factors and the timeliness of 
earnings. First of all the results for the transitional process are significant and they show 
that the transitional process causes lower timeliness of earnings (β2 and β21) and lower 
incremental bad news sensitivity (β4 and β41). This contradicts hypothesis 4: “Asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings is higher in the countries with more progress in transitional 
process”. The reason why the outcome for the transitional process is different from my 
expectations is that there was a negative relation between the development of capital 
markets and the speed of privatization of state-owned –enterprises, which is the main 
element of the TRANSP proxy. The rapid privatization which was the main indicator of the 
progress of the transitional process was connected with a lack of setting up proper 
regulations. On the other hand high standards for securities law was a main driver of 
conservative accounting. Furthermore, high standards constrained privatization and the 
development of private enterprises due to difficult access to capital markets, as was the 
case in Poland. 
The results for equity market exposure are insignificant, so the coefficients cannot really 
be interpreted; the reason why the outcome from equity market exposure is insignificant 
can be connected to the underdeveloped security markets in the analyzed countries. The 
securities markets are still unstable and vulnerable to outside factors (Schroder, 2000). 
This can be a reason why the results are not significant. Further on, in Blommestein’s 
paper (1998, OECD report) it is indicated that the cost of establishing regulatory bodies 
and regulations encouraging conservatism was too high. Because market development did 
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not go alongside the development of regulations.This can also be a reason why despite 
higher market exposure of the listed companies accounting conservatism was not 
encouraged Based on this result I do not find significant evidence, which proves hypothesis 
4: “Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in the countries with higher market 
exposure”. 
 
Table 3 provides evidence that countries with impartial courts (clear legal framework) 
have a higher incremental sensitivity to bad news. Since the companies face the threat of 
litigation from investors when earnings are overvalued rather than the opposite, this threat 
is more probable in countries where the legal system is clear and enforceable. It is 
reasonable that companies recognize their “bad news” quicker in countries with high legal 
standards. The result is on a significant level. Furthermore, there is no evidence of the 
influence of the legal framework on good news sensitivity since the results are not 
significant. The outcome confirms my expectations regarding hypothesis 5: “Asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings is higher in countries with a strong legal system”. 
There is no evidence about the influence of securities law on the timeliness of earnings, 
since the results are not significant. However, there is a reason to do some further 
research by changing the construction of the dummy variable. The way it is done in 
previous analysis means that there are 79 observations with 0 values of the dummy, and 
2080 with 1. This can be a reason for the insignificant results regarding the securities 
market in the previous analysis. This modification in the construction of dummy variables 
increases the number of observations with the dummy variable value of 0 to 473. The 
results after the correction of the SECLAW dummy variable are consistent with the 
expectation stated in hypothesis 6: “Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in 
countries with strong securities laws”. Countries with high quality securities laws recognize 
good news slower, at a significant level. However, based on the results there is no 
evidence showing how securities laws influence the recognition of bad news since the 
results are insignificant. The change in construction of the dummy variable improves the 
result and confirms the hypothesis. The improvement of the dummy variable was certainly 
justifiable, since previously the observations were in the majority of instances assigned to 
the high quality of security law, and it was impossible to get significant results. 
The results regarding political economy are as follows: The sensitivity of good news is 
higher in countries with a high risk of expropriation at a 1% significance level. The result 
shows that companies operating in countries, which have a higher risk of expropriation, 
incorporate good news faster than countries with a low risk of expropriation. On the other 
hand, incorporation of bad news is also quicker in high risk of expropriation countries on 
the significance level 1% and 5%. Because post-communist countries are considered as non-
benevolent countries, states which take over companies, that perform well the higher 
coefficient β41 than β4, confirms that companies in countries with a high risk of 
expropriation undervalue their earnings by quicker incorporation of negative events. On 
the other hand, a higher β21 than β2 is not consistent with the assumption that Eastern 
European countries are non-benevolent countries. The results show that countries with 
high PTECON incorporate good news faster but that the incremental bad news sensitivity is 
also higher. Then, it is hard to asses which direction the influence of political economy is 
stronger. Based on the results I can conclude that hypothesis 7 “Asymmetric timeliness of 
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earnings is higher in countries, where there is a high risk of expropriation” is confirmed, 
because incremental speed of bad news recognition relative to good news recognition is 
higher for countries with high risk of expropriation than for countries with low risk of 
expropriation (β41).  
The findings regarding tax regime are opposite to the stated hypothesis 9 “Asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings is higher in countries with strong tax regime”, but confirm the 
expectations about the influence of this aspect on conservatism in post-communist 
countries. The result verifies that in countries with strict tax regimes, there is no 
conservatism but rather aggressive accounting (negative coefficient β41 on the significant 
level). It provides evidence that the tax regime has a significant influence on conservatism 
in post-communist countries, which confirms a brief divagation of Jindrichovska and 
McLeay (2007) about the reasons for the lack of conservatism in the Czech Republic. 
However, a high tax burden resulting in slower good news recognition may prove that tax 
regulation encourages conservatism, as expected by Bushman and Piotroski (2006). 
Nevertheless, the results show that β41 is negative on the significance level of 1%, which 
does not confirm hypothesis 9: “Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in countries 
with a strong tax regime”.  
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
The objective of this research is to analyze conservatism in accounting in the post-
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are members of the European 
Union and to identify institutional factors which have influenced conservatism in these 
countries.  
I investigated Eastern European countries which have already joined the European Union 
and had a communist regime in the past. I measured unconditional conservatism using the 
market-to-book ratio and Basu’s conditional conservatism model. The period of my analysis 
was limited to the years 1994-2008.  
Hereafter, I will shortly recall the results of my research. First of all, my main research 
question was ”Is there accounting conservatism in Eastern Europe?”. After the analysis I 
conducted I can answer: yes, there is unconditional conservatism in Eastern Europe. On the 
other hand I found evidence confirming the existence of conditional conservatism in 
Eastern Europe (including Poland in the sample). I compared the results for Eastern Europe 
with the results for Western Europe, and I concluded that accounting conservatism is 
represented more brightly in Western European countries  
I also found answers for more detailed sub-questions in my research. Regarding my first 
sub-question “Does accounting conservatism differ across Eastern Europe?” I found that the 
level of conditional conservatism differed in the three countries analyzed. My second sub-
question was as follows: “Does the transitional process influence accounting conservatism 
in Eastern Europe?”. Hypothesis 4 was aimed at answering this question. The evidence 
shows that the progress of transition discourages conservatism. Thus it seems that the 
regulations are the main incentives for accounting conservatism in Eastern Europe. The 
results are consistent with the outcome of hypothesis 7 regarding security laws.  
My last research sub-question verifies whether institutional factors influence accounting 
conservatism in Eastern Europe. First of all I did not find significant evidence that equity 
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market exposure encourages accounting conservatism and I justify this by pointing out the 
vulnerability of equity markets in emerging markets, which overshadow the results. The 
second institutional factor which I analyzed was the quality of law. I found evidence that 
the impartiality of the legal system encouraged conditional conservatism in Eastern 
Europe, which is in accord with my expectations. After the quality of law I researched 
another regulatory aspect: security law. In this case I also found that higher standards of 
security law positively influence the level of conservatism. These outcomes were in 
accordance with my eighth stated hypothesis. I found that the risk of expropriation by the 
state discouraged conservatism. 
The results for the tax regime’s influence on conditional conservatism was opposite to my 
expectations; however it is justifiable, since high tax burdens are so strong in these 
countries. This means that companies do not try to underestimate their earnings, but 
rather they try to recognize them in a timely manner due to the danger of penalties.  
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Income Smoothing and Earnings 
Informativeness 
 
 
A matter of institutional characteristics or accounting standards? 
 
 
Alexandra Tudor1 
 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
This study investigates the level of income smoothing and its impact on the 
informativeness of earnings.  The main contribution of this research is that as well IFRS as 
investor protection are considered to examine the association between income smoothing 
and earnings informativeness. Income smoothing is measured as the variation in net 
income relative to the variation in operating cash flows. A returns-earnings regression 
based on Zarowin (2002) is used to measure earnings informativeness. A sample of listed 
companies from United Kingdom (strong investor protection), France and the Netherlands 
(weak investor protection) is chosen. The results suggest that companies in United 
Kingdom show less smooth earnings compared to companies in France and the Netherlands. 
In addition I find that firms smooth income to a higher degree in the period after IFRS. 
Moreover income smoothing improves earnings informativeness during the pre IFRS period 
for all sample companies, and to a higher degree in the United Kingdom, although not 
significant. Subsequently to IFRS adoption the results suggest that income smoothing 
decreases earnings informativeness in all countries. 
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5605. 
 
 1. Introduction 
Income smoothing is a form of earnings management and is generally defined as the 
dampening of fluctuations in reported earnings over time (Ronen and Yaari 2008, 317). In 
other words, management is inclined to take actions to increase earnings when earnings 
are relatively low and to decrease earnings when earnings are relatively high. The main 
reasons that managers smooth earnings are: maximizing their own wealth, reducing the 
                                             
1 This master thesis is supervised by ms. Dr. Y. Wang. Currently Alexandra Tudor is working as an Associate at 
the Assurance department of PriceWaterhouseCoopers in Eindhoven.  
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perceived riskiness of the firm, enhancing firm value, meeting debt covenants, reducing 
tax and political costs and enhancing the reliability of financial forecasts. 
Although there is evidence that income smoothing takes place, its effect on earnings 
informativeness is largely unknown. Hereby is earnings informativeness defined as “the 
amount of information about future earnings or cash flows included in current period 
stock return” (Zarowin 2002, 4). The literature hypothesizes two opposite effects of 
income smoothing (Zarowin 2002, Tucker and Zarowin 2006). One viewpoint is that income 
smoothing results in altered information and thus less informative stock prices. On the 
other hand income smoothing through efficient communication of private information 
about the firm’s future expectations can lead to more informative stock prices.  
This study investigates the relation between income smoothing and earnings 
informativeness in three different countries: UK, France and Netherlands. To compare 
between countries, the institutional infrastructure of the three countries has to be 
considered. The most relevant considered institutional factor here is investor protection, 
which is about how well the law protects shareholders against expropriation by managers 
(Cahan et al. 2008).  
Income smoothing is assumed to take place through accounting choices. These choices in 
turn are dependent on the applied accounting standards. Therefore the set of accounting 
rules companies need to comply with, should be considered. As of January 1, 2005, 
companies listed in the European Union are required to present their consolidated financial 
statements applying International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These new 
standards aim to improve comparability of companies across countries.  
In this research I attempt to provide an answer to the following research questions: 
 
What is the impact of IFRS on the level of income smoothing and its relation with 
earnings informativeness? 
 
What is the impact of investor protection on the level of income smoothing and its 
relation with earnings informativeness? 
 
Each country’s sample consists of two periods, pre IFRS and post IFRS. I measure the 
degree of income smoothing as the ratio between the variation in net income and variation 
in operating cash flows (Zarowin 2002). The relation between income smoothing and 
earnings informativeness is given in a returns – earnings regression based on Zarowin (2002) 
and Tucker and Zarowin (2006).  
I predict that the level of income smoothing will be higher in all three countries after IFRS 
adoption, since IFRS allows managers with more discretion. Companies in France and 
Netherlands, as weak investor protection countries, are expected to show higher levels of 
income smoothing during both periods. 
The relation between income smoothing and earnings informativeness is predicted to be 
positive prior to IFRS for all three countries, with a stronger effect for UK, which is 
characterized by strong investor protection. After IFRS, the relation between income 
smoothing and earnings informativeness is expected to be weaker than in the first period 
for France and Netherlands and stronger for UK.  
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The association between income smoothing and earnings informativeness is important for 
policy makers as it relates to the ability of firms to manage earnings (Zarowin 2002, 4). 
This ability can be influenced by institutional factors (Leuz et al. 2003, Cahan et al. 2008) 
and accounting standards (Barth et al. 2008, Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008). I contribute to 
the body of international research by taking both the effects of IFRS and investor 
protection into account when investigating income smoothing and earnings 
informativeness.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: chapter 2 provides a comprehensive 
literature review. In chapter 3 the hypotheses are developed and research design is 
presented. Chapter 4 describes the empirical results and in the end chapter 5 provides a 
summary and conclusions of this study.  
 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Income smoothing and informativeness 
 
2.1.1 Definition 
Ronen and Sadan (1981, 2) define income smoothing as “a deliberate attempt by 
management to signal information to financial users”. In an earlier work the definition is 
“the deliberate dampening of fluctuations about some level of earnings which is 
considered to be normal for the firm” (Barnea et al. 1976, 110).  
A more recent depiction is “to characterize income smoothing as earnings management, 
we need to define the point at which managers’ accrual decisions result in “too much” 
smoothing and so become earnings management” (Dechow and Skinner 2000, 238). 
Basically income smoothing is the reduction of the variance in periodic profit over time to 
the extent allowed by accounting and management principles.  
 
2.1.2  Earnings informativeness 
Efficient income smoothing can improve the informativeness of a firm’s current and past 
earnings about future earnings and cash flows. Earnings informativeness (or stock price 
informativeness) is defined by Zarowin (2002, 4) as “the amount of information about 
future earnings or future cash flows impounded in the current period stock return.” 
Resource allocation can be improved if stock prices include more information through 
income smoothing (Zarowin 2002, 3).  
When making discretionary accounting choices managers consider expected future earnings 
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1995, 77). Tucker and Zarowin (2006, 253) categorize the managers’ 
use of reporting discretion as either (a) garbling or (b) efficient communication of private 
information. The authors argue that if income smoothing is garbling, then the resulting 
earnings are less informative about future earnings. When income smoothing is used to 
communicate private information about future performance expectations, it could provide 
more information about future earnings and cash flows. This last argument is the one I use 
further in this master thesis. 
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2.1.3  The relation between income smoothing and earnings informativeness 
Although the effect of income smoothing on earnings informativeness is not thoroughly 
investigated, the accounting literature so far theorizes two opposite effects of income 
smoothing on earnings informativeness according to Zarowin (2002, 4) and Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006, 253). One viewpoint is that managers use income smoothing to make public 
their private information about the firm’s future earnings (Ronen and Sadan 1981, Chaney 
and Lewis 1995, Tucker and Zarowin 2006). Here income smoothing results in more 
information about future earnings and cash flows, which in turn is reflected in the stock 
prices. Alternative findings suggest that income smoothing alters information and makes 
stock prices less informative. Less information about future earnings and cash flows will be 
reflected in the stock prices, making smoothing harmful (Tucker and Zarowin 2006, 253).  
 
2.1.4  Income smoothing improving the value relevance2 of earnings 
The study of Hunt et al. (2000) investigates whether earnings smoothing through 
discretionary accruals improves or deteriorates the informativeness of earnings. The 
findings suggest that both discretionary and nondiscretionary accrual accounting practices 
increase the informativeness of earnings. Further the results support the informativeness 
hypothesis, namely that managers smooth income to convey their private information. 
Here, Hunt et al. (2000, 8) refer to the study of Chaney and Lewis (1995), which also 
stated that only managers have private information about future earnings and therefore 
smooth income.  
 
The study of Zarowin (2002) introduces a new approach by focusing on the relation 
between current stock prices and future information in a cross-sectional setting. Zarowin 
(2002, 4) defines stock price informativeness as “the amount of information about future 
earnings and cash flows that is reflected in current period stock returns”. This notion is 
measured as the coefficient on future earnings (FERC) in the regression of current stock 
return on current and future earnings.  
Regressions of stock returns against lagged, current and one year ahead earnings or cash 
flows and accruals, provide evidence that increased smoothing is associated with increased 
earnings informativeness. Thus firms with stock returns including more information about 
future earnings and cash flows have higher stock price informativeness.  
 
The study of Tucker and Zarowin (2006) is more recent, and the approach used is closely 
related to Zarowin (2002). The authors believe that a firm has certain information about 
future earnings when current earnings are realized, because of the continuous business 
cycle. Then the reporting behaviour and the stock price reveal this information.  
The research of Tucker and Zarowin (2006) provides evidence of more informative stock 
prices when firms smooth income, with stock prices of higher-smoothing firms more 
informative than lower-smoothing firms. Again, this is evidence that firms use discretion in 
reporting standards to make public information about future earnings and cash flows. 
 
 
                                             
2 The term value relevance is used for earnings informativeness 
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2.1.5  Income smoothing as “garbling” 
The second viewpoint in the income smoothing literature is that managers use their 
reporting discretion to “garble” earnings according to Tucker and Zarowin (2006, 253).  
Sloan (1996) investigates whether information about future earnings is fully reflected in 
the stock prices. This information is assumed to be contained in accruals and cash flows. In 
a regression of future abnormal returns on earnings, evidence is found that stock prices fail 
to anticipate the lower persistence of earnings impounded in accruals.  
 
The research of Beneish and Nichols (2005) expands on Sloan (1996) by examining the role 
of earnings management in relation with the market pricing of accruals more thoroughly. 
The results suggest that when the probability of managed earnings is high, positive 
earnings are less persistent than negative earnings. This is in contradiction with investors’ 
expectations that firms which manipulate earnings have higher future earnings. 
Subsequently the authors argue that earnings management is misleading.  
 
 
 2.2 Institutional characteristics 
 
2.2.1 Investor protection 
The notion of investor protection is defined by Cahan et al. (2008, 3) as “how well 
investors are protected by law from expropriation by managers and controlling 
shareholders of firms”. Insiders (managers) have the incentive to act in their own interest 
(opportunism), to obscure private control benefits and not reporting the true firm 
performance. An example is overstating earnings. When outside investors detect this 
behaviour, they will try to take actions against the insiders according to Leuz et al. (2003, 
506). Investors are protected by law and regulation, which can differ across countries. 
Insiders are less intended to act opportunistically when investors are better protected. 
Here the distinction is made between strong investor protection and weak investor 
protection countries. This distinction is based on characteristics of a country’s legal 
system, legal enforcement, shareholder rights, equity market importance, ownership 
concentration and disclosure requirements (Leuz et al. 2003, following La Porta et al. 
1997, 1998).  
 
2.2.2 The relation between investor protection, income smoothing and 
earnings informativeness 
A study defining earnings management as managers’ opportunistic behaviour and thus 
misleading is the research of Leuz et al. (2003, 506). Managers have the incentive to 
conceal true firm performance. The extent of their discretion depends on the accounting 
rules in a country and the legal system. Institutional characteristics are also taken into 
account. The results suggest that income smoothing is more persistent in weak investor 
protection countries. 
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The study of Cahan et al. (2008) investigates whether earnings informativeness due to 
income smoothing is related to the institutional infrastructure of a country. They use the 
approach of Tucker and Zarowin (2006) to measure earnings informativeness. This study 
focuses on the positive effects of income smoothing, managers communicating their 
private information about firm’s future expectations. 
The legal enforcement index based on La Porta et al. (1998) is used to measure investor 
protection. Legal enforcement is considered to be a good indication because laws are 
ineffective if they are not enforced. The findings suggest that income smoothing is more 
pervasive in countries with weak investor protection. Consequently income smoothing in 
countries with strong investor protection improves earnings informativeness to a higher 
extent than in countries with weak investor protection. Opportunism is associated with low 
investor protection while the communication of private information is related to strong 
investor protection. While there is less income smoothing in strong investor protection 
countries, its effect on informativeness is stronger than in countries with weak investor 
protection. Thus the efficient communication use of income smoothing predominates the 
use for opportunistic purposes.  
 
2.2.3 The introduction of IFRS 
As of January 1, 2005, all companies listed in the European Union are required to apply 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) when preparing their consolidated 
financial statements. IFRS are accounting standards issued by an independent body in 
Europe, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).   
With the introduction of IFRS, standards are more principle based. More general principles 
rather than detailed rules are developed. Associated with the principle based approach of 
IFRS is fair value accounting, which is defined in IAS 39 as: “the amount for which an 
assets could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties 
in an arm’s length transaction” (IFRSs in your pocket 2009, 98). Fair value accounting 
differs from historical cost accounting in that it requires estimates based on market prices, 
which are not always observable (Ball 2006) and thus subject of management judgement. 
With the introduction of IFRS, many international differences in accounting standards are 
about to disappear. Harmonization will be the result, which improves the comparability of 
companies across countries. To achieve this, consistent appliance of IFRS across countries 
is necessary. The IASB is a standard setter and not a regulator. Implementation of the 
standards is primarily the responsibility of managers, auditors and local regulators in each 
country (Ball 2006). 
 
2.2.4 IFRS, earnings management and earnings informativeness 
The introduction of one single set of accounting standards in the European Union is 
supposed to increase uniformity and comparability. Increased uniformity goes together 
with reduced managers’ discretion, as concluded by Palepu et al. (2007).  
For instance, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) compare voluntary adoption of IFRS 
with German GAAP during 1999-2001. They find no significant difference in the level of 
earnings management.   
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Barth et al. (2008) investigate whether the degree of earnings management changes after 
voluntary adoption of international standards during 1994-2003, in a cross country study. 
They conclude that the level of income smoothing is lower for companies applying 
international standards. Also they find a higher association between net income and stock 
returns, which is evidence of earnings being more informative.  
The study of Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) examines the consequences of the introduction 
of IFRS on earnings management in UK, France and Australia.  It is argued that IFRS 
“provides firm with substantial discretion” (Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008, 484). Earnings 
management is found to be higher after IFRS adoption in France and remaining stable in UK 
and Australia. The explanation given is that countries have different institutional 
characteristics.  
 
Soderstrom and Sun (2007) attempt to find an explanation for the mixed results in prior 
research on the consequences of IFRS adoption for accounting quality. They argue that 
accounting quality not only depends on the accounting standards applied but also on a 
country’s legal and political system and financial reporting incentives. Accounting standard 
setting is primarily influenced by government in code law countries and private 
organizations in common law countries. Differences in legal enforcement across countries 
also play a role.  
 
 
3. Hypothesis development and research design 
After 2005 listed companies in Europe are required to apply IFRS. These standards follow a 
principle based approach and fair value accounting which requires more subjective 
judgement.   
Paananen and Lin (2008) report that income smoothing behaviour increased after IFRS 
adoption in Germany. Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) provide evidence of more earnings 
management after IFRS introduction in France. This leads to my first hypothesis: 
 
H1: After the introduction of IFRS, firms in UK, France and Netherlands smooth income to 
a higher degree than during pre IFRS period. 
 
Certain studies investigated the level of income smoothing across countries, by taking 
investor protection into consideration (e.g. Cahan et al. 2008, Leuz et al. 2003). Their 
findings suggest that income smoothing is more pervasive in countries where shareholders 
are less protected by law and regulations. Following these results, I deduce the next 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: Income smoothing is lower in countries with strong investor protection regimes.  
 
Keeping in mind that UK is a strong investor protection country and France and 
Netherlands have weaker investor protection based on proxies of La Porta et al. (1998) and 
the fact that I investigate two time periods, the following sub hypotheses are developed: 
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a: During pre IFRS adoption period income smoothing is higher in France and Netherlands 
compared to UK. 
b: During post IFRS adoption period income smoothing is higher in France and Netherlands 
compared to UK. 
 
When managers use income smoothing to communicate private information about future 
earnings, this information will be revealed in the stock price (Tucker and Zarowin 2006). 
Other studies argue that the effect of income smoothing on earnings informativeness also 
depends on the country’s legal origin. Cahan et al. (2008) conclude that in strong investor 
protection countries income smoothing leads to more informative earnings. This is due to 
the fact that managers in these countries have high incentives to smooth earnings in order 
to reveal information to the market.   
Assuming that the first hypothesis is true, and considering previous evidence about income 
smoothing improving earnings informativeness in strong investor protection countries, I 
have the same expectation about firms in UK. 
 
H3: After the adoption of IFRS, income smoothing improves earnings informativeness to a 
higher extent than during the pre IFRS adoption period for firms in UK. 
 
In contradiction to high investor protection, weak investor protection allows for more 
discretion. In this case the managerial intendancy to manipulate earnings aggravates 
according to Hung (2001). The author also suggests that the positive effect of income 
smoothing on value relevance of earnings is attenuated in low investor protection 
economies. This is because in those countries, managers are believed to smooth income for 
opportunistic reasons, according to Cahan et al. (2008). Income smoothing is then 
considered to cause earnings to be noisier and thus less informative Tucker and Zarowin 
(2006). 
Considering the fact that France and Netherlands are characterized by weak investor 
protection, the next hypothesis can be formulated: 
 
H4: After IFRS adoption, income smoothing improves earnings informativeness to a lower 
extent than during the pre IFRS period for firms in France and Netherlands.   
 Sample data 
The aim of my study is to compare two groups of countries with different institutional 
characteristics prior to IFRS adoption and after the IFRS adoption. I choose listed 
companies from France and the Netherlands (French origin) on the one side and United 
Kingdom (English origin) on the other side. UK is a strong investor protection country while 
France and the Netherlands display a lower level of investor protection. Besides UK has a 
common law system, while France and the Netherlands are code law countries. The 
judgement on the strength of the investor protection system is based on the scores for the 
investor protection proxies (proxies from La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, used by Leuz et al. 
2003).  
I use annual, firm level data for my research from the databases Worldscope (Thomson One 
Banker) and Datastream. The regressions will be estimated for two sample periods: pre 
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IFRS adoption (2002 – 2004) and post IFRS adoption (2006 – 2008). The base years will be 
2003 and 2007 respectively. 
An overview of the sample construction is provided in table 1, after the missing 
observations are left out. For the final samples: financial firms are excluded, because of 
their different accounting practices.  
 
Table 1 Sample 
Country Pre IFRS Post IFRS 
France 363 241 
The 
Netherlands 
82 78 
UK 642 253 
Total 1.087 572 
 
Methodology 
 
 Income smoothing measure 
Income smoothing is measured by variation in net income relative to the variation in 
operating cash flows: σNI/σCFO. A lower relative variation in net income is evidence of 
income smoothing (Zarowin 2002). To estimate the income smoothing measure for 2003 
(pre IFRS, base year), data about net income and operating cash flows for the years 2001, 
2002, and 2003 is needed. Similar, the smoothing measure of 2007 (post IFRS, base year) 
requires data from 2005, 2006, 2007.  
An income smoothing ranking is employed by Zarowin (2002) to control for industry and 
time effects. I choose a similar way of ranking, with a small modification. The smoothing 
variable IS is determined as the fractional ranking of income smoothing and takes values 
between 0 and 1. The fractional ranking is the raw rank minus 1 divided to the number of 
observations minus 1. An example: The firms are arranged according to the σNI/ σCFO from 
low smoothing to high and suppose there are 100 firms totally. The highest smoothing firm 
has raw rank 100, which results in a fractional ranking of (100-1)/(100-1) = 1, for the 
second highest smoothing firm it will be (99-1)/(100-1) = 0,989. A higher value indicates 
more income smoothing and thus a higher rank.  
 
 Earnings informativeness measure 
The relation between stock returns and future earnings is measured by the future earnings 
response coefficient (FERC). This is the coefficient on future earnings in a regression of 
current stock return on current and future earnings. The model of Tucker and Zarowin 
(2006) requires a longer sample period, since three years ahead of earnings and returns are 
included in the regression. Zarowin (2002) restricts the sample period, by taking only one 
year ahead of earnings and returns in consideration. I choose this last approach, since my 
sample period after IFRS is limited. Besides like Zarowin (2002, 13) argues, if there is an 
association between income smoothing and earnings informativeness it is more likely to be 
discovered in the next year than in the second or third year. 
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Main model 
To provide evidence on hypothesis 3 and 4, the effect of income smoothing on the relation 
between stock return and future earnings has to be examined. This will be achieved, by 
applying the next regression based on Zarowin (2002): 
 
Rt = b0 + b1EPSt-1 + b2EPSt + b3EPSt+1 + b4Rt+1 + b5ISt + b6ISt * EPSt-1 +  b7ISt * EPSt + b8ISt * EPSt+1 
+ b9ISt * Rt+1 + εt  
 
Where:  
Rt  = the current annual stock return in year t 
EPSt-1  = the earnings per share for year t-1, deflated by the stock price at the beginning 
of year t 
EPSt  = the earnings per share for year t, deflated by the stock price at the beginning of 
year t 
EPSt+1 = the earnings per share in the year t+1, deflated by the stock price at the 
beginning of year t 
Rt+1 = the stock return for year t+1 
 
The earnings per share variables are adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends and 
excluding extraordinary items. The FERC is represented by b3, and is predicted to be 
positive. The higher this coefficient the more information about future earnings is included 
in the current stock price. The coefficient on current earnings, b2 is also predicted to be 
positive and higher than b3.The coefficient on past earnings is predicted to be negative. 
The coefficient on ISt * EPSt+1, b8, is expected to be positive if income smoothing results in 
more information about future earnings (since a higher ranking means more smoothing). In 
contrast when income smoothing is considered as garbling then b8 is predicted to be 
negative. In that case current stock returns contain less information about future earnings. 
This regression will be estimated for each country twice, before IFRS and after IFRS 
adoption.   
 
4. Empirical results and analysis 
4.1 The degree of income smoothing 
 
UK  
From performed sample statistics it follows that the mean σNI/σCFO amounts 2,147 during 
pre IFRS and 1,350 after IFRS. A lower ratio indicates a higher degree of income smoothing. 
In fact the ratio should be less than 1 for income smoothing firms (Zarowin 2002). When I 
take a look at the absolute values of the σNI/σCFO ratio, then I conclude that 305 from the 
622 UK firms (49%) have a ratio lower than 1, which is evidence of income smoothing. For 
the post IFRS period 155 from 239 companies (65%) show a lower variation in net income 
relative to the variation in operating cash flows. The difference in the mean values 
together with the decrease in the absolute values suggests that firms in UK smooth income 
to a higher degree after IFRS adoption.  
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To confirm this establishment, the Mann-Whitney test is performed. This is a non 
parametric test that allows comparing two independent samples, which do not satisfy the 
condition of normally distributed data. The actual Mann-Whitney statistic is the U3.  
The results of the Mann-Whitney test for UK are given in table 2. 
 
Table 2 Mann-Whitney test results pre IFRS UK vs. post IFRS UK  
Ranks Test Statisticsa 
 Period N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks  σNI/σCFO 
Pre IFRS 621 452,41 280.946,00 Mann-Whitney U 60.604,000 
Post IFRS 239 373,57 89.284,00 Wilcoxon W 89.284,000 
Total 860   Z -4,169 
σNI/σCFO 
    Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 
     a. Grouping Variable: Period 
 
The lower mean rank in the post IFRS period means that there are more lower values of 
the ratio σNI/σCFO, than in the pre IFRS period. The difference between these means is 
significant. From previous statements I conclude that firms in UK smooth income to a 
higher degree after adoption of IFRS, which confirms that hypothesis 1 is proven true for 
UK. 
 
France 
The mean income smoothing ratio (σNI/σCFO) is 1,097 in the pre IFRS period and 0,987 after 
IFRS adoption. Again, the mean ratio is lower after adoption of IFRS. In addition it takes a 
value lower than 1. For the absolute values of smoothing firms I find that about 66% in the 
pre IFRS period and 71% during the period after IFRS introduction have a ratio below 1. 
Also here the Mann-Whitney test is performed. 
 
Table 3 Mann-Whitney test results pre IFRS France vs. post IFRS France 
Ranks Test Statisticsa 
 Period N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks  σNI/σCFO 
Pre IFRS 346 291,77 100.954,00 Mann-Whitney U 39.003,000 
Post IFRS 231 284,84 65.799,00 Wilcoxon W 65.799,000 
Total 577   Z -0,489 
σNI/σCFO 
    Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0,625 
     a. Grouping Variable: Period 
 
The Mann-Whitney test designates that the mean rank is lower after IFRS, but the 
difference is not significant (1-tailed significance 0,625/2 = 0,313). However, there is still 
an indication that companies in France smooth income more after adoption of IFRS. Thus 
hypothesis 1 is considered to be true for France. 
 
 
 
                                             
3 U=N1N2 + (N1 * (N1+1))/2 – R1, where N1 and N2 are the sample sizes of the two groups and R1 is the sum of 
ranks of the first group.  
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The Netherlands 
As for UK and France, for Netherlands the mean σNI/σCFO ratio is also smaller subsequent to 
IFRS adoption. The mean value is 1,550 in the first period with respect to 1,237 in the 
second period. Prior to IFRS, approximately 59% companies show a ratio indicating income 
smoothing practices. After IFRS the percentage grows up to 76%. This is consistent with the 
results of Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008), which also find evidence of increased earnings 
management in France. 
 
Table 4 Mann-Whitney test results pre IFRS Netherlands vs. post IFRS Netherlands 
Ranks Test Statisticsa 
 Period N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks  σNI/σCFO 
Pre IFRS 78 82,97 6.472,00 Mann-Whitney U 2.537,000 
Post IFRS 76 71,88 5.463,00 Wilcoxon W 5.463,000 
Total 154   Z -1,543 
σNI/σCFO 
    Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0,123 
     a. Grouping Variable: Period 
 
In the table 4 the results of the Mann-Whitney test are presented. The mean rank is lower 
in the second period, thus the income smoothing ratio is lower over the whole period, 
significant at 10% level (1-tailed significance 0,123/2 = 0,061). There is evidence that 
companies smooth income to a larger degree after appliance of IFRS standards. Thus the 
prediction made in hypothesis 1 is considered true for Netherlands. 
 
Comparison between France, the Netherlands and UK 
France and Netherlands have weaker investor protection than UK. The legal environment 
of a country is predicted to influence the degree of managers’ discretion in a country.  
 
Pre IFRS 
The Kruskal-Wallis test is similar to the Mann-Whitney, it is based on ranks, and performs 
well with not normally distributed data. In addition, the Kruskal-Wallis can be used to test 
for differences among more than two groups, which is the case here, since I want to 
compare the mean of σNI/σCFO for UK, France and the Netherlands.  The results of this test 
for the pre IFRS period are shown in the next table. 
 
Table 5 Pre IFRS Kruskal-Wallis test results France, Netherlands and UK  
Ranks Test Statisticsa 
 Country N Mean Rank  σNI/σCFO 
UK 621 574,25 Chi-Square 45,586 
France 346 439,55 df 2 
Netherlands 78 485,15 Asymp. Sig. 0,000 
σNI/σCFO 
Total 1.045  a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
    b. Grouping Variable: Country 
 
The mean rank is the highest for UK and lowest for France. A lower mean rank indicates 
lower values of σNI/σCFO. The difference is significant, which means that the country in 
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which a company operates influences the degree of income smoothing. In France and 
Netherlands firms smooth income to a larger extent compared to firms in UK in the pre 
IFRS period. Also the mean σNI/σCFO is higher for UK, as mentioned in section 4.1. These 
findings confirm hypothesis 2a. 
 
Post IFRS 
The same expectations apply for the post IFRS period. Table 6 presents the results of the 
Kruskal-Wallis test.  
 
Table 6 Post IFRS Kruskal-Wallis test results France, Netherlands and UK  
Ranks Test Statisticsa 
 Country N Mean Rank  σNI/σCFO 
UK 239 294,02 Chi-Square 7,451 
France 231 260,17 df 2 
Netherlands 76 249,49 Asymp. Sig. 0,024 
σNI/σCFO 
Total 546  a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
    b. Grouping Variable: Country 
 
Again the mean rank of UK is the highest, followed by France and Netherlands. The degree 
of income smoothing is significantly different across the investigated countries, with 
companies in UK smoothing income less than companies in France and Netherlands. This 
conclusion can also be depicted if the mean ranks of σNI/σCFO for the three countries are 
considered. Hypothesis 2b is thus supported by the results. 
Even in the period after IFRS firms in weak investor protection countries smooth income 
more than firms in strong protection countries. They might do so for different reasons. 
With weak investor protection (e.g. weak public enforcement) opportunistic behaviour is 
less likely to be detected and probably more prevalent.   
 
4.2  Income smoothing and earnings informativeness 
In this section the results of the main model are presented per country. The main model 
for each period is specified below. 
 
Pre IFRS: Rt = b0 + b1EPS2002 + b2EPS2003 + b3EPS2004+ b4R2004 + b5IS2003 + b6IS2003 * EPS2002 +  
b7IS2003 * EPS2003 + b8IS2003 * EPS2004 + b9IS2003 * R2004 + εt  
 
Post IFRS: Rt = b0 + b1EPS2006 + b2EPS2007 + b3EPS2008 + b4R2008 + b5IS2007 + b6IS2007 * EPS2006 +  
b7IS2007 * EPS2007 + b8IS2007 * EPS2008 + b9IS2007 * R2008 + εt  
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Table 7 Results UK 
 Model 
variables Intercept EPSt-1 EPSt EPSt+1 Rt+ 1 ISt 
ISt * 
EPS t-1 
ISt * 
EPSt 
ISt * 
EPSt+ 1 
ISt * 
Rt+1 
Coefficients -0,268 0,018 0,142 -0,032 -0,089 0,014 0,056 0,258 0,507 0,058 
t-statistic  (-9,966) (1,516) (2,585) (-0,408) (-4,129) (0,287) (0,879) (1,395) (2,503) (1,447) 
UK pre 
IFRS* 
P-value 0,000 0,130 0,010 0,683 0,000 0,774 0,380 0,164 0,013 0,148 
Coefficients 0,003 1,121 0,686 2,072 -0,408 0,277 -1,643 1,764 -2,786 0,527 
t-statistic  (0,043) (2,364) (0,697) (2,168) (-2,714) (1,975) (-1,268) (0,827) (-1,617) (1,865) 
UK post 
IFRS** P-value 0,966 0,019 0,487 0,031 0,007 0,049 0,206 0,409 0,107 0,063 
*Adj. R2=0,215 
**Adj. R2=0,165 
  
The coefficient on the interaction between income smoothing and future earnings is the 
one I am interested in (ISt * EPSt+1). For the pre IFRS period this coefficient is significantly 
positive, as predicted. Thus it can be concluded that income smoothing enhances earnings 
informativeness in the pre IFRS period for UK. The value of b7 is also positive but not 
significant. 
For the post IFRS period income smoothing is predicted to improve the information content 
of current stock returns about future earnings to a higher extent than in the pre IFRS 
period for UK. In contrast, b8 is found to be highly negative. However the results are not 
significant and the explanatory power of the model is also lower in the post IFRS period.  
If income smoothing alters information in the post IFRS period, a suitable explanation 
should be provided. It might be possible that IFRS allows for more discretion than UK 
GAAP, which encourages managers to manipulate earnings for opportunistic reasons. 
In the end, the evidence provided does not support hypothesis 3, since the results are 
inconsistent with the predictions and not significant.  
 
Table 8 Results France 
 Model 
variables Intercept EPSt-1 EPSt EPSt+1 Rt+1 ISt 
ISt * 
EPSt-1 
ISt * 
EPSt 
ISt * 
EPSt+1 
ISt * 
Rt+1 
Coefficients -0,348 0,086 0,090 0,013 0,009 0,229 -0,151 0,263 0,483 -0,209 
t-statistic  (-10909) (2,063) (1,464) (0,144) (0,234) (4,110) (-1,021) (1,346) (2,227) (-2,800) 
France 
pre 
IFRS* P-value 0,000 0,040 0,144 0,885 0,815 0,000 0,308 0,179 0,027 0,005 
Coefficients 0,110 1,667 1,116 -0,078 0,207 0,069 -0,791 -0,813 -0,088 -0,116 
t-statistic  (1,660) (3,108) (1,988) (-0,142) (1,106) (0,523) (-0,483) (-0,572) (-0,083) (-0,349) 
France 
post 
IFRS** P-value 0,098 0,002 0,048 0,887 0,270 0,601 0,629 0,568 0,934 0,728 
*Adj. R2=0,224 
**Adj. R2=0,153 
  
 
The key interest coefficient is significantly positive for France during pre IFRS. Income 
smoothing also causes stock return to include more information about current earnings, 
although b7 is not significant.   
In the second period, b8 shows a negative value, but highly insignificant. The same 
conclusion as for UK can be drawn here. In addition b7 is negative, which means that 
income smoothing does not lead to more information about current earnings being 
included in the price, which is unreasonable. 
Although for the post IFRS period the results are not significant, I carefully consider 
hypothesis 4 to be true for France, based on the results for both periods. Income 
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smoothing causes earnings to be less informative after IFRS adoption, I can not conclude 
that income smoothing is garbling in the post IFRS period, since the results are not 
significant. 
 
Table 9 Results Netherlands 
 Model 
variables Intercept EPSt-1 EPSt EPSt+1 Rt+1 ISt 
ISt * 
EPSt-1 
ISt * 
EPSt 
ISt * 
EPSt+1 
ISt * 
Rt+1 
Coefficients -0,232 -0,186 0,295 0,365 -0,291 0,053 0,622 -0,486 0,269 0,065 
t-statistic  (-3,639) (-2,216) (2,687) (1,438) (-2,501) (0,508) (2,007) (-1,233) (0,405) (0,303) 
NL pre 
IFRS* 
P-value 0,001 0,030 0,009 0,155 0,015 0,613 0,049 0,222 0,687 0,763 
Coefficients 0,106 1,066 1,370 0,797 -0,095 0,071 -0,278 1,420 -2,961 0,246 
t-statistic  (1,022) (1,777) (2,186) (1,290) (-0,261) (0,327) (-0,108) (0,664) (-1,942) (0,384) 
NL post 
IFRS** 
P-value 0,310 0,080 0,032 0,201 0,795 0,745 0,915 0,509 0,056 0,702 
*Adj. R2=0,316 
**Adj. R2=0,226 
  
 
For Netherlands b8 is also positive but not significant prior to IFRS. The coefficient on 
current earnings is negative and insignificant. The evidence is not convincing, so I can not 
conclude that income smoothing improves earnings informativeness before IFRS adoption. 
After IFRS, the coefficient on future earnings is highly negative and significant at 10% 
level, which induces that income smoothing is altering information. In contrast, b7 is 
positive but not significant. Given the insignificant results for the pre IFRS period, I 
consider that hypothesis 4 is supported for Netherlands. 
 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
5.1  Conclusions 
First of all I found evidence of higher income smoothing behaviour after the introduction of 
IFRS in UK, France and Netherlands. These results confirm the expectation that IFRS 
standards allow for more managerial discretion. Fair value accounting requires subjective 
judgement. Managers probably use this incentive to smooth income streams.  
Further, in the weak investor protection countries France and Netherlands, firms present 
more stable earnings than in UK, for both periods of time. An explanation is that managers 
in low investor protection countries are more able to hide true firm’s performance for 
stakeholders and act in their own benefit (Cahan et al. 2008).  
The second part of my research, relates to the effect of income smoothing on earnings 
informativeness. In the period prior to IFRS income smoothing causes stock returns to 
contain more information about future earnings for all three countries, with insignificant 
results for Netherlands. Subsequently to IFRS adoption the findings indicate that income 
smoothing decreases earnings informativeness for all the three countries, although the 
results are insignificant for UK and France. This is in accordance to my expectations for 
France and Netherlands but not for UK. Since firms in UK show more stable earning after 
IFRS, it is not only about the degree of smoothness. Like Cahan et al. (2008) suggest, in 
strong investor protection countries firms mainly smooth income to efficiently 
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communicate information about true firm performance, while in weak investor protection 
countries opportunism is the major reason. In the first case, income smoothing should 
improve the value relevance of earnings.  
A possible explanation for the garbling effect of income smoothing in the post IFRS period 
for UK, is that managers act in their own interest. The new standards provide more 
incentives for managers to smooth earnings than the UK GAAP standards probably. 
Managers use this discretion in an opportunistic way, despite of the high level investor 
protection. Another explanation could be that the public enforcement of accounting rules 
in the sample countries also changed after the introduction of IFRS. Or maybe national 
regulators expect more guidance from the European regulatory body (CESR) about how to 
enforce the new IFRS rules. Less strict enforcement would create more incentives for 
managers to deceive. However the results for the post IFRS period are not significant, and 
should carefully be interpreted.  
The degree of investor protection seems to be less important after IFRS adoption. 
Nevertheless this is a suggestive interpretation, since some results are insignificant.  
 
Based on the evidence found no explicit conclusion can be drawn. The differences in the 
degree of income smoothing and earnings informativeness among countries can not be fully 
assigned to just the applied accounting standards, neither to just the institutional factors. 
It is rather a combination of factors, which affects the incentives for income smoothing. 
 
In the end I would like to conclude this discussion by quoting Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008, 
493): 
“…management incentives and national institutional factors play an important role in 
framing financial reporting characteristics, probably more important than accounting 
standards alone. The IASB and the European Commission should now devote their efforts 
to harmonizing incentives and institutional factors rather than harmonizing accounting 
standards.” 
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To summarize, the relation I found between IFRS, investor protection, income smoothing 
and earnings informativeness in this research is as follows.  
 
    UK          France, Netherlands 
        (Strong investor protection)     (Weak investor protection) 
 
 
Pre IFRS                       Low IS      Medium IS 
 
 
    
  Informative earnings  >       Informative earnings 
 
 
Post IFRS               Medium IS                 High IS  
    
 
             
  Uninformative earnings*                      Uninformative earnings* 
 
IS = income smoothing 
* the evidence is not significant 
 
5.2 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
I acknowledge that my study has some limitations. First of all the interpretation of the 
model is uncertain in an inefficient market, since it assumes market efficiency. Secondly, 
the income smoothing measure might not capture smoothing behaviour accurately. Next, 
the chosen samples include are small compared to prior research. The mandatory adoption 
of IFRS is still recent and the time horizon of data is limited. Fourthly, other factors that 
can influence income smoothing and/or the relation between income smoothing and 
earnings informativeness are not taken into account (e.g. firm size, industry, the growth 
rate of the company, inflation). In the end additional robustness test are not performed.  
In the end future research should be able to better investigate the effect of IFRS adoption 
on income smoothing and earnings informativeness using a bigger sample and omitting the 
implementation period. The influence of institutional factors should be more thoroughly 
investigated and changes in managerial incentives should be identified. 
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The Mandatory Introduction of IFRS as a 
Single Accounting Standard in the 
European Union and the Effect on 
Earnings Management 
 
 
Mark Lippens1 
     
 
Executive summary  
In this study, it was investigated whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS from 1 January 
2005 by all listed companies in the European Union led to significantly lower levels of 
earnings management. I found that, despite the stricter character of IFRS compared to 
national GAAP, accruals-based earnings management has strictly increased as a 
consequence of the adoption of IFRS. I further found that real earnings management has 
strictly increased, and that, despite the fact that both manifestations of earnings 
management strictly increased, due to the introduction of IFRS, they are increasingly used 
as substitutes of one another. This indicates that management looks for alternatives to 
manipulate earnings when accruals-based earnings management becomes more difficult, 
instead of lowering their earnings management activities. I was therefore unable to 
establish that IFRS has been successful in restricting earnings management 
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5129.  
 
1. Introduction 
In 2002, the EU Council and Parliament accepted the IAS-directive (1606/2002/EC). This 
regulation requires that all listed companies in the member states, beginning on 1 January 
2005, prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). With this legislation, the discussion on the role of 
accountings standards in producing high quality financial reporting with little room for 
earnings management, has intensified and is expected to intensify even further.  
 
                                             
1 This article is based on my Master Thesis. I thank Prof. Dr. M.A. van Hoepen RA for his role as thesis 
supervisor. Currently, I am employed at KPMG Accountants N.V. as a trainee in the audit department. 
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While IFRS is thought to be more strict and rules-based, it also creates new opportunities 
for the exercising of judgement in the financial reporting process. Furthermore, new 
incentives to smooth earnings are created, in order to prevent the increase in volatility of 
earnings as a consequence of the introduction of IFRS. These conflicting effects make it 
hard to predict which effect IFRS will have on the prevalence of earnings management. 
Unfortunately, the existing literature on the effects of IFRS on the level of earnings 
management is also far from conclusive. 
 
The mandatory adoption of IFRS thus creates opportunities for research on accounting 
standards and their effect on preventing earnings management. The fact that many 
countries now apply one single set of accounting standards creates an opportunity to 
research the isolated effect of tighter accounting standards, as the effect can now be 
researched in different institutional settings. However, new questions arise, due to the 
relatively newness of IFRS and some of its particularities, with the increased role of fair 
value as the most pronounced one. The main question therefore is whether IFRS is 
successful in reducing earnings management and producing high quality financial reporting. 
This leads to the following research question that is investigated in this study: 
 
Has the mandatory adoption of IFRS from 1 January 2005 by all listed companies in the 
European Union led to significantly lower levels of earnings management? 
 
To avoid the problems in existing research, the research design proposed in this study is 
different from that used in most earlier studies on this topic. Most important is that I 
consider the possibility that while accruals management could indeed be effectively 
reduced by stricter accounting standards, management could turn to real earnings 
management by strategically structuring transactions, to manipulate reported earnings. 
Because IFRS will not lead to a decrease in the incentives to manage earnings, and possibly 
even to increased incentives to do so, managers can still be expected to manage earnings. 
Real earnings management then becomes a feasible alternative for accruals-based earnings 
management.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, a broad literature review is 
presented that considers the existing literature with respect to the effect of accounting 
standards in general, and IFRS in particular, on the prevalence of earnings management. In 
Chapter 3 my hypotheses are developed. The research methodology that is used to test 
these hypotheses is explained in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 my results are presented and 
Chapter 6 concludes with the summary and conclusion.  
 
 
2. Prior literature  
2.1 Definitions 
To consider whether the introduction of IFRS indeed enhances financial reporting quality, 
first of all a measure of financial reporting quality is needed. For this, the amount of 
earnings management is often considered. Earnings management is thought to have a 
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negative influence on the transparency and comparability of financial reporting 
(Heemskerk & Van der Tas, 2006).  
 
In the wide range of literature regarding earnings management, several definitions of 
earnings management can be found. Healy and Wahlen (1999) provide us with the following 
definition: 
 
“Healy and Wahlen (1999): “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement 
in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company, 
or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” 
 
Central theme in the above definition is the purposeful intervention by a firm’s 
management in the financial reporting process. This intervention is possible because of the 
discretion available to management to do so. Standard setters allow managers a 
considerable amount of judgement in the financial reporting process. This enables 
managers to choose the reporting methods, estimates, and disclosures that match the firm 
best and thereby provide the most information for financial statement users (Healy & 
Wahlen 1999). However, greater discretion over financial reporting also creates 
opportunities for earnings management. In that case, choices made by a firm’s 
management in the financial reporting process are not motivated by best reflecting their 
firm’s underlying performance (Healy & Wahlen 1999). Instead, they are aimed at 
influencing the users of the financial reports in such a way that will benefit the 
organisation or its management.  
 
Earnings management does not need to refer exclusively to the exercising of judgement in 
the accounting process. Another way to manipulate earnings is to strategically structure 
transactions. This can be done in several ways, including speeding up sales by providing 
greater discounts or cutting R&D expenses to increase earnings. Roychowdhury (2004) 
states that the failure to look at real earnings management next to accruals-based earnings 
management could well explain the lack of strong results in many previous studies. Graham 
et al. (2005) even find evidence that suggests that earnings management by real 
transactions is becoming more important than accounting earnings management. 
Therefore, in my study I consider both accounting earnings management or accruals-based 
earnings management, and specially designed transactions or real earnings management.   
   
2.2 Overview of prior literature 
Due to the relative novelty of IFRS, the amount of research on the effect that the 
widespread adoption of IFRS has had on the level of earnings management in the EU is 
limited. Studies that do focus on IFRS, for the most part compare IFRS with US GAAP, 
making use of the availability of data of early adaptors in countries such as Germany and 
Switzerland. Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) and Heemskerk and Van der Tas (2006) are 
examples of studies that focus on early adopters. Both studies address the question 
whether the adoption of IFRS is associated with lower levels of earnings management. 
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Tendeloo and Vanstraelen focus on Germany, and investigate whether German companies 
that have adopted IFRS engage significantly less in earnings management compared to 
German companies reporting according to German GAAP.  
 
Using the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management, 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) are unable to establish that IFRS impose a significant 
constraint on earnings management. Adoption of IFRS even seems to increase the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals. However, when the authors take hidden reserves into 
consideration, there is no difference in earnings management behaviour between IFRS 
adopters and companies reporting under German GAAP. Also, companies that have adopted 
IFRS appear to engage more in earnings smoothing. But this increase is significantly 
reduced when the company has a Big 4 auditor.  
 
Like Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), Heemskerk and Van der Tas (2006) are unable to 
associate the adoption of IFRS with lower levels of earnings management. Heemskerk and 
Van der Tas gathered a research sample that consists of 160 financial reports of German 
and Swiss companies. Making use of the same earnings management proxies as Tendeloo 
and Vanstraelen (2005), they find that with the implementation of IFRS, the use of 
discretionary accruals has increased. Controlling for country of origin, industry or size does 
not significantly influence this result. For their measure of income smoothing, they find 
that with the implementation of IFRS, the use of accruals to smooth earnings has 
increased.  
 
The results of their study leads Heemskerk and Van der Tas (2006) to conclude that 
earnings management has increased with the implementation of IFRS. The incentive to 
manage earnings in order to reduce the effect that IFRS has on the volatility of earnings, is 
identified by the authors as the main explanation for their results. They also point to the 
increased role of subjectivity under IFRS, which creates opportunities for management to 
manage earnings.   
 
So, both Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) and Heemskerk van Van der Tas (2006) are 
unable to associate IFRS with lower levels of earnings management compared to national 
GAAP. This is consistent with Goncharov and Zimmerman (2006), who focus on income 
smoothing, and find no significant difference in earnings management between German 
GAAP and IAS. Besides considering IFRS and German GAAP, Goncharov and Zimmerman also 
focus on US GAAP. They find that firms that report under US GAAP engage in earnings 
smoothing less often than firms that report under German GAAP or IAS. So while no 
significant differences between German GAAP and IAS are found, their results lead the 
authors to conclude that US GAAP is more effective at mitigating earnings management 
than either German GAAP or IAS. 
 
Another study that investigates the comparative quality of IAS and US GAAP, is that of 
Barth et al. (2006). They find that firms applying IAS generally have lower accounting 
quality than US firms. In particular, IAS firms have a significantly lower variance of the 
change in net income, a lower ratio of the variances of the change in net income and 
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change in cash flows, a significantly more negative correlation between accruals and cash 
flows, and a higher frequency of small positive net income. Barth et al. also compare 
accounting amounts for IAS and US firms before and after the IAS firms adopt IAS. The 
results suggest that application of IAS reduces, but does not eliminate differences in 
accounting quality between the two sets of firms. 
 
In the literature, but also in the financial press and by regulators, the focus has largely 
been on earnings management through the exercising of judgement in the accounting 
process. However, recent findings indicate that management is increasingly willing to 
sacrifice real economic value by using strategic transaction to manage earnings (Graham et 
al., 2005). As a possible explanation, Graham et al. (2005) state that in the post Enron and 
WorldCom era, and with the implementation of laws like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, managers 
are afraid to use their discretion to manipulate accruals. Tighter accounting standards, 
also leave less room for managerial judgment in the financial reporting process. 
 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) study the effect of tightening accounting standards. They 
distinguish between accounting and real earnings management. Accounting earnings 
management concerns the way accounting standards are applied on given transactions and 
events. Real earnings management changes the timing or structuring of real transactions. 
Ewert and Wagenhofer find that as a consequence of tighter accounting standards, real 
earnings management strictly increases, which is interpreted as real earnings management 
substituting for the more difficult and thus costlier accounting earnings management.  
 
However, although accounting earnings management thus becomes more difficult, the 
study shows that stricter accounting standards do not unambiguously reduce accounting 
earnings management. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) point to the trade-off between two 
effects of tighter accounting standards. On one hand, it becomes more difficult and thus 
costlier to engage in accounting earnings management. But at the same time, the 
reduction in accounting earnings management increases the association between reported 
earnings and the market price reaction. This stronger association increases the benefit and 
thus the incentives for a firm’s management to engage in earnings management. So, Ewert 
and Wagenhofer show that tighter accounting standards not only lead to increased real 
earnings management, but also to increased incentives to manage earnings overall. The 
authors therefore conclude that that total earnings management can either decrease or 
increase with tighter accounting standards. 
 
Results obtained by Cohen et al. (2007), which focus on earnings management in the pre- 
and post- Sarbanes Oxley Periods, are a further indication that stricter rules aren’t 
necessarily successful in restricting earnings management. They authors find evidence that 
a substitution effect exists between accruals-based earnings management and real 
earnings management. The researches document that accruals-based earnings 
management increased steadily in the years before the passage of SOX, followed by a 
significant decline in the years afterwards. Conversely, the level of real earnings 
management declined prior to SOX, and increased significantly in the post-SOX period. 
Therefore, Cohen et al. (2007) not only show that other mechanisms apart from accounting 
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standards play a role in restricting earnings management, but they are also able to 
document a substitution effect between the two main manifestations of earnings 
management.   
 
3. Hypotheses development  
From the overview of previous research, it can be learned that existing literature is far 
from conclusive with respect to the effects of the adoption of IFRS on the prevalence of 
earnings management. However, some possible explanations for this lack of conclusive 
findings can be identified. First of all, most existing research on the effect of IFRS on the 
level of earnings management focuses on data samples from before 2005. In this year IFRS 
became mandatory for listed companies in the European Union. Before that date, in 
countries like Germany and Switzerland, firms could voluntarily choose to adopt IFRS. This 
means that research results from these earlier studies could be biased by factors such as 
self-selection and false signalling.  
 
Also, due to a lack of effective enforcement and a lack of knowledge about IFRS (then IAS) 
by both regulatory and legal bodies and users of financial statements, a firm’s 
management could falsely state that it complied with IFRS, while in fact this was hardly 
the case. When these companies are included in the research sample, the results will 
naturally be biased towards IFRS being not effective in restricting earnings management. 
The same applies to the problem with self selection. Companies that already had high 
quality financial reporting could comply with IFRS relatively easy, thereby making a 
statement to their investors about their financial reporting quality. However, when high 
financial reporting quality is the reason behind the voluntary adoption of IFRS, complying 
with IFRS will naturally not have a significant effect on financial reporting quality. Again, 
this could significantly bias the results of earlier studies.  
 
Another important consequence of the focus of most earlier research on the period before 
2005, is the fact that the IASB’s improvements project, under which existing standards are 
being revised and new standards are issued, had not been started at the time of the 
research. In recent years, many standards have been revised and new IFRS standards have 
been issued. It can be expected that this has dramatically increased the quality of the 
standards. Therefore, results from earlier research probably are not representative for the 
current standards. 
 
Also, while there is convincing evidence that real earnings management nowadays is used 
intensively to manage earnings, most existing exclusively focus on accruals-based earnings 
management. This means that a large part of earnings management activities is probably 
not considered in these studies. This in turn leads results obtained in these studies to be 
not representative of the magnitude of all manifestations of earnings management 
combined.  
 
Together, these considerations lead me to believe that the results in previous research on 
the effect of IFRS on the level of earnings management are not representative for the 
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effect that the widespread adoption of IFRS from 1 January 2005 has had on the magnitude 
of earnings management in the EU member states. Based on the above, I expect the results 
in most previous studies to be biased towards IFRS being ineffective in restricting earnings 
management.  
 
IFRS is characterised by stricter rules, which reduces the possibilities for accruals-based 
earnings management. The increased importance of subjectivity with respect to fair value 
accounting has an opposite effect. But if the decreased tolerance towards accounts 
manipulation by users and regulators as a consequence of recent accounting scandals is 
taken into account, it can be expected that the overall effect of IFRS on accruals-based 
earnings management is a restrictive one. Therefore, the first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: The widespread adoption of IFRS in the European Union from 1 January 2005, has led 
to an absolute decrease of the level of accruals-based earnings management by listed 
companies in the EU member states. 
 
However, as stated earlier, accruals-based earnings management is only part of the story. 
Management seems to increasingly turn to real earnings management to manipulate 
earnings. Furthermore, with the introduction of IFRS, earnings are thought to become 
more volatile, while previous research shows that management likes to present a smooth 
earnings path. Volatile earnings are, among others, associated with higher risk and thus 
lead to higher capital costs. With incentives to manage earnings remaining the same, or 
even increasing as a consequence of increased incentives to smooth earnings, management 
can be expected to look for alternative ways to manage earnings. Consistent with findings 
in previous studies, I hypothesize that management shifts away from accruals-based 
earnings management towards real earnings management. The second hypothesis therefore 
is: 
 
H2: The widespread adoption of IFRS in the European Union from 1 January 2005, has led 
to an absolute increase of the level of real earnings management by listed companies in 
the EU member states. 
 
As I hypothesize that accruals-based earnings management decreases and real earnings 
management increases as a consequence of the adoption of IFRS, I implicitly assume that 
there is a substitution effect between the two manifestations of earnings management. I 
expect accruals-based earnings management to decrease as a consequence of stricter 
accounting standards. At the same time, management can be expected to turn to 
alternative ways to manage earnings, mainly real earnings management, as incentives to 
do so remain the same or even increase. To test the existence of a substitution effect, my 
third hypothesis is: 
 
H3: The widespread adoption of IFRS in the European Union from 1 January 2005, has led 
to a substitution effect, with accruals-based earnings management and real earnings 
management increasingly used as substitutes of one another.  
 
 88 
With this hypothesis I test whether, in the post-IFRS period, accruals-based earnings 
management and real earnings management are more used as substitutes of one another 
instead of as complementary ways to manage earnings, compared to the pre-IFRS period.  
 
Lastly, I consider listed companies from six different countries in my research sample. 
Several studies address the fact that there is more to restricting earnings management and 
enhancing financial reporting quality than high quality accounting standards alone. As Ball 
et al. (2003) state “…it is incomplete and misleading to classify countries in terms of their 
formal accounting standards, or even their standard setting institution, without giving 
substantial weight to the institutional influences on preparers’ actual financial reporting 
incentives.” Therefore, I control for these institutional factors. 
 
Considering differences in the institutional context and because of the different 
accounting traditions in the countries from my sample, I expect that the adoption of IFRS 
will have different effects in different countries. In countries where earnings management 
was relatively high in the pre-IFRS period, I expect the introduction of a set of high quality 
accounting standards such as IFRS, to have had a relatively large effect at restricting 
earnings management. And although accounting standards are not all there is to restricting 
earnings management, the fact that the implementation of IFRS in the EU member states is 
part of a larger action plan to enhance investor protection and effective and efficient 
capital markets further enhances this expectation. Therefore, my last hypothesis is: 
 
H4: The widespread adoption of IFRS in the European Union from 1 January 2005, has had 
different effects in different countries, with the restricting effect on the level of 
earnings management being the highest in countries with the highest levels of earnings 
management in the pre-IFRS period. 
 
4. Research Design 
I focus on two main kinds of earnings management, namely accruals-based earnings 
management and real earnings management.  
 
4.1 Accruals based earnings management  
Magnitude of discretionary accruals  
As a first measure of accruals-based earnings management, I consider the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals. Total accruals exist of non-discretionary accruals, which are 
normally related to economic activity, and discretionary accruals, that result from 
manipulative actions by management. Only total accruals can be observed, which means 
that discretionary accruals have to be estimated. Several models have been developed for 
this purpose, under which the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995). This model is 
among the ones most frequently used in studies on the relation between accounting 
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standards and the level of earnings management, and will also so be used in this study, 
although I make some modifications. 
 
The Modified Jones Model has received heavy criticism. By some studies, it is found to 
generate tests of low power for detecting earnings management of economically plausible 
magnitudes (e.g. accruals of 1% to 5%) (Peasnell et al., 2000). This leads to Type II errors, 
in which the null hypothesis of no earnings management is wrongly accepted. Also, in the 
case of extreme financial performance, the model is poorly specified, in that it attributes 
these extremes to earnings management (Peasnell et al., 2000). So in this case, Type I 
errors pose a problem, in that researches wrongly reject the null hypothesis of no earnings 
management. 
 
Several improvements have been proposed in the literature to deal with these problems. 
Following Peasnell et al. (2000), I use a cross-sectional model. This, among other things, 
generates larger sample size, thereby increasing both the efficiency and reliability of the 
results. Also, to deal with the problem of misspecification in the case of extreme financial 
performance, I include the change in cash flow from operations as an extra variable in the 
regression. Dechow (1994) finds that the change in operating cash flow is negatively 
correlated with total accruals. Also, Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) argue that including cash 
flow from operations in the regression model not only increases precision, but also 
increases the power to detect earnings management, especially at lower levels of earnings 
manipulation. 
 
Apart from the adjusted Model proposed above, I will also use the original Modified Jones 
Model, adjusted for credit sales. This increases comparability of the results with earlier 
studies which also use this model. Also, using the two models to estimate discretionary 
accruals could be informative as to the relative quality of both models. 
 
Using the cross-sectional approach to estimate discretionary accruals, first firms are 
matched on year (t) and industry (k). A minimum of six observations per regression is 
required. Than, in the first stage of the two-stage cross-sectional regression, for each 2 
digit SIC-year groupings, accruals are regressed on the change in sales adjusted by credit 
sales (∆ADJREV), gross property, plant, and equipment (PPE), and the change in cash flow 
from operations (ΔCFO), using the following regression. 
 
(1) TAit/Ai, t-1 = α1t[1/Ai, t-1] + α2[∆ADJREVit/Ai, t-1] + α3[PPEit/Ai, t-1] + α4[∆CFOit/Ai,t-1] + εit 
 
All variables in the model are scaled by lagged total assets (Ai,t-1) to reduce 
heteroscedasticity. εit is included as an error term. Total accruals (TAit) are calculated as 
earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (EBXIit) minus the 
operating cash flows from continuing operations (CFOit): 
 
(2) TAit  =  EBXIit - CFOit 
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As said, apart from the model stated above, I will also use the original Modified Jones 
Model, adjusted for credit sales: 
 
(3)  TAit/Ai, t-1  =  α1t[1/Ai, t-1] + α2[∆ADJREVit/Ai, t-1] + α3[PPEit/Ai, t-1] + εit 
 
After the first stage, the coefficient estimates from equation (1) and (3) are used to 
estimate the firm-specific non-discretionary accruals (NDAit) for the sample firms: 
 
(4)  NDAit  =  â1t[1/Ait-1] + â2[∆ADJREVit/Ait-1] + â3[PPEit/Ait-1] + â4[∆CFOit/Ai,t-1] 
 
And for the Modified Jones Model: 
 
(5)  NDAit =  â1t[1/Ait-1] + â2[∆ADJREVit/Ait-1] + â3[PPEit/Ait-1] 
 
Finally, discretionary accruals (DAit for the Modified Jones Model, DAit(ΔCFO) for the model 
that controls for financial performance) are calculated as: 
 
(6)  DAit  or DAit(ΔCFO)  =  TAit/Ait-1 – NDAit 
 
In this study, the desire by management to reduce the volatility of earnings is considered 
as one of the main incentives for earnings management. This means that earnings can be 
managed downwards as well as upwards. Furthermore, no specific corporate events are 
distinguished that drive earnings management activities. Because accruals reverse over 
time, and no assumptions are made regarding the direction in which earnings are managed, 
I compute the absolute value of discretionary accruals to proxy for earnings management. 
My proxies for accruals-based earnings management will therefore be the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, calculated with either the ΔCFO model, ABS_DA(ΔCFO), or the 
Modified Jones Model, ABS_DA. 
Income smoothing 
Apart from the magnitude of discretionary accruals, I also consider a second measure of 
accruals-based earnings management. Following Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), and 
Heemskerk and Van Der Tas (2006), I use the correlation between total accruals and cash 
flow from operations as a proxy for income smoothing. A negative correlation between 
accruals and cash flow is inherent to accrual accounting. However, accruals can also be 
managed to smooth the variability in cash flow from operations. Differences in the 
magnitude of the negative correlation between total accruals and cash flow from 
operations before and after IFRS are then indicative for the difference in the magnitude of 
income smoothing in the two periods. 
 
4.2 Real earnings management 
Apart from focussing on manipulating earnings by using discretion over the accounting 
process, I also consider real earnings management. As I did with accruals, I rely on previous 
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studies for my proxies for real earnings management. Following, among others, 
Roychowdhury (2006), I consider the abnormal level of cash flow from operations, and the 
abnormal level of production costs to be proxies for the level of real earnings 
management. These proxies have been used and proven to be valid in subsequent studies 
by, among others, Gunny (2006) and Cohen (2007).  
 
Roychowdhury (2006) considers three manipulation methods that affect the levels of cash 
flow from operations and productions costs: 
1. Sales manipulation, which is accelerating the timing of sales by offering increased price 
discounts or more lenient credit terms. 
2. The reduction of discretionary expenses, which include advertising expense, research 
and development, and SG&A expenses. 
3. Overproduction, which involves lowering cost of goods sold by increasing production. 
 
From this, it follows that: 
1. Abnormally high price discounts and overproduction lead to abnormally high production 
costs relative to sales.  
2. Price discounts and overproduction have a negative effect on contemporaneous 
abnormal cash flow from operations, while reducing discretionary expenditures has a 
positive effect. Therefore, the net effect on abnormal CFO is ambiguous.  
Abnormal cash flow from operations 
The estimating models that I use are based on Roychowdhury (2006), which is in turn based 
on Dechow et al. (1998). First, normal CFO is expressed as a linear function of sales (Sit) 
and the change in sales (ΔSit). Again, all variables in the model are scaled by lagged total 
assets (Ai,t-1) to reduce heteroscedasticity:  
 
(7)  CFOit/Ai, t-1  =  α1t[1/Ait-1] + α2t[Sit/Ai, t-1] + α3t[∆Sit/Ai, t-1] + εit 
 
Then, in the second stage, normal cash flow from operations (NCFOit) is calculated using 
the estimated coefficients from equation (7): 
 
(8)  NCFOit/Ai, t-1  =  â1t[1/Ait-1] + â2t[Sit/Ai, t-1] + â3t[∆Sit/Ai, t-1] 
 
Lastly, abnormal cash flow from operations (R_CFO) is measured as the actual cash flow 
from operations (CFOit) minus the estimated normal cash flow from operations (NCFOit). 
 
(9)  R_CFO  =  CFOit/Ai, t-1 - NCFOit/Ai, t-1 
 
As explained earlier, the effect of the different real earnings management activities on 
cash flow is ambiguous. Futhermore, no direction of earnings management is predicted in 
this study. Therefore, as with discretionary accruals, I use the absolute value of abnormal 
CFO (ABS_R_CFO), as my first proxy for real earnings management. However, to be 
consistent with earlier studies, I will also consider the nominal value of R_CFO.  
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Abnormal production costs 
Production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold (COGS) and the change in 
inventory during the year. First, COGS are modelled as a linear function of 
contemporaneous sales: 
 
(10)  CGOSit/ Ai, t-1   = α0t + α1t[1/Ait-1] + α2t[Sit/Ai, t-1] + εit 
 
Inventory growth is modelled as: 
 
(11)  ∆INVit/ Ai, t-1  =  α0t + α1t[1/Ait-1] + α2t[∆Sit/Ai, t-1] + α3t[∆Si, t-1/Ai, t-1] +  εit 
 
Thus, inventory growth is modelled as a function of current sales and lagged sales. Next, 
production costs (PROD) are defined as the sum of COGS and INV. Using (6) and (7), 
production costs are then modelled as: 
 
(12)  PRODit/ Ai, t-1 = α0t + α1t[1/Ait-1] + α2t[Sit/Ai, t-1] + α3t[∆Sit/Ai, t-1] + α4t[∆Si, t-1/Ai, t-1] + εit 
 
Again, in the second stage, abnormal production costs (R_PROD) are estimated as the 
observed production costs, minus the estimated normal production costs, which in turn is 
calculated by using the obtained coefficients from the first stage. 
 
5. Tests and results  
5.1 Sample description 
I investigate the prevalence of earnings management in two main time periods: the pre-
IFRS period, and the post-IFRS period. The pre-IFRS period extends from 2000 through 
2004, and the post-IFRS period extends from 2005 through 2006.  
 
My sample includes listed companies from Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, The 
Netherlands and Sweden. In all these countries, IFRS is mandatory for listed companies 
from 1 January 2005. Although Sweden is not a member of the EU, the audit report and 
basis of presentation note refer to IFRS as adopted by the EU.  
 
I exclude financial institutions (SIC 60-69) and utility companies (SIC 40-49) from my 
sample, as these industries are subject to specific accounting requirements and sometimes 
significant government intervention and regulation, which affects the earnings figures. 
Companies of which data of all variables is not available, firm equity is negative, or total 
or discretionary accruals are above 100% of  lagged total assets, are also excluded from the 
sample. Due to the restriction that a minimum of six observations per regression is 
required, my sample includes observations from three industries, namely: Manufacturing 
(SIC 20-39), Wholesale Trade (SIC 50-59), and Services (SIC 70-89).  
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5.2  Model specification 
I performed regression analysis to control for the differences in earnings management 
incentives. The earnings management proxies are regressed on IFRS and a number of other 
independent variables, to test whether IFRS has an effect on the levels of earnings 
management, apart from other factors that may also play a role. For my proxies for 
accruals-based earnings management, ABS_DA and ABS_DA(ΔCFO), I use the following 
model: 
EMt  = δ0 + δ1YEARt + δ2IFRSt + δ3ROAt + δ4CFOt + δ5LNEMPLt + δ6LEVERAGEt + δ7IND + 
δ8COUNTRY + δ9COUNTRY*IFRS + ε1t 
Where: 
EMt = EM-proxy, either ABS_DA or ABS_DA(ΔCFO) 
YEARt = calendar year 
IFRSt = dummy variable (pre-IFRS = 0, post-IFRS = 1). 
ROAt = return on assets in year t. 
CFOt = cash flows from operations in year t, divided by lagged total assets. 
LNEMPLt  = natural logarithm of the number of employees in year t. 
LEVERAGE t  = ratio of long term debt over common equity in year t. 
IND = industry dummy:  
SIC 20-39 (Manufacturing) = 1;  
SIC 50-59 (Wholesale trade) = 2; 
SIC 70-89 (Services) = 3 
COUNTRY = country dummy: 
 Italy = 1; 
Belgium = 2; 
 The Netherlands = 3 
Denmark = 4; 
 Finland = 5; 
 Sweden = 6. 
 
To test for the effect of the implementation of IFRS on my real earnings management 
proxies, I use a similar model: 
 
RMt  = δ0 + δ1YEARt + δ2IFRSt + δ3ROAt + δ4LNEMPLt + δ5LEVERAGEt + δ6IND + 
δ7COUNTRY + δ8COUNTRY*IFRS + ε1t 
 
Where RM is either absolute abnormal cash flow from operations (ABS_R_CFO) or abnormal 
production costs (R_PROD). 
 
Finally, I also consider a second measure of accruals-based earnings management. 
Following Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), and Heemskerk and Van Der Tas (2006), I use 
the correlation between total accruals and cash flow from operations as a proxy for income 
smoothing. Differences in the magnitude of the negative correlation between total 
accruals and cash flow from operations before and after IFRS are indicative for the 
difference in the magnitude of income smoothing in the two periods.  
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ACCt  = δ0 + δ1YEARt + δ2IFRSt + δ3ROAt + δ4CFOt + δ5IFRSt*CFOt + δ6LNEMPLt + 
δ7LEVERAGEt + δ8IND + δ9COUNTRY + δ10COUNTRY*IFRS + ε1t 
 
ACCt is the value of total accruals in year t, scaled by lagged total assets. The interaction 
variable IFRSt*CFOt is included to test for the effect of IFRS on the negative correlation 
between total accruals and cash flow from operations. As hypothesized in H1, I expect 
accruals-based earnings management, under which income smoothing, to decrease after 
the introduction of IFRS. In other words, I expect that the introduction of IFRS leads to a 
less negative correlation between total accruals and cash flow from operations, compared 
to the pre-IFRS period. Therefore, a positive coefficient for this interaction variable is 
expected.  
 
5.3 Regression results: accruals-based earnings management 
From my regression analysis, LEVERAGE and the interaction variable COUNTRY*IFRS prove 
to be insignificant, and are therefore excluded from further analysis. The interaction 
variable IFRS*COUNTRY, also didn’t prove to be significant. I was unable to establish that 
the effect of IFRS on restricting earnings management, after controlling for the other 
variables in the model, is different across the countries in my sample. Therefore H4 is 
rejected, and because of the lack of significance, I have excluded the interaction variable 
from further analysis. 
 
Possibly, the relatively newness of IFRS is to blame for the lack of significant results for 
this interaction variable. It was found by some studies that with respect to the 2005 
implementation of IFRS, financial statements retained a strong national identity (Ernst & 
Young, 2006). Due to unfamiliarity with IFRS, companies seem to have adopted IFRS in a 
way that deviates as little as possible from prior local standards, at least until IFRS 
practice has developed internationally. If in different countries, companies have adopted 
IFRS in a way that is as much as possible consistent with previous national GAAP, then the 
implementation will have had little effect on the relative levels of earnings management in 
the different countries of my sample.  
 
For YEAR, I get a negative and significant coefficient, meaning that for my sample period, 
a declining trend in time of accruals-based earnings management can be observed. This 
decline is not directly caused by the introduction of IFRS. Possibly, the knowledge that the 
implementation of IFRS would go through in 2005 has had an effect in earlier years, as 
companies anticipated on this fact. Also, other initiatives such as that related to corporate 
governance could have caused the level of earnings management to decline.  
 
Finally, the dummy for IFRS proves to be significant and has a positive coefficient. This 
indicates that the implementation of IFRS has had an increasing effect on the level of 
earnings management. This is in contrast to what I hypothesize in H1, but consistent to 
what Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), and Heemskerk and Van der Tas (2006) find. After 
controlling for other incentives for earnings management, this finding means that IFRS is 
unsuccessful in diminishing the level of earnings management. IFRS even seems to increase 
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the amount of earnings management. Increased discretion in the accounting process, 
partly due to the introduction of fair value, could be to blame for this finding. Also, the 
increasing volatility of earnings, and thus increased incentives to smooth them, could 
cause earnings management to increase after the introduction of IFRS.  
 
5.4  Regression results: income smoothing 
Regression analysis for income smoothing also shows an increasing effect for IFRS. Apart 
from leading accruals based earnings management measured by the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals to increase, income smoothing therefore also increases in response 
to the introduction of IFRS. This is inconsistent with H1, which is therefore rejected. 
 
My findings on accruals based earnings management indicate that IFRS has an increasing 
effect on accruals-based earnings management. At the same time however, time-trend 
analysis shows that the overall level of accruals-based earnings management for my total 
sample is significantly lower in the post-IFRS period compared to the pre-IFRS period. How 
then to explain this contradiction?  
 
The decreasing trend in accruals-based earnings management, independent of the 
introduction of IFRS, could possibly be explained by the anticipation of firms on the 
implementation of IFRS in 2005, as well as other initiatives such as those related to 
corporate governance. These factors may have also caused an acceleration in the 
decreasing trend from 2005, in turn leading to significant lower levels of accruals-based 
earnings management in the post-IFRS period independent of the implementation of IFRS 
itself. Based on my findings, this decreasing trend has accelerated despite of the 
implementation of IFRS, as IFRS itself has an increasing effect on accruals-based earnings 
management.  
 
5.5  Regression results: real earnings management 
For abnormal cash flow from operations, consistent with my models for accruals-based 
earnings management, a decreasing trend in time is found, as well as a positive effect of 
IFRS. Thus, apart from leading to increased accruals-based earnings management, based on 
my findings the implementation of IFRS also leads to increased real earnings management. 
This is consistent with H2, which is therefore accepted. However, in stead of a substitution 
effect between the two main manifestations of earnings management, this increase in real 
earnings management goes hand in hand with an increase in accruals-based earnings 
management. 
 
For abnormal production costs, most independent variables are not significant. Based on 
the lack of significance found for almost all independent variables, it could be seriously 
questioned whether the model used to estimate abnormal production costs is reliable. 
Based on the R Square of only 0,037 for the regression model with R_PROD, many 
explanatory variables are missing in the model. The R Square of 0,211 for the model with 
ABS_R_CFO leads to more confidence in the results found, although there is still room for 
more explanatory variables.   
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The regression results for ABS_R_CFO are consistent with my time-trend analysis, where I 
established that the level of real earnings management measured as the absolute abnormal 
cash flow from operations is significantly higher in the post-IFRS period. So despite of a 
decreasing trend in real earnings management during my sample period, real earnings 
management is significantly higher in the post-IFRS period, with IFRS adding to this 
increased magnitude. 
 
5.6  Regression results: substitution effect EM/RM 
Lastly, I test the substitution effect between the two main manifestations of earnings 
management by including a proxy for real earnings management as an independent 
variable in the regression for accruals-based earnings management, and vice versa. Given 
the lack of significant results, abnormal production costs are excluded from this analysis.  
 
I included my proxy for real earnings management, ABS_R_CFO, as an extra control 
variable in my regression for accruals-based earnings management. I have excluded cash 
flow from operations, as I now included abnormal cash flow from operations, which is part 
of total CFO. The interaction variable IFRS*ABS_R_CFO, is included to test whether the 
introduction of IFRS has led to a substitution effect between accruals-based earnings 
management and real earnings management. 
 
Results obtained from the regression analysis show that there is still talk of a decreasing 
trend in accruals-based earnings management during my sample period, and IFRS still has 
an increasing effect on accruals-based earnings management. For my interaction variable 
with IFRS, IFRS*ABS_R_CFO, I obtain a negative coefficient, although not significant for the 
regression with ABS_DA(ΔCFO). The obtained negative coefficient indicates that the 
introduction of IFRS has led to a substitution effect between the two main manifestations 
of earnings management, although both accruals-based earnings management and real 
earnings management have strictly increased. Results show that the introduction of IFRS 
has led to a more negative relation between accruals-based earnings management and real 
earnings management, meaning that in the post-IFRS period, accruals-based earnings 
management and real earnings management are increasingly used as substitutes of one 
another. 
 
Controlling for accruals based earnings management in my regression for real based 
earnings management leads to similar results. Again, the signs of the obtained coefficients 
are mostly unchanged, with also for real earnings management a decreasing trend in time 
during my sample period, and an increasing effect of the adoption of IFRS on the level of 
earnings management. The signs of the coefficients for the accruals-based management 
proxies, as well as for the interaction variables, are consistent with that obtained for the 
regression of absolute discretionary accruals when controlled for real earnings 
management. The negative coefficient for the interaction variables indicates that the 
introduction of IFRS had led the two main manifestations of earnings management to be 
increasingly used as substitutes of one another. This is consistent with H3, which is thus 
accepted. 
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6. Summary and conclusions 
In this study, I investigated whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS from 1 January 2005 
by all listed companies in the European Union has led to significantly lower levels of 
earnings management. I hypothesized that due to the stricter character of IFRS compared 
to national GAAP, combined with the decreased tolerance towards accounts manipulation 
by users and regulators as a consequence of recent accounting scandals, accruals-based 
earnings management has strictly declined after the introduction of IFRS. However, results 
obtained from regression analysis indicate exactly the opposite, namely that accruals-
based earnings management has increased as a consequence of the adoption of IFRS.  
 
I also hypothesized that management shifts away from accruals-based earnings 
management towards real earnings management. With incentives to manage earnings 
remaining the same or even increasing as a consequence of increased incentives to smooth 
earnings, I expected management to look for alternative ways to manage earnings. 
Regression analysis confirmed that real earnings management has strictly increased as a 
consequence of the introduction of IFRS.  
 
So both accruals-based earnings management and real earnings management has increased 
as a consequence of the implementation of IFRS. However, I also expected that there 
would be talk of a substitution effect between the two manifestations of earnings 
management, as accruals-based earnings management was expected to decrease and real 
earnings management to increase as a consequence of the implementation of IFRS. To test 
whether there is still talk of a substitution effect between the two manifestations of 
earnings management, I performed additional regression analysis. From this, I indeed 
found that IFRS has led the two manifestations of earnings management to be increasingly 
used as substitutes of one another, despite the fact that the magnitude of both 
manifestations of earnings management have strictly increased in the post-IFRS period 
compared to the pre-IFRS period.  
 
Lastly, I considered whether the implementation of IFRS has led to different effects in the 
different countries in my sample. However, regression analysis shows that the country in 
which a company is based has no significant influence on the effect of IFRS on the level of 
earnings management. This could be explained as IFRS having the same effect on the 
relative levels of earnings management in different countries. But it could also be 
interpreted as IFRS being ineffective in restricting earnings management all together. This 
last interpretation is consistent with the rest of my obtained results, as well as with the 
finding in earlier studies that IFRS is mainly applied in line with national accounting 
traditions.  
 
Based on these findings therefore, I am unable to establish that for my total research 
sample IFRS has led to less accruals-based earnings management. Although accruals-based 
earnings is significantly lower in the post-IFRS period than in the pre-IFRS period, 
regression analysis shows that when controlled for differences in earnings management 
incentives, IFRS has led to an increase in accruals-based earnings management. This is 
consistent with earlier studies, such as that by Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) and 
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Heemskerk and Van der Tas (2006). My results also show that IFRS has led to an increase in 
real earnings management. With both accruals-based earnings management and real 
earnings management increasing as a consequence of the adoption of IFRS, it can be stated 
that based on my findings, IFRS has not been successful in restricting earnings 
management.  
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Goodwill Impairment as a Tool for 
Earnings Management 
 
 
Jamilla Lemans1 
 
 
Executive summary2 
This research examines whether or not goodwill impairments are being used by Dutch 
listed firms to manipulate earnings. Two different regression models are used for this 
purpose which include firm-specific factors as well as proxies for big bath accounting, 
income smoothing and a factor for measuring the recognition of higher impairments around 
the time of a CEO change. The results show that the method (model) chosen to measure 
the impairment decision influences the generated results, and that overall no strong 
evidence is found which indicates that goodwill impairments are indeed being used to 
manipulate earnings. 
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5375. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This research examines whether or not the impairment of goodwill is used to manipulate 
earnings at Dutch listed firms in the period 2005-2008. Since the introduction of the 
standards IFRS 3 and IAS 36, more professional judgement is needed for the valuation of 
goodwill in the financial statements, thereby bringing a higher level of subjectivity. This 
subjectivity provides opportunities for management to manipulate earnings, which can 
cause a distorting image in the financial statements which are provided to its users. When 
considering this subjectivity in the light of the current credit crisis, it becomes clear that 
this is a hot topic. The goal of this research is to investigate the significance of 
management’s influence on the value of goodwill which is being accounted for when 
applying an impairment test. This leads to the following overall research question: 
 
Are goodwill impairments being used by management as a tool for earnings management? 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First some important prior research 
on earnings management and goodwill is discussed (Section 2). Next, the hypotheses are 
presented as well as the models which are being applied in this research. Section 4 then 
presents the main results as well as the analysis. The paper concludes with a short 
                                             
1 Jamilla Lemans studied Economics and Business at the Erasmus University and is currently working as an 
auditor at Ernst & Young Accountants LLP. This study has been supervised by ms. Dr. Y. Wang. 
2 For a more elaborate discussion of earnings management and goodwill (impairment), as well as a more 
elaborate discussion of empirical evidence from prior literature and more detailed results of the empirical part 
of this research, a reference is made to the full text version of the master thesis.  
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summary and conclusion, the limitations of this research as well as some suggestions for 
future research on this topic in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Prior literature 
This section will discuss prior literature regarding earnings management, the implications 
of applying the impairment test for goodwill, as well as how the impairment test can be 
used as a tool for earnings management. 
 
2.1 Earnings management 
In the literature many different insights with regard to defining earnings management 
exist. A definition that is used often and will be used in this research is the definition from 
Schipper (1989, pp. 92): “Disclosure management, in the sense of a purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some 
private gains (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the 
process”. This definition implies that management intervenes in the reporting process to 
reach some sort of personal gains. Also it does not classify earnings management as fraud. 
Therefore this definition captures the most import aspects of earnings management and 
fits this research in a good manner. 
 
In practice, also different types of earnings management can be distinguished. The two 
most important types for this research are big bath accounting and income smoothing. Big 
bath accounting is an example of the use of earnings management to decrease the earnings 
of a firm. As many as possible, losses and write-offs are incurred in the same year. 
According to Mohanram (2003, pp. 2), big bath accounting is used by firms which cannot 
achieve their targets in a year. When these firms miss their targets, they engage in 
accounting methods to make the firm’s results even worse. Two reasons for this can be 
identified. First it is very unlikely that the firm can reach the targets set for that year, 
implying the year is ‘lost’. Secondly, the costs arising from missing the targets are incurred 
anyway. The costs the firm will incur from performing even worse will be minimal, since 
the biggest damage is done by missing the targets. The additional incurred losses can be 
used to increase or smooth income in future years.  
Income smoothing on the other hand is used by management if they want to present a 
consecutive line of increasing earnings. To achieve this, earnings management that both 
increases and decreases income can be used. If the firm’s income is higher than targeted, 
income can be decreased by using earnings management. As Mohanram (2003, pp. 3) points 
out, two purposes for this kind of accounting can be identified. The first is to ‘save’ some 
income for the future when the firm may not be able to meet its targets. The earnings 
from the previous period are used later. Earnings management can then be considered ‘as 
an intertemporal transfer of income between periods’ (Mohanram, 2003, pp. 6). The 
second purpose of decreasing income, if income is higher than targeted, is to prevent 
expectations about the firm’s performance to rise. If the expectations about future 
earnings increase, future targets will be more difficult to reach. Consequently, the 
consecutive line of increased earnings can be ended, as a result of one exceptionally good 
result. 
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2.2 The goodwill impairment test 
The issuance of the new standard IFRS 3 requires that goodwill will be impaired annually 
based on fair value estimates of the acquired business. The impairment test replaces the 
annual depreciation of goodwill that was used previously. 
According to IFRS 3, it is necessary to recognize an impairment loss when there is a 
decrease in value. An impairment loss is defined as ‘the amount by which the carrying 
amount of an asset or a cash generating unit exceeds its recoverable amount’ (IAS 36.6). 
 
An implication of applying the impairment test in practice is that a large amount of factors 
need to be determined for the impairment calculation, including the recoverable amount, 
the value in use, the carrying amount and the fair value. For instance regarding fair value, 
it is important that entities, who are estimating expected future cash flows, rely on 
reasonable and supportable assumptions and projections, according to Lander and 
Reinstein (2003, pp. 228). Also they should consider all available evidence to estimate 
these cash flows, since this forms the basis of the impairment test. The weight given to 
such evidence should be commensurate with how well the entity can verify this evidence 
objectively. Entities using ranges to estimate the amount or timing of possible cash flows 
should consider the likelihood of possible outcomes either directly, when applying an 
expected cash flow approach, or indirectly through the risk-adjusted discount rate, when 
determining the best estimate of future cash flows. 
However, the factors used in an impairment test depend on a lot of assumptions made by 
management, since management is responsible for preparing the initial impairment 
calculation. The auditor only has the obligation to check this calculation. Some examples 
of assumptions that need to be made in the calculation include the discount factor (the 
weighted average cost of capital can be used for this), the amounts of future cash flows 
and the growth factor of the future cash flows. These assumptions give rise to a relatively 
high level of subjectivity in the impairment test. This level of subjectivity is supported by 
literature of Kuipers and Boissevain (2005). They argue that the most important 
opportunities to manage earnings are present in the area of cash flow projections. 
Therefore the underlying assumptions need to be challenged, amongst others internally 
and by the auditor, to test whether these assumptions are realistic. The existence of this 
higher level of subjectivity is also supported by Ball (2006) and Bini and Bella (2007). 
However, challenging the assumptions may be quite difficult to accomplish in practice. 
Johnson (2007) expresses concerns about auditors who may lack the necessary training in 
valuation methods for estimating fair values. This raises serious questions regarding the 
implementation of the fair value principle (and impairment) in practice. 
Ball (2006) provides a possible reason for management to use impairments as a tool to 
manage earnings. Management fears to be punished by the market in the case of 
impairment shortly after an acquisition. The market may see this impairment as a sign of 
mismanagement, because the firm has likely overpaid for the acquired business. This 
reasoning is also supported by empirical evidence found by Li et al. (2005). 
 
2.3 Managing goodwill impairments 
This section will discuss the link between earnings management and the impairment of 
goodwill based on a summary of the most important prior research done on this subject. A 
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distinction is made between different kinds of research that give other insights into this 
subject. 
 
Zucca and Campbell (1992) performed empirical research to test the link between earnings 
management and goodwill impairments. They assume that there is no pattern in the path 
of expected earnings, indicating that the path is ‘random’. Zucca and Campbell (1992) 
found that the majority (45 out of 77) of the write-downs investigated were recorded when 
earnings were below expected earnings (“bathers”), while 22 out of 77 were recorded 
when earnings exceeded expectations (“income smoothers”). They interpreted these 
results as evidence that write-downs are used to manage earnings. 
Van de Poel et al. (2008) recently studied a sample of listed companies in 15 EU countries 
preparing financial statements under IFRS in the period 2005-2006. They find, based on 
regression analysis, that the goodwill impairment decision for these companies is highly 
associated with financial reporting incentives. More specifically, their findings support that 
companies typically take their impairments when earnings are ‘unexpectedly’ high 
(smoothing) or when they are ‘unexpectedly’ low (big bath accounting). This evidence is 
therefore in accordance with the results of the research of Zucca and Campbell (1992). 
Research was performed by Alciatore et al. (1998) on the finding that the discretion 
inherent in GAAP pertaining to asset impairments could be used by firms in their self-
interest. An example they provide is that firms may use GAAP flexibility to avoid taking 
impairments due to concerns about potentially negative stock market reactions to such 
charges. Other firms could however record an impairment loss when earnings are 
particularly high in order to smooth income or, alternatively, they could take a bath by 
accelerating an impairment when earnings are already poor to maximize profits in future 
periods. Alciatore et al. (1998) argue that this flexibility suggests that the impairment 
decision could be strategically used by managers to adjust the timing and amounts of 
charges to income. 
In addition, Jordan and Clark (2004) also found evidence which indicated that companies 
with unusually low earnings in a year reported a large impairment loss in order to lower 
the reported earnings even further, which is indicative of big bath accounting. Empirical 
evidence consistent with this behaviour is found by Francis et al. (1996). They show that 
managers use two different sorts of determinants in the asset impairment decision. On the 
one hand, managers take into account factors which reflect declines in the values of assets 
due to poor firm performance, increased competition and changes in the economic 
climate. On the other hand, asset impairment decisions may be influenced by personal 
reporting incentives, which means that management may take advantage of the discretion 
afforded by accounting rules to manipulate earnings by either not recognizing impairments 
when this is needed, or by recognizing impairments only when it is advantageous for 
management to do so. Francis et al. (1996, pp. 134) use a weighted tobit model to 
estimate the importance of impairments and earnings management variables in explaining 
both the existence and amount of a firm’s write-off decisions. They find that for the full 
sample of write-offs, both manipulation and impairment are important determinants, but 
that incentives play a substantial role in explaining such items as goodwill write-offs. 
Sevin and Schroeder (2005) also conducted research concerning goodwill impairments but 
focused more on the size of the firm as a factor that could influence the impairment. They 
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found that smaller firms were more negatively impacted by SFAS 142 and were therefore 
more likely to impair goodwill than larger firms. They therefore argued that goodwill 
seemed to be an account that lends itself to some level of manipulation and that the firm 
size and the level of earnings appear to be a factor in determining the impairment. 
Beatty and Weber (2006) examine several potentially important economic incentives that 
firms face when making impairment decisions. In using a regression model, which is 
consistent with previously discussed research by Van de Poel et al. (2008), they find 
evidence suggesting that firms’ equity market concerns affect their preference for ‘above-
the-line’ versus ‘below-the-line’ accounting treatment, and firms’ debt contracting, 
bonus, turnover, and exchange delisting incentives affect their decisions to accelerate or 
delay expense recognition. However, Bens (2006) questioned the regression model used by 
Beatty and Weber (2006, pp. 296). He argued that accounting decisions can be quite 
complex, and such a simple linear framework (many dummy variables are incorporated in 
the model) may not capture many of the interesting subtleties involved. Moreover, many 
of the proxy variables used in the Beatty and Weber framework were difficult to interpret 
unambiguously. This criticism indicates that the regression model used by Beatty and 
Weber (2006), but herewith also the model used by Van de Poel et al. (2008), should be 
adjusted to capture more of the complexity of accounting (impairment) decisions. 
Henning et al. (2004, pp. 119) used a research method consistent with research discussed 
previously by Van de Poel et al. (2008) and Beatty and Weber (2006). Regarding the 
amount of goodwill write-offs, their results indicate that “U.S. firm goodwill write-offs 
and U.K. firm goodwill revaluations exceed the amounts predicted by our models when we 
consider the initial value of goodwill. However, the actual write-offs and revaluations do 
not differ from amounts predicted by our models when we consider changes in the value 
of goodwill after the acquisition”. The authors find this interesting, since this kind of 
valuation behaviour is consistent with the big bath findings of Elliott and Shaw (1988). The 
results of Henning et al. (2004, pp. 114) may therefore reflect managerial incentives to 
maximize the goodwill impairment in transition, especially since the impairment was 
shown as a non-operating loss in the year of the adoption of SFAS 142, but as an operating 
expense in subsequent years. According to Henning et al. (2004, p. 119), it appears that 
“U.S. firms delayed the income-reducing effects of goodwill write-offs, and U.K. firms 
timed the asset-increasing effects of goodwill revaluations to avoid additional agency 
costs”. These findings indicate that a certain amount of influence was used in determining 
the timing of the impairment decision, because a different timing of the impairment (and 
revaluation) could have had a major influence on the presented income in the financial 
statements. 
 
Another direction of research supporting the link between earnings management and 
goodwill impairments was performed by Masters-Stout et al. (2007, pp. 2). In their 
research they incorporate the change in CEO as a variable which could influence the 
impairment decision. They hypothesize that CEOs tend to manipulate the impairment in 
the early years of their tenure since blame can be placed on earlier management’s 
acquisition decisions and expensing goodwill early can improve future earnings. If new 
CEOs impair more goodwill than their senior counterparts, it would indicate that the 
impairment rules are not being applied consistently. In their research they also use a 
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regression model, as previously seen with Van de Poel et al. (2008), Beatty and Weber 
(2006) and Henning et al. (2004). The results of the analysis (Masters-Stout et al., 2007, 
pp. 13) provide compelling evidence that new CEOs impair more goodwill than their senior 
counterparts. Also a relationship exists between net income and the amount of impairment 
for all CEOs. These results therefore indicate that the new impairment rules, at a 
minimum, are applied differently between new and senior CEOs. 
Strong and Meyer (1987, pp. 643) also performed research regarding CEO changes and 
goodwill impairments. They used multiple discriminant analysis to investigate the 
determinants of goodwill. In using this method, they determined that the change in senior 
management was a significant variable in explaining the tendency to report asset 
impairments. If the new executive came from outside the firm, this effect was even more 
significant. 
The results of the research by Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008)3 provide additional evidence 
for the conclusion that impairments are reported in the case of a CEO change. They use a 
multivariate tobit model to assess the determinants of transitional goodwill impairment 
losses, which is in accordance with the method used by Francis et al. (1996) as discussed 
earlier. Overall, Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008, pp. 43) find that the adoption of the 
impairment approach effectively triggered the recognition of large impairment losses for 
Canadian firms. An association is shown between the magnitude of transitional goodwill 
impairment losses and firms’ incentives to both overstate and understate them. The results 
(Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008, pp. 51) suggest that firms record higher transitional 
goodwill impairment losses to minimize the deviation from the industry median ROE 
(return on equity) and ROA (return on assets) as well as when they experience a change in 
CEO. The results are also consistent with firms recording lower transitional impairment 
losses to avoid further deviation from the industry median leverage, when there are 
sizable unrealized gains on exercisable stock options, when they subsequently issue new 
debt or equity capital, and when they are cross-listed in the United States. Finally, their 
findings seem to indicate that financially literate and independent audit committee 
members constrain managerial opportunism with respect to transitional goodwill 
impairment losses.  
 
 
3. Hypothesis development, model development and sample selection 
 
3.1 Hypothesis development 
Based on the discussion of empirical evidence about the link between earnings 
management and goodwill impairments, it is possible to develop multiple hypotheses. 
 
The first hypothesis can be linked back to the discussion of big bath accounting. When 
earnings are unexpectedly low and therefore the overall performance of the firm is below 
the desirable level, management will be more likely to choose for the recognition of an 
                                             
3 Noticeable for this research is that Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) divided the total sample into industry 
groups (energy, materials, industrial, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health care, financials, 
information technology, telecommunications and utilities), according to TSX Indices, as given by Compustat. 
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impairment loss since the performance is already low. Therefore they ‘take a bath’ by 
recognizing a high goodwill impairment loss. This will provide management with the 
opportunity to increase or at least improve earnings in future years, since then the 
recognition of an impairment loss will probably not be necessary. This can also be linked 
to the bonus plan hypothesis which is also an important aspect of earnings management. 
Managers are unable to reach their bonus in a year of poor firm performance and 
therefore they take a bath to improve the chance of reaching the bonus in future years.  
 
Based on the theory of big bath accounting, the following hypothesis is developed:  
 
H1: Firms are more likely to recognize a goodwill impairment loss 
when their earnings are ‘unexpectedly’ low, ceteris paribus. 
 
To test this hypothesis, a proxy for the use of big bath accounting will be incorporated in 
the model. In this research the variable BATHit (and BATH2it) will be used for this purpose. 
This variable is used to determine whether the earnings (before taxes) of the firm are 
below the industry median. When this is the case, management has an incentive to engage 
in earnings management by taking a bath. How this variable is measured is discussed into 
more detail in Appendix I. It is expected that a positive relation will be found between 
this variable and the impairment decision, since low earnings indicate poor performance 
and therefore an impairment loss may need to be recognized. Based on the latter, it is 
expected that the hypothesis will hold when tested by the model which is developed for 
this research. 
 
The reasoning for the development of the second hypothesis is based on earnings 
management in the form of income smoothing. Under the circumstances that earnings are 
‘unexpectedly’ high and the performance of the firm does not influence the bonus level 
anymore, management will have an incentive to recognize a goodwill impairment loss. 
This choice can be based on the fact that earnings are so high that the ceiling of the 
manager’s bonus has already been reached. In that case, it is more profitable for 
management to accelerate the impairment since accelerating goodwill impairments has a 
positive effect on the chance of reaching the bonus in future years. Also this choice can 
be based on the fact that management wants to present a consecutive line of increasing 
earnings. When impairments need to be accounted for, this could have a great influence 
on this consecutive line of earnings, depending of course on the absolute size of the 
impairment. Therefore management may have incentives to postpone the impairment loss 
and to pass the impairment on to the future in the case of poor performance. However, 
when looking at the case when earnings are unexpectedly high, these earnings can then 
be smoothed by recognizing an impairment loss that may not have been necessary yet to 
boost performance in the future. Therefore, this hypothesis can be seen from two 
different viewpoints. The first viewpoint is based on the bonus plan hypothesis, the 
second is based on the incentive to smooth earnings. 
Based on the previously discussed theory the following hypothesis can be formulated. 
 
H2: Firms are more likely to recognize a goodwill impairment loss 
when their earnings are ‘unexpectedly’ high, ceteris paribus. 
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As also discussed with the first hypothesis, for this hypothesis also a proxy needs to be 
determined which can measure whether income smoothing takes place. For this purpose 
the variable SMOOTHit (and SMOOTH2it) will be incorporated in the model (see Appendix I 
for a more precise measurement of this variable). This variable is used to determine 
whether the firm’s earnings deviate (substantially) upward from the industry median. 
When this is the case, an indication is found that management has an incentive to smooth 
earnings. It is expected that a positive relation will be found between this variable and the 
impairment decision, since the unexpected good performance of a firm provides the 
incentive to smooth earnings and therefore to report an impairment loss. 
Based on the latter, it is expected that this hypothesis will hold when tested by the model. 
 
Overall, Hypothesis 1 and 2 imply that it is expected that managers are encouraged to 
underreport earnings in the case of large earnings surprises. In that case, firms have 
incentives to report all impairments and even accelerate impairments to boost 
performance in the future (see also Van de Poel et al., 2008, pp. 15). 
 
The effects of a change in CEO are also included in this research, since the discussed 
evidence in the previous section has shown that a change in CEO can result in big bath 
accounting. Important research discussed on this topic was done by Masters-Stout et al. 
(2007). They found compelling evidence that new CEOs impair more goodwill than their 
senior counterparts. Also Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) found higher transitional goodwill 
impairment losses when a firm experienced a CEO change. The reasoning behind this is 
that new CEOs will try to loose the inheritance of the previous CEO to make sure that the 
performance in the following years will improve. So the new CEO will try to pass the weak 
performance onto its predecessor. As discussed with the first hypothesis, the new CEO will 
therefore ‘take a bath’ to loose this entire inheritance immediately in the first year. 
Based on the previously discussed theory it is therefore also hypothesized that: 
 
H3: Firms that experience a change in CEO record higher transitional 
goodwill impairment losses. 
 
To test this hypothesis, a proxy is incorporated in the model only now for measuring higher 
impairments around the time of a CEO change. The variable CEOit will be used for this 
purpose which is based on a combination of the models of Masters-Stout et al. (2007, pp. 
6) and Francis et al. (1996, pp. 122-124). The results of research done by Masters-Stout et 
al. (2007, pp. 11-12) and Francis et al. (1996, pp. 125) have proven that, as expected, this 
variable has a significant impact on the impairment decision. Since a change in CEO is 
often associated with big bath accounting, it is therefore expected that a positive relation 
will be found between this variable and the impairment decision. 
Based on the theory and the outcomes of these studies, it is therefore expected that this 
relation between CEO changes and the recognition of goodwill impairment losses can be 
found in this empirical research, which implies that it is expected that Hypothesis 3 will 
hold when being tested by the model 
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3.2 Model development 
In the brief literature review, multiple models have been mentioned that were used to 
perform empirical research on goodwill impairments and earnings management. The choice 
was made to use the model of Van de Poel et al. (2008) as the starting point for this 
research, and from thereon make adjustments to fit the model to the purposes of this 
research. The model of Van de Poel et al. (2008) is the most appropriate model to use as a 
starting point for this research since it incorporates many different factors, including 
reporting incentives and economic conditions of the firm. Also the variables are measured 
such that the magnitude of the figures is also taken into account in a large number of cases 
when investigating the impairment decision. 
The following two adjusted models are developed for this research.4  
 
Model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Sample selection 
The focus of this research will be on all Dutch listed companies in the period 2005-2008. 
This implies that the total initial sample consists of 1.529 firm-year observations as 
gathered through the Thomson One Banker financial databases from Worldscope 
Fundamentals. Noticeable is that the year 2008 has also been included as far as is known 
at this very moment5.  
 
                                             
4 The precise measurement of the variables is incorporated in Appendix I and will not be discussed here into 
further detail. For the reasoning behind the choice of these different variables as well as the choice for the 
method of measuring the variables, a reference is again made to the full text version of the thesis. 
5Date of sample selection is March 17th 2009. 
IMPAIRMENTit = α0 + α1 BATHit + α2 SMOOTHit + α3 CEOit  
+ α4 ΔSALESit + α5 ΔOCFit + α6 ΔindROAit   
+ α7 GOODWILLit-1 + α8 SIZEit  + α9 INDUSTRYit + εit 
IMPAIR_AMOUNTit = α0 + α1 BATH2it + α2 SMOOTH2it + α3 CEOit
+ α4 ΔSALESit + α5 ΔOCFit + α6 ΔindROAit   
+ α7 GOODWILLit-1 + α8 SIZEit  + α9 INDUSTRYit + εit 
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Table 1: Goodwill impairment losses by industry (excl. Financials) 
 
Number of firm-year observations  
Industry group Total % of total Impairment % of total 
0001 Oil and Gas 17 4.63% 5 29.41% 
1000 Basic materials 11 3.00% 5 45.45% 
2000 Industrials 134 36.51% 29 21.64% 
3000 Consumer goods 55 14.99% 12 21.82% 
4000 Health care  23 6.27% 1 4.35% 
5000 Consumer services 63 17.17% 13 20.63% 
6700 Other  7 1.91% 3 42.86% 
9000 Technology  57 15.53% 11 19.30% 
 Total 367 100.01%6 79 21.53% 
 
 
The initial sample is adapted to the research setting. This is done by excluding those 
observations which concern inactive firms, as well as observations for which not all data is 
available (especially for the year 2008). In addition, also those observations have been 
excluded in which no goodwill opening balance is present and simultaneously no 
impairment is recorded since these observations do not relate to goodwill and/or 
impairments and therefore do not have any additional value for this research. After this 
process of elimination the sample consists of 393 firm-year observations, split up into the 
different industries, as depicted in Table 1. 
Important to notice is that financials have been excluded since such firms have to deal 
with very different laws and regulations than firms in other industries and may therefore 
cause a distortion in the results. The final sample therefore consists of 367 observations. 
 
 
4. Results and analysis 
This section will present the results of the performed empirical research, as well as an 
analysis of the results. In the first subsection, the results for the total sample are 
presented for both models. The second subsection briefly presents the results for the 
alternative tests. 
 
Noticeable is that five different versions of the two models have been used in the 
regression analysis to determine whether any significant changes occur when a particular 
variable is excluded. Version I is the full model as depicted in section 3.2. The versions II, 
III and IV each exclude (one of) the variables that were incorporated to test the 
hypotheses. This is done to test whether these variables have additional explanatory power 
and whether excluding these variables can lead to changes in the results concerning the 
regression coefficients. The choice is made to exclude the variables in the following order. 
Version II first excludes the variable CEOit since this variable is not one of the types of 
earnings management as distinguished by the theory. The next variable that is excluded for 
                                             
6 The total percentage differs from 100% as a consequence of rounding-off the percentages for each industry. 
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version III is BATHit, since big bath accounting may be easier to detect than income 
smoothing and may therefore be used less often by management to avoid a loss of 
prestige. Therefore, version IV excludes the variable SMOOTHit. Version V is the last 
version that is applied and is composed of the full model (version I), but includes also the 
interaction term between big bath accounting and a CEO change, since this is a factor 
which is added to the model instead of removed like was done for the previous versions, 
since it is expected that this will have additional explanatory power. 
 
4.1 Regression results 
This section presents the regression results for both models. Noticeable is that the focus 
here is on the most important variables in the model, which are used to test the 
hypotheses. The results for the remaining variables are only depicted in Table 2 and 3 and 
will not be discussed into further detail in this paper. 
 
4.1.1  Regression results Model 1 
For Model 1, the conclusion is drawn that the explanatory power of the model (Adjusted R-
square) is not high, namely 0.093 at a maximum for version III of the model (1-III), 
indicating that this is the optimal version of the model. Noticeable is that Model 1-III is not 
the full model or the full model with as an additional variable the interaction term 
between big bath accounting and a CEO change. This implies that the models 1-I and 1-V 
have less explanatory power than the model that does not include the variable BATHit and 
the interaction term. This implies that these factors do not have additional explanatory 
power and can best be left out of the model. This result contradicts with expectations, 
since it was expected that the full model (including the interaction term) would have the 
highest explanatory power. In addition, the regression part of the Sum of Squares is 
particularly low, confirming the low explanatory power. The conclusion can therefore be 
drawn that Model 1 does not predict the impairment decision accurately and that a large 
residual is presented which cannot be explained by the regression. 
 
Table 2 shows that the economic factor ΔOCFit, the reporting incentive SMOOTHit and the 
control variable SIZEit are factors that have a significant influence on the impairment 
decision (IMPAIRMENTit) for all versions of Model 1. For the model versions I, II and III the 
significance levels at which these factors prove to have a significant influence are also 
similar. However, the significance level that is applicable in the case of the economic 
factor ΔOCFit for versions IV and V is somewhat different (1% and 10% respectively instead 
of 5%), but the factor still has a significant influence. 
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Table 2: Regression results Model 1 (total sample) 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
 
(Constant) 
-0.246 
(0.003)*** 
-0.245 
(0.002)*** 
-0.236 
(0.002)*** 
-0.175 
(0.014)** 
-0.247 
(0.003)*** 
 
ΔindROAit 
0.005 
(0.395) 
0.005 
(0.395) 
0.005 
(0.379) 
0.004 
(0.473) 
0.005 
(0.397) 
 
ΔSALESit 
0.057 
(0.328) 
0.057 
(0.324) 
0.056 
(0.330) 
0.065 
(0.261) 
0.056 
(0.333) 
 
ΔOCFit 
-0.440 
(0.030)** 
-0.443 
(0.028)** 
-0.476 
(0.009)*** 
-0.314 
(0.056)* 
-0.439 
(0.032)** 
 
BATHit 
0.027 
(0.691) 
0.027 
(0.690) 
  0.025 
(0.734) 
 
SMOOTHit 
0.108 
(0.047)** 
0.108 
(0.044)** 
0.106 
(0.047)** 
 0.108 
(0.047)** 
 
CEOit 
-0.008 
(0.868) 
   0.007 
(0.898) 
 
GOODWILLit 
0.066 
(0.655) 
0.067 
(0.652) 
0.067 
(0.648) 
0.054 
(0.715) 
0.066 
(0.656) 
 
SIZEit 
0.065 
(0.000)*** 
0.065 
(0.000)*** 
0.064 
(0.000)*** 
0.059 
(0.000)*** 
0.065 
(0.000)*** 
 
BATHit*CEOit 
    0.008 
(0.951) 
 
***, **, * = coefficient is significant at the α=0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level 
 
When examining the effects of the variables of interest on the impairment decision into 
more detail, the conclusion can be drawn that the reporting incentive SMOOTHit has a 
positive significant influence on the impairment decision, which is consistent with 
expectations and prior research (Zucca and Campbell, 1992; Van de Poel et al., 2008). This 
indicates that high earnings and therefore high performance lead to a higher reported 
impairment loss, which is a proxy for the use of income smoothing. This implies that firms 
use impairments as a tool for earnings management in the form of income smoothing to 
present a consecutive line of increasing earnings. Therefore this provides evidence in 
support of Hypothesis 2 that firms are more likely to report a goodwill impairment loss 
when their earnings are ‘unexpectedly’ high. 
One variable that does not prove to have a significant influence on the impairment 
decision is the reporting incentive BATHit. This result contradicts with the results of Zucca 
and Campbell (1992) and Van de Poel et al. (2008), since they found evidence that this 
factor does have a significant effect on the impairment decision. Since this effect was 
supported by the theory concerning big bath accounting, it is remarkable that the results 
show no significant effect. Noticeable is that the model which has the highest explanatory 
power does not include this variable, indicating that it does not have additional 
explanatory power when incorporated in a model with the other variables. One possible 
reason why this variable has no significant effect is that management does not use the 
discretion provided by IFRS to report large impairment losses when performance is poor, 
based on economic considerations for the firm as a whole or with regard to private gains. It 
is possible that management is afraid it needs to step down when performance is even 
lower. Also it is possible that management can still earn a bonus at the current 
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performance level which would be lost when an impairment loss is reported. Many 
considerations can therefore lead to the same decision not to report an impairment. These 
results however indicate that big bath accounting is not used by management, which 
implies that no evidence is found in support of Hypothesis 1, stating that firms are more 
likely to recognize a goodwill impairment loss when their earnings are unexpectedly low. 
Therefore this hypothesis should be rejected based on this evidence. 
Another variable that does not have a significant effect on the impairment decision is 
CEOit. Again it is remarkable that no significant relation is found, since this result is 
inconsistent with expectations as well as with the results of the research performed by 
Masters-Stout et al. (2007), Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) and Strong and Meyer (1987) 
which indicated that a significant positive relation should have been found. Since the 
effect on the impairment decision is not significant, this variable does not prove that more 
or higher impairments are being reported around the time of a CEO change. This therefore 
implies that no evidence is found in support of Hypothesis 3, which should therefore be 
rejected. A possible reason why this effect does not prove to be significant is that also the 
variable associated with big bath accounting is not significant, indicating that less use is 
being made of this method. Another reason is that not in many cases when a CEO change 
has taken place, an impairment loss is being reported. Perhaps the performance of the 
company has not been such at the time of the change that an impairment loss could have 
been justified. Therefore the impairment could not have been passed onto the previous 
CEO since then suspicion would have been raised, which implies that it is in the best 
interest of the CEO not to report an impairment loss. 
 
4.1.2  Regression results Model 2 
For Model 2, the Adjusted R-square is at a maximum of 0.566 for version V of the model (2-
V). The explanatory power of this model is therefore quite high. Noticeable is that this 
concerns the full model which incorporates all variables as well as the interaction term, 
indicating that together these variables can best predict the impairment decision. In 
addition, the regression for Model 2-V explains the largest part of the Sum of Squares, 
which leads to a smaller residual. This confirms that the explanatory power is quite high. 
 
The estimates of the regression coefficients for Model 2 are depicted in Table 3. The 
results show that the economic factors ΔSALESit and ΔOCFit, the reporting incentives 
BATH2it and SMOOTH2it, the control variable GOODWILLit and the interaction term 
BATH2it*CEOit all have a significant influence on the impairment decision 
(IMPAIR_AMOUNTit) for all versions of the model, except the interaction term which is only 
incorporated in model version V. For all these variables the significance levels are also the 
same for all versions of the model, except for ΔSALESit (5% level, with exception of version 
III where the 1% level is applicable). 
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Table 3: Regression results Model 2 (total sample) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***, **, * = coefficient is significant at the α=0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level 
 
When examining the variables of interest into more detail, the conclusion can be drawn 
that the variable BATH2it has a significant influence, however with a negative sign. This 
result contradicts expectations and prior research (Francis et al., 1996; Van de Poel et al., 
2008), since it was expected that low earnings would lead to the recognition of an 
impairment loss. Evidence now is found indicating that firms experiencing ‘unexpectedly’ 
low earnings are more likely not to report an impairment loss. This effect can be caused by 
the relative magnitude of the change in earnings. Perhaps the level of earnings for a firm 
were not substantially low from the view of management, therefore leading to the delay of 
an impairment. The choice not to record an impairment loss can then possibly be based on 
the idea that the lower performance is only temporarily and therefore no impairment is 
necessary. This can therefore account for the different sign for this variable, since low 
performance in this case is not associated with goodwill impairments. Based on theory this 
can also be explained as a form of loss minimalisation. So this method is different than big 
bath accounting, since that method can also be associated with loss maximalisation. This 
result implies that no evidence is found supporting Hypothesis 1, stating that firms are 
more likely to report a goodwill impairment loss when their earnings are ‘unexpectedly’ 
low. Therefore this hypothesis needs to be rejected based on the different sign of the 
effect, even though the effect is significant. 
The variable SMOOTH2it also has a negative significant influence on the impairment 
decision for the model versions I, II and V, but a positive sign for model version III. This 
positive sign is as expected, since a high performance and therefore high earnings can be 
smoothed by recognizing an impairment loss. This result is also consistent with the 
research of Francis et al. (1996). However, the negative sign for this variable when the 
other model versions are applied contradicts expectations. This can be explained by the 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
(Constant) -0.017 
(0.007)*** 
-0.017 
(0.009)*** 
-0.009 
(0.216) 
0.008 
(0.222) 
-0.010 
(0.058)* 
ΔindROAit 0.000 
(0.259) 
0.000 
(0.268) 
0.000 
(0.632) 
0.000 
(0.562) 
0.000 
(0.580) 
ΔSALESit 0.010 
(0.019)** 
0.011 
(0.015)** 
0.013 
(0.009)*** 
0.011 
(0.034)** 
0.008 
(0.040)** 
ΔOCFit 0.176 
(0.000)*** 
0.173 
(0.000)*** 
-0.158 
(0.000)*** 
-0.102 
(0.000)*** 
0.190 
(0.000)*** 
BATH2it -0.421 
(0.000)*** 
-0.422 
(0.000)*** 
  -0.245 
(0.000)*** 
SMOOTH2it -0.119 
(0.002)*** 
-0.113 
(0.003)*** 
0.148 
(0.000)*** 
 -0.142 
(0.000)*** 
CEOit 0.005 
(0.127) 
   -0.004 
(0.164) 
GOODWILLit 0.038 
(0.001)*** 
0.038 
(0.001)*** 
0.043 
(0.001)*** 
0.048 
(0.000)*** 
0.029 
(0.002)*** 
SIZEit 0.001 
(0.306) 
0.001 
(0.248) 
0.000 
(0.819) 
-0.002 
(0.071)* 
0.001 
(0.267) 
BATH2it*CEOit     -0.325 
(0.000)*** 
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reasoning that earnings are not high enough to record an impairment loss. One possible 
reason for this can be that management cannot reach the maximum bonus when an 
impairment is recognized. Also it is possible that the recognition of an impairment can 
negatively affect the presentation of a consecutive line of increasing earnings. These 
results indicate that for model version III this variable is a proxy for the use of income 
smoothing, which implies that evidence is found that goodwill impairments are indeed 
being used as a tool for earnings management in the form of income smoothing. Therefore, 
for this model version, evidence is found that supports Hypothesis 2, indicating that firms 
are more likely to record a goodwill impairment loss when their earnings are 
‘unexpectedly’ high. However, for the other model versions (I, II and V) the results 
indicate that the variable is not a proxy for income smoothing or profit minimalisation, but 
instead a proxy for profit maximalisation since no impairment loss is being recognized. This 
implies that for these model versions evidence is found which is not in support of 
Hypothesis 2. Therefore this hypothesis should be rejected. 
For the interaction term BATH2it*CEOit the sign is negative, which contradicts with the 
individual expectations for these two variables since for both variables a positive relation 
was expected. This result also contradicts with the individual results in prior research 
(Francis et al., 1996 for BATH2it; Masters-Stout et al., 2007 for CEOit). taking into account 
that no prior research incorporated an interaction term for the combined effect of these 
factors. A possible explanation for the negative sign for this interaction term can be based 
on the result for the proxy for big bath accounting. The sign of the variable BATH2it is 
negative. When the sign for the variable CEOit is positive, together these variables lead to 
a negative sign for the interaction term. In that case the sign for the variable CEOit is as 
expected. Since the interaction term is significant and negative, a CEO change is not 
associated with big bath accounting but more with loss minimalisation. In other words, 
around the time of a CEO change, loss minimalisation is applied instead of big bath 
accounting and therefore the new CEO does not pass a weak performance onto his 
predecessor to loose the inheritance. Evidence is therefore found which contradicts with 
Hypothesis 3, indicating that firms which experience a change in CEO record higher 
goodwill impairment losses. Therefore this hypothesis should be rejected. 
 
4.2 Results alternative tests 
When comparing the results from the two models, it is a remarkable finding that the 
results differ significantly, since Van de Poel (2008) has stated that the use of a model 
with a dummy variable as the dependent variable (Model 1) to measure the impairment 
decision does not lead to different results compared to the use of goodwill impairment 
amounts (deflated by total assets) for measuring the dependent variable (Model 2). Since 
the results differ substantially after applying the two different models, alternative tests 
have been performed. Appendix II depicts the results of these tests for both models. 
 
The main conclusions that can be drawn from these tests are as follows. For Model 1 (see 
Tabel 4, Appendix II), the results show that the variable SMOOTHit is the only significant 
variable for the observations from the year 2005, while for all other years none of the 
variables of interest have a significant influence on the impairment decision. This indicates 
that the results are heavily influenced by the observations from 2005, which is the 
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transition year to IFRS. Therefore it can be concluded that income smoothing has only 
been applied in 2005, meaning that Hypothesis 1 only holds for the observations from 2005 
and should be rejected for all other years. The results for the total sample therefore do 
not sustain alternative tests. Based on these results, it seems that the introduction of IFRS 
has provided management the opportunity to manipulate earnings.  
 
The results for Model 2 are depicted in Table 5 (Appendix II). The results show that for the 
years 2005 and 2008 none of the variables have a significant effect on the impairment 
decision. It seems that in 2005 management was awaiting further developments as a 
consequence of the introduction of IFRS and that the credit crisis has influenced 
management’s behaviour in 2008. Observations from 2005 and 2008 therefore cause a 
distortion in the results for the total sample, since they weaken the effects of the 
different reporting incentives on the impairment decision. 
For the observations from 2006 and 2007, the results differ substantially. For 2006 the 
variables BATH2it and SMOOTH2it have a significant effect for the model versions I, II and 
III, but not for version V. Since these reporting incentives do not have a significant effect 
on the impairment decision for version IV, this result contradicts with those for the total 
sample. However, for the other versions of Model 2, the sign of the variable SMOOTH2it is 
positive while it was negative for the total sample. This indicates that for the observations 
in 2006, higher impairments are being recognized in the case of unexpectedly high 
earnings. This implies that income smoothing is being used as a tool for earnings 
management, meaning that evidence is found in support of Hypothesis 2, while previously 
evidence for profit maximalisation was found. Noticeable is that the variable CEOit proves 
to be significantly negative only for version V at the 5% level. This result contradicts the 
result for the total sample, since in that case a positive relation is found for version I 
instead of V. Therefore a CEO change in this case is associated with lower impairments. 
The interaction term is still negative and significant at the 1% level. Therefore the 
conclusions drawn based on the earlier results for this factor are robust. 
For 2007, the reporting incentives BATH2it and SMOOTH2it and the interaction term have a 
significant effect when applying the model versions I, II and V, but not for version IV since 
in that case SMOOTH2it is not significant. The signs and significance levels for these 
variables are similar to those for the total sample. This can therefore lead to the 
conclusion that the conclusions drawn earlier based on these variables sustain after this 
alternative test. For the sample of 2007 also the variable CEOit proves to have a significant 
positive effect at the 1% level for Model 2-I. This contradicts prior results for the total 
sample, since then this variable is not significant. This therefore indicates that in 2007 
more CEO changes occurred simultaneously with the recognition of higher impairment 
losses. Therefore evidence is found that a firm which experiences a change in CEO 
recognizes higher impairments, which is in support of Hypothesis 3. 
 
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
In this research it has been investigated whether goodwill impairments are being used as a 
tool to manipulate earnings. Based on the presented results, the conclusion needs to be 
drawn that it depends on the model which is being applied whether this is the case, since 
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the results from the two models differ substantially. After alternative testing, the results 
differ from those for the total sample. For Model 1 earnings management is only found for 
the observations from 2005, so after the introduction of IFRS. For Model 2 (total sample), 
only indications are found that goodwill impairments are being used for profit 
maximalisation and loss minimalisation, instead of income smoothing and big bath 
accounting. Impairments are therefore used in a less extreme manner. After alternative 
testing, the only strong evidence however remains that in 2007 higher goodwill 
impairments have been recorded around the time of a CEO change. For all other 
observations, no (conclusive) evidence is found for earnings management. So overall, the 
results for the total sample are heavily influenced by the transition year to IFRS (2005) and 
the credit crisis (2008) and no strong evidence is found which indicates that management 
indeed uses goodwill impairments to manipulate earnings. 
This research implies that goodwill impairments are highly subjective and therefore it is 
recommended to lower this subjectivity for instance by developing guidelines for 
management to perform the impairment test. More research should be performed on this 
subject to make it possible to include potential guidelines in the standards or to provide 
the standards with more detailed descriptions on how to perform the impairment test. This 
in turn could make it easier for auditors to check the impairment test and may therefore 
lower the subjectivity associated with it. 
 
A limitation of this research is that no results have been generated for each industry 
separately. Since the subsamples for the different industries would have been too small in 
this research, the choice was made not to run the regression for each industry separately 
since it would make the results less reliable. This can however be a good example for 
future research. Also it is possible to look at financials or compare financials to the other 
firms, since financial firms have been excluded from this research because of their 
different laws and regulations with which they need to comply. 
Also it is possible to investigate the effects of the introduction of IFRS on the level of 
earnings management in the Netherlands with regard to goodwill. This could be done by 
examining a certain period before and after the introduction (compare the use of 
amortization with impairments). Also the influence of the revised standard IFRS 3R can be 
investigated in a similar manner, since this new standard allows the use of the full goodwill 
method which can have an impact for the financial statements. 
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Appendix I 
 
Overview of the variables and their definitions 
Dependent variables 
IMPAIRMENTit Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if firm i takes a goodwill 
impairment in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
IMPAIRMENT_ 
AMOUNTit 
The reported impairment amount deflated by total assets at the end of 
year t-1. 
Economic factors 
ΔindROAit The percentage change in firm i‘s industry return on assets (ROA) from 
year t-1 to year t, where industry is defined based on the Industrial 
Classification Benchmark Industry (ICB) from Worldscope. 
ΔSALESit The percentage change in firm i‘s sales from year t-1 to year t (= the 
change in firm i’s sales from period t-1 to t, divided by total assets at 
the end of year t-1). 
ΔOCFit The change in firm i‘s operating cash flows from period t-1 to t, divided 
by total assets at the end of t-1. 
Reporting incentives 
BATHit Indicator variable equal to 1 if the change in firm i‘s pre-impaired 
earnings (before tax) from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets at 
year t-1, is below the industry median of non-zero negative values, and 
0 otherwise (= the proxy for the use of big bath accounting by 
management). 
SMOOTHit Indicator variable equal to 1 if the change in firm i‘s pre-impaired 
earnings (before tax) from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets at 
year t-1, is above the industry median of non-zero positive values, and 
0 otherwise (= the proxy for the use of income smoothing by 
management). 
BATH2it  The value of unexpected earnings when unexpected earnings are below 
zero, and 0 otherwise. Unexpected earnings are measured as the 
operating earnings (earnings before taxes, so net income + income 
taxes) in year t less the operating earnings in year t-1, divided by total 
assets at the end of year t-1. 
SMOOTH2it The value of unexpected earnings less the write-off when this resulting 
amount exceeds zero, and 0 otherwise. Unexpected earnings are 
measured as the operating earnings (earnings before taxes, so net 
income + income taxes) in year t less the operating earnings in year t-1, 
divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
CEOit Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm experienced a change in the 
CEO position in year t-1 or t, and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables 
GOODWILLit The ratio of firm i’s opening balance of goodwill on total assets at t-1. 
SIZEit The natural logarithm of firm i‘s total assets in year t. 
INDUSTRYit Indicator variable that takes the values of the ICB industry codes to 
divide the sample into multiple industry groups. The industry 
distribution is based on the ICB (Industrial Classification Benchmark 
Industry) division. There is a total of 9 industry groups. 
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Appendix II – Regression results alternative tests 
 
 
Table 4: Summary regression results Model 1 – Regression coefficients 
 BATHit SMOOTHit CEOit 
Total sample, 2005-2008 0.027 
(0.691) 
0.108 
(0.047)** 
0.008 
(0.668) 
Total sample, 2005-2006 -0.056 
(0.561) 
0.156 
(0.025)** 
-0.003 
(0.958) 
Total sample, 2007-2008 0.090 
(0.346) 
0.033 
(0.713) 
0.035 
(0.648) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005-2008 0.004 
(0.954) 
0.107 
(0.060)* 
0.032 
(0.535) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005-2006 -0.073 
(0.497) 
0.146 
(0.041)** 
0.022 
(0.726) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2007-2008 0.056 
(0.586) 
0.029 
(0.769) 
0.043 
(0.634) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005-2006-
2007 
-0.024 
(0.769) 
0.094 
(0.112) 
0.041 
(0.452) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005 -0.037 
(0.808) 
0.186 
(0.075)* 
-0.025 
(0.783) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2006 -0.089 
(0.548) 
0.061 
(0.569) 
0.066 
(0.488) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2007 0.008 
(0.956) 
-0.031 
(0.778) 
0.072 
(0.505) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2008 -0.042 
(0.842) 
0.084 
(0.728) 
0.056 
(0.779) 
 
***, **, * = coefficient is significant at the α=0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level 
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Table 5: Summary regression results Model 2 – Regression coefficients 
 BATH2it SMOOTH2it CEOit 
Total sample, 2005-2008 -0.421 
(0.000)*** 
-0.119 
(0.002)*** 
0.005 
(0.127) 
Total sample, 2005-2006 -0.263 
(0.000)*** 
0.062 
(0.081)* 
0.000 
(0.998) 
Total sample, 2007-2008 -0.705 
(0.000)*** 
-0.385 
(0.000)*** 
0.014 
(0.023)** 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005-2008 -0.440 
(0.000)*** 
-0.139 
(0.001)*** 
0.009 
(0.032)** 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005-2006 -0.264 
(0.000)*** 
0.071 
(0.079)* 
0.001 
(0.870) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2007-2008 -0.711 
(0.000)*** 
-0.391 
(0.000)*** 
0.024 
(0.002)*** 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005-2006-
2007 
-0.461 
(0.000)*** 
-0.152 
(0.001)*** 
0.009 
(0.040)** 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005 -0.005 
(0.670) 
0.000 
(0.943) 
0.000 
(0.442) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2006 -0.342 
(0.000)*** 
0.140 
(0.035)** 
-0.007 
(0.183) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2007 -0.860 
(0.000)*** 
-0.482 
(0.000)*** 
0.028 
(0.004)*** 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2008 -0.065 
(0.720) 
0.187 
(0.424) 
0.008 
(0.574) 
 
***, **, * = coefficient is significant at the α=0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level 
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Earnings Management through Goodwill 
Impairment: 
CEO and CFO tenure impact 
 
 
Olga Vladimidrovna Viśnevskaá MSc. LL.B.1 
 
 
Executive summary 
This paper examines the relationship between the extent of goodwill impairment and the 
properties of CEOs and CFOs of a selection of FTSE Eurotop 100 Index companies. Prior 
research indicated that it is likely that CEOs tend to take earnings baths early in their 
tenure, as the losses can then still easily be blamed on their predecessors, as well as 
creating a lower benchmark for measuring their own future financial performance. Also, 
the nature of a specific turnover process and the prior employment of the incoming CEO 
(hired from within or outside the company) have been considered as an explanatory 
variable by some studies. The outcomes of this study indicate that the tenure and prior 
employment of the CEO are significantly associated with a company’s financial reporting 
behavior in relation to the magnitude of goodwill impairment. However, contrary to 
expectations, goodwill impairment charges are likely to increase as the tenure of a CEO 
increases. CEOs promoted from inside the same company are likely to impair goodwill by 
larger amounts, compared to CEOs hired from outside the company. A significant 
association between the CFO tenure and prior employment variables and the magnitude of 
impairment charges was not established in this study.  
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5550. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The objective of this study is to asses the extent of goodwill impairment by European 
companies for the period 2006-2007, and to investigate the relationship between the 
extent of goodwill impairment and the properties of executives in charge at the time. 
 
The commonly used opportunistic perspective of the Positive Accounting Theory predicts 
that when self-interested actors are confronted with opportunities to use discretion with 
                                             
1 This thesis was supervised by Drs. C.D. Knoops. Olga Viśnevskaá has graduated from the Erasmus School of 
Economics and is currently in completing her masters thesis on the topic of financial law at the Rotterdam 
School of Law. 
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regard to financial accounting and reporting to their own advantage, they will do so. This 
practice of ‘earnings management’ could be aimed at either increasing the reported 
income, or decreasing it through income smoothing and taking of earnings baths. The 
International Financial Reporting Standards are often criticized for allowing room for 
discretion especially due to the prescription of use of fair values. More specifically, the 
accounting treatment of goodwill through the use of impairment tests is often criticized. 
My own examination of the financial reporting standards revealed that indeed, in my 
opinion, there was room for managerial discretion with respect to goodwill (re)valuation 
and possible losses arising from it. Accordingly, I expect executives to use goodwill 
impairment charges to manage earnings to achieve personal goals. As I wonder whether 
personal goals could be related to the phase of employment of an executive, I formulate 
the following research question: 
 
Are tenure and prior employment of the CEO and the CFO associated with a 
company’s financial reporting behavior in relation to the magnitude of 
goodwill impairment? 
 
Considering the prior research mentioned further in this master thesis, this study mainly 
builds and expands on the work conducted by Masters-Stout e.a. 2007. My study adds value 
to the existing body of research for the following reasons: 
• Firstly, contrary to most studies mentioned in this master thesis, as well as that by 
Masters-Stout, this study is conducted using data of European companies that are 
subject to IFRS and not SFAS. The outcomes can thus be considered more relevant in 
the European context; 
• Secondly, as far as my knowledge goes, no other study has been conducted on the 
relationship between the CFO tenure and prior employment and a company’s financial 
reporting behavior regarding the magnitude of goodwill impairment; 
• Finally, as far as I know, no other study has combined and offset both CEO and CFO 
properties in relation to goodwill impairment, in one research design. 
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, I will describe the theoretical 
background to my study and review the outcomes of prior research on the subject. 
Continuingly, I will introduce the hypotheses that were tested and follow with a brief 
description of the sample used in my study. I will then describe the research design and 
the corresponding model and continue with the elaboration of the results. Before I 
conclude this article, I will reflect on the outcomes of my study and give suggestions for 
further research. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background and prior literature 
2.1  Earnings management and financial reporting incentives 
The practice of managers trying to influence the financial reporting numbers and the way 
they appear in the financial statements is often known by the term ‘earnings 
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management’. Several incentives to manage earnings can be identified, for 
example (Palepu e.a., 2007): 
1. accounting-based debt covenants: requirement of certain debt-contracts and 
meeting targets arising from them, can induce managers to distort accounting 
figures to gain more favorable results; 
2. management compensation: (bonus-)compensation  which are often connected to 
reported profits and wanting to secure their position for longer period of time, is 
another motivation to favorably influence the reported income; 
3. corporate control contests: managers can use accounting numbers to gain approval 
of company’s shareholders in their attempt to become/remain a manager. 
 
There are several ways for managers to influence financial reporting, one of which is asset 
distortion. When managers desire to increase reported earnings they tend to overstate 
assets, as this is accompanied by either an increase in income or a reduction of costs in the 
income statement. On the other hand, managers can also desire to deflate earnings by 
understating assets. Managers can ‘smooth income’ by overstating expenses during a 
period of exceptional performance by the company. Also managers can ‘take a bath’ in 
income by overstating expenses during a period of exceptionally bad performance to 
create an appearance of a turnaround in the following years (Palepu e.a., 2007). Thus, 
managers are not necessarily interested in presenting accounting figures only ‘for the 
better’ as earnings baths occur as well. 
 
2.2 Discretionary financial reporting and the case of goodwill 
The first step in the examination of prior research concentrated on the studies of the 
relationship between opportunistic behaviour and goodwill impairment testing. Prior 
research showed evidence of opportunistic behavior on the account of managers with 
regard to impairment testing of goodwill as the prescribed accounting treatment. The 
findings were, however, not uniform. Some researchers (Anantharaman 2007, Henning and 
Shaw 2004) found little support for the criticism of goodwill impairment testing, which was 
introduced as the new accounting treatment of goodwill in SFAS 142 and IAS 36. To the 
contrary, other studies have shown evidence of the misuse of managerial discretion to 
some degree under the new accounting standards (Beatty and Weber 2005, Lapointe 2005, 
Zang 2008, Ramanna and Watts 2007, Carlin e.a. 2007). 
 
2.3 Management tenure: the role of the chief executive officer 
Like any process, the period of tenure of the chief executive officer (CEO) can be divided 
into different phases. The agency theory predicts that managers are guided by self-
interest. Presumably, different phases of tenure will correspond with different goals and 
motivations. And so, the second step of the literature examination was aimed at examining 
the relationship between the executive management’s phase of employment and its 
influence on financial reporting. 
 
Moore (1973) conducted one of the first studies on the subject of the influence of 
management changes in the field of accounting. He found that in the year of a top 
management change, income reducing discretionary accounting decisions, such as write-
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downs, write-offs and taking of provisions, occurred significantly more than in years with 
no management change. He interpreted the overall results to be an indication of the newly 
appointed management taking an earnings bath. More so, because the majority of 
companies with indication of income-reducing discretionary accounting decision did report 
an increase in income in the first reporting year after the change. Accordingly, Moore 
hypothesized that the incentives of the incoming management for taking the income 
reducing discretionary decisions are two-fold. First, the blame would be placed on their 
predecessors and the historical benchmark for their own future performance is reduced. 
Second, the losses taken in the year of the change would not have to be reported in the 
future, thus increasing the future reported income and the appearance of their 
performance. 
 
Later, DeAngelo (1987) found that when a ‘dissident’ (an outside manager) was hired, he 
would report an ‘immediate earnings bath’, so to be able to report an earnings turn-
around in the following years. Pourciau (1993) investigated the behavior of incoming 
managers in cases of what she called a non-routine (involuntary) executive change. She 
found that for these instances the incoming executives managed accruals in the year of the 
change to reduce income, and did the opposite in the following year. Additionally, in the 
year of the change, larger write-off were taken. Francis e.a. (1996) conducted a broad 
study of possible causes of discretionary write-offs. Among others, she found that write-
offs occur more frequently if preceded by a management change, and are then also larger 
in size. 
 
Several studies, which did not directly investigate the relationship between executive 
tenure and goodwill impairment, did produce outcomes on this subject as well. Like Beatty 
and Weber (2005), who hypothesized that the difference between actual and predicted 
goodwill write-offs could be explained by the departure of the CEO who made the original 
acquisition decision. Further, the study by Lapointe (2005) also found that higher 
transitional goodwill impairment losses correlated with companies having experienced 
recent management change. Additionally Ramanna and Watts (2007) found that goodwill-
write offs are negatively associated with CEO tenure. Finally, Zang (2008) found that 
recent management change was an explanatory variable for earnings management through 
transitional goodwill impairment losses2, as he believed that higher goodwill impairment 
losses were taken during the transitional period to increase the likelihood of higher 
earnings in the future. 
 
Bengtsson e.a. (2007) investigated the occurrence of earnings management in Sweden, 
surrounding management turnovers through both accruals, as well as write-offs. Earnings 
were reduced in the first year of the turnover and increased in the following year. This 
supports the findings in the previously mentioned studies. Furthermore, Bengtsson 
attempted to distinguish an association between earnings management and an executive 
turnover in question, being routine versus non-routine. However, he found no conclusive 
evidence in support of this distinction. 
                                             
2 Loss incurred by companies upon the adoption of the new SFAS. 142 standard. 
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Masters-Stout e.a. (2007) performed a subsequent study, which related goodwill 
impairments under SFAS 142 to CEO tenure. For the companies that did impair, she found 
that newly appointed CEOs reported higher impairments than senior CEOs.’ Her additional 
findings indicated that CEOs hired internally from within the present employees of the 
company impaired relatively smaller amounts. She hypothesized that these CEOs were 
more ‘personally invested’ in previously taken strategic acquisition decisions and thus 
lacked what she called a ‘fresh perspective’. These outcomes were however insignificant. 
 
2.4  Management tenure: the role of the chief financial officer 
From the previous step of my prior research analysis it became clear that scholars 
hypothesize that CEOs have certain incentives to manipulate financial reporting, have the 
power to do so, and use their power to act on their incentives. In the continuing step I 
attempt to consider the role of another senior manager, which could be presumed to 
influence the financial reporting of a company: the chief financial officer (CFO). 
 
The role of the modern CFO is no longer limited to mere ‘financial record keeping’. Now, 
the CFO ‘is one of the top decision makers – often leading member of the top management 
along with the chief executive officer and the chief operating officer.’ (Copeland, 2001). A 
CFO today, is involved in decision-making on many levels and about many significant issues 
throughout the entire company. Intuitively, it can be supposed that some incentives that 
drive CEOs, might similarly drive CFOs. If so, the agency theory predicts that the CFO will 
also try to exert influence to satisfy his self-interests. Surprisingly, very few studies have 
been conducted on the influence of the CFO in the field of accounting research. Could it 
be more commonsense to consider the CFO to have more influence on financial reporting? 
More than the CEO? 
 
Building on that intuition, Jiang and Petroni (2008) were interested in finding the answer 
to the question of ‘who has the most influence on earnings management’, the CEO or the 
CFO. They executed three previously conducted studies, which already established an 
association between CEOs’ equity incentives and earnings management, and reexamined 
them by also testing the association between the CFOs’ equity incentives and earnings 
management. The general outcomes indicated that the amount of discretionary accruals 
was more closely associated with the CFO rather then with the CEO incentives and that the 
role of a CFO is indeed influential with regard to a company’s financial reporting behavior. 
 
Greiger and North (2006) also suspected that the CFO ‘has a substantial amount of control 
over a company’s reported financial status’, as they studied the effect of a CFO change on 
reported accruals. They found that after an appointment of a new CFO, earnings are 
significantly reduced through the management of accruals. Furthermore, these findings did 
not seem to be influenced or mitigated by the appointment of a new CEO. Finally, they 
also found that the hiring of a CFO from a different source than the company’s direct audit 
company, produced more significant outcomes. 
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3. Hypothesis development 
Based on these outcomes of prior research and the predictions of the positive accounting 
theory I have arrived at the following hypotheses to be tested in my study: 
 
H1: Shorter CEO tenure corresponds with higher goodwill impairment charges. 
H2: Companies with CEOs, who have been employed by the same company two 
years or less, will take relatively higher goodwill impairment losses. 
 
Additionally, I have asked myself whether the logic that has been applied to the 
relationship between properties of a CEO of a company and its financial reporting 
behavior, could also be applied to the properties of the CFO. Combined with the outcomes 
of studies regarding the CEO properties mentioned above I arrive at the following 
additional hypotheses: 
 
H3: Shorter CFO tenure corresponds with higher goodwill impairment charges. 
H4: Companies with CFOs, who have been employed by the same company two 
years or less, will take relatively higher goodwill impairment losses. 
 
 
4. Sample and data collection 
My study examined the financial data of 58 major European companies listed in the FTSE 
Eurotop 100 Index during the period 2006-2007, resulting in 116 observations. In 37% of the 
cases, goodwill impairments were observed. Largest average absolute and relative 
(measured against revenues) impairment losses were observed in the telecommunications 
industry. The average CEO tenure for companies within the sample was 5.9 years; the 
average CFO tenure was 4.5 years. Additionally, 67% of the CEOs in the sample, prior to 
their appointment, were employed by the same company for less than three years, which 
classified them as ‘internal hires’ for the purpose of my study. 54% of the CFOs were 
classified as internal hires. When examining the subsample of companies that that have 
taken a decision to impair goodwill, the frequency of the impairment decision decreased 
as observed tenures of CEOs increased. A similar pattern was observed between the 
frequency of impairment decisions and CFO tenure. 
 
The financial data was hand collected using the information provided in the annual 
reports. Information regarding the tenure and prior employment of the executives was 
hand-collected for each executive from additional sources like company websites and 
newspaper articles, as a general database for such information of European companies 
does not exist. 
 
 
5. Research design and model 
To test my hypotheses I used a multivariate regression model, which I will describe in this 
section. 
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The dependent variable of this model (IMPit) is the reported goodwill impairment charge. 
First, the effects of the independent variables were measured against the reported nominal 
impairment amount. Secondly, I believed that there would be added value to measuring the 
dependent variable relative to the effect this has within the entire income statement of a the 
specific company, as this puts the impairment charge amount into perspective. This is why, 
the alternative dependent variable metric is the impairment loss divided by the revenue. 
 
To test my hypothesis I added several independent variables of interest. To test H1 and H3, I 
departed from Master-Stout e.a. (2007), who used dummy variables to distinguish between 
the new and old executives , as I do not find their arguments to be substantial enough to 
justify the separation into those specific categories. Using a continuous metric would, as I 
believed, provide for a test of a more nuanced relationship between the dependent variable 
and this independent variable of tenure. Furthermore, other studies that have used executive 
tenure as an independent variable (e.g. Ramanna, Watts, 2007), have also used a 
continuous metric. Consequently, to test the effect of executive tenure, I use the tenure 
duration measured in years (CEO_TENUREit and CFO_TENUREit). In line with the 
hypotheses I have formulated, I expected there to be a negative association between these 
variables and the dependent variable. 
 
To test H2 and H4 I added dummy-variables into the model (CEO_INTERNALit, 
CFO_INTERNALit). These dummy variables made it possible to test for the difference in the 
impact of an executive prior employment on the (relative) size of the impairment charge. The 
dummy variable was coded 0 and is considered to be an external-hire, if the executive in 
question was employed by company i for less than three years before appointment as an 
executive officer. In the other case the variable was coded 1. I based this distinction on 
Master-Stout e.a. (2007), as it seems reasonable to consider an executive who has been 
with a company for less than three years not to be entrenched. In line with the hypotheses I 
have formulated, I expected there to be a negative association between these variables and 
the dependent variable. 
 
Additionally, I included several control variables associated with the economic condition of 
the companies. I used EBITDA (EBITDAit) to control for the size of the economic activity of a 
company. I saw the EBITDA amount as the measure of the ability of a company to absorb 
impairment charges. I did not hypothesize a coefficient sign, as, on one hand, I can imagine 
that higher EBITDA can be seen by the management as buffer that can absorbed ‘unwanted’ 
expenses and smooth income. On the other hand, lower (than expected) EBITDA could also 
induce an earnings bath strategy. 
 
Further, I included the after tax net income (INCOMEit), which is also used by Masters-Stout 
e.a. (2007), as a measure of economic performance (profitability) of the companies in the 
sample. This variable is included in the model to account for the overall profitability of a 
company. Although net income already includes any impairment losses, I presumed that if a 
company is confronted with a negative or extremely low or high net income before the 
publication of final financial results, the management might feel tempted to adjust the 
reported impairment charge. Consequently, similar pattern that I described for the EBITDA 
can also be applied to the relationship between the net income and the goodwill impairment 
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charge: high profits could induce income smoothing and losses can be seen as an 
opportunity to take (further) earnings baths. Thus, no coefficient sign was hypothesized 
either. 
 
The size of a company (SIZEit) measured as the natural logarithm of company’s total assets 
to normalize the impact of the part of the sample on the larger side of the spectrum, was 
included in the model as well. I predicted a positive relationship between the size of a 
company and the amount of the impairment charge, which is also supported by 
Van de Poel e.a. (2008) outcomes. It seems to me that, as larger companies are often the 
product of several prior mergers, this would result in more recognized goodwill that in turn 
can be a subject to impairment. 
 
Finally, I included a company’s leverage, measured as total liabilities divided by the total 
assets, as control variable. I expected highly leveraged companies to be subjected to more 
attention and scrutiny by their creditors (who are professional investors), and these 
companies to operate under bigger restrictions of loan contracts. This should in turn reduce 
the amount of earnings management in general. And when earnings management would 
take place, it would probably be directed upwards to increase reported earnings. For this 
reasons I expected a negative coefficient sign for this variable. This variable can be 
considered a proxy for room for discretionary earnings management by a company as was 
used by Zang (2008). 
 
Hence, my empirical model looks as follows: 
 
I tested this model using the data from the entire sample, as well as performing separate 
tests on the data from the subsample of companies that impaired goodwill during the 
observed period. Furthermore, I used two different definitions of the independent variable 
IMP (measured in absolute and in relative values), and also of the independent variable 
CEO_TENURE (measured in years and as a natural logarithm). This has resulted in different 
outcomes. Secondly, I executed three types of regression with regard to the executive 
properties data. First, I applied the abovementioned model, removing the CFO variables 
and accounting only for the CEO properties, to measure the ‘pure’ association between IMP 
and CEO tenure and prior employment. After that, I did the same now removing the CEO 
tenure and prior employment properties, to measure the ‘CFO effect’. Thirdly, I tested my 
main model, mentioned above, which controlled the associations between impairment 
charges and one executive type tenure and prior employment, for that of the other.  
 
 
6. Results 
6.1 CEO properties 
The outcomes regarding the independent variables of interest, the CEO properties, are 
consistent in all cases. However, they are entirely not as expected. CEO tenure is 
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positively associated with impairment charges. Furthermore, compared to CEOs hired from 
outside the company, CEOs hired from inside the company are associated with higher 
impairment charges. These associations are significant at α<.05 for both the entire sample 
and the subsample, when tenure is expressed as a logarithm. When tenure is expressed in 
years, measuring impairment relative to revenues, gives slightly better significance results. 
Overall, these finding indicate that H1 and H2 of my research design are false. These 
findings are summarized in table 1. 
 
Table 3 Regression outcomes CEO properties 
6.2 CFO properties 
The coefficients of the independent variables of interest were insignificant at α<.05 for all 
tests performed on the data from the entire sample. Within the subsample, the association 
between prior employment of the CFO and the magnitude of impairment charges is 
significant. For this population, compared to CFOs hired from outside the company, CFOs 
hired from inside the company are associated with relatively higher impairment charges, 
contrary to expectations. As such, the validity of H3 and H4 was not established for the 
entire sample, and validity of H3 was not established for the subsample either. H4 was 
proven to be significantly false for the data of the subsample. These findings are 
summarized in table 2. 
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Table 4 Regression outcomes CFO properties 
 
6.3 Combined model 
With respect to independent variables of interest, several associations become clear. The 
association between the CEO tenure and the magnitude of impairment charges is 
significant at α<.05 in all cases, except for the test of the subsample using the absolute 
values of IMP and using the tenure variable expressed in years. When tests are performed 
on the data of the entire sample CEO prior employment is significant at α<.05, except 
when IMP is measured in relative values and the CEO tenure is measured in years. Overall, 
this means that when the decision not to impair is taken into account and the model 
controls for the association of CFO properties, the association between the CEO tenure and 
the magnitude of impairment charges is positive. Furthermore, compared to CEOs hired 
from outside the company, CEOs hired from inside the company are associated with higher 
impairment charges. Thus, H1 and H2 were proven to be false for the entire sample. 
 
In the subsample, the association between the CEO tenure and the magnitude of 
impairment charges is significant at α<.05, except for when IMP is measured in absolute 
values and tenures are measured in years. The association with CEO prior employment is 
not significant within the subsample. As such, H1 has proven to be false within the 
subsample, and validity of H2 has not been established. 
 
The association between CFO tenure and the magnitude of impairment charges when 
controlled for the associations of CEO properties, remains insignificant at α<.05 in all 
cases. The validity of H3 thus is not established. Furthermore, the association between the 
magnitude of impairment charges and CFO prior employment is insignificant when 
analyzing the data of the entire sample. However, within the subsample, CFO prior tenure 
association is significant at α<.05, when impairment charge is measured in absolute values, 
regardless of the definition of tenure. The absolute size of goodwill impairment charges is 
positively associated with a CFO being promoted from inside, when the decisions not to 
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take goodwill impairment losses is disregarded. H4 is thus proven to be false within the 
subsample. H4 validity has not been established for the entire sample. These findings are 
summarized in table 3. 
 
Table 5 Regression outcomes controlled for both types of executives 
 
7. Analysis of the outcomes 
The first question I ask myself based on the outcomes of my study, is: why would 
impairment charges increase during the course of employment of a CEO? More specifically, 
what incentives could there be for managers to want to increase impairment charges late, 
instead of early, in their tenure? An alternative explanation to wanting to take earnings 
baths early in their tenure, could be the job security argument. Contrary to the arguments 
behind my hypotheses, it is conceivable that CEOs might want to show good results 
(immediately) after their appointment and would want to avoid ‘unnecessary’ losses, to 
justify their appointment and secure their position. This desire might even induce ‘upward 
earnings management’. CEOs, who have acquired ‘relational goodwill’ for their positive 
performance throughout the course of their tenure, could also believe that this would be 
sufficient to mitigate any harm to their reputation from losses taken in later stages of their 
tenure, and thus would take these losses easier than ‘younger’ CEOs. 
 
Furthermore, the influence of CEO employment contracts and compensation schemes, 
which is not taken into account in this study, could have alternative explanatory power for 
the established association between the magnitude of impairment charges and CEO tenure. 
These contracts and payment schemes are usually constructed (in line with the agency 
theory) in such way as to align management incentives with company’s/shareholders best 
interests. Presuming that earnings management is motivated by management self-interest 
and that employment contracts are constructed effectively, this should lead to a reduction 
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of earnings management. Similarly, Beatty and Weber (2005) found that managers who are 
subject to more binding ‘contracts that include effects of accounting changes…will prefer 
to delay expense recognition’. Including executive compensation (plans) into a research 
model could be a consideration for future research. 
 
The second question that I ask myself is: why do the outcomes of my study indicate that 
internally promoted CEOs impair relatively more than CEOs hired from outside the 
company? First of all, it is important to note that the majority (69%) of CEOs whose data 
were included in this study, where classified as internal hires. This fact, by itself, might 
have a distortive effect on the outcomes of the study. 
 
Additionally, perhaps when it comes to employment history, the magnitude of the goodwill 
impairment charges is not best explained by the duration of CEO prior employment by the 
same company before his appointment. Reconsidering my prior hypothesis, I believe that 
the assumption that a manager becomes personally involved in prior acquisition due to his 
mere presence in the same company, might be too general. Instead, entrenchment could 
better be defined by the fact whether the manager in question was actually involved in the 
decision process that preceded a specific acquisition. Some support for this idea was also 
found in Beatty and Weber’s study (2005), which linked the likelihood of a SFAS 142 
impairment to the likelihood of a CEO making ‘the original acquisition’. Again, future 
studies can inquire to the feasibility of researching prior employment from this angle. 
 
An alternative explanation could also be that the prior employment of an executive could 
represent experience and knowledge. An executive, who has been with the same company 
for a longer period of time, is likely to have specific inside knowledge that would allow 
him to make a better judgment about the value of goodwill, and in turn might make it 
‘easier’ to take an impairment charge compared to a counterpart who lacks similar 
experience and knowledge. This could result in the observed relationship between prior 
employment and the size of impairment charges. 
 
Thirdly, I ask myself what other issues there might be that might have influenced or limit 
the outcomes of my study. First, there is the fact that contrary to most of prior research 
that has been done on the subject of goodwill impairment and/or the influence of CEO 
properties (which often have been performed in the United States), my study is aimed at 
European companies. For example, this could account for the existence of cultural 
differences between my and the prior research. Perhaps, the European context and 
tradition with regard to expectations and the regulation of executive behavior, contribute 
to a less competitive executive environment, which results in less opportunistic behavior. 
 
Furthermore, there could be other issues with regard to the chosen sample. For instance 
there is a noticeable presence of former state owned companies in my sample. As such the 
oil & gas and the telecommunication sectors combined, account for almost a quarter of the 
companies in the sample. One can speculate whether these companies are subject to a 
specific kind of (government-like) corporate culture, which most probably does not exist in 
the American context. These companies might also still be subject to governmental 
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influence and specific regulation, which would reduce the amount of discretion available 
to managers. 
 
In addition, the descriptive statistics reveal that that the telecommunications industry 
accounts for the largest goodwill impairment losses observed within my sample. It is a 
commonly known fact that during the observed period companies in that particular 
industry underwent several economic adversities, such as the devaluation of purchased 
UMTS frequencies. The heterogeneity problem surfaces with regard to this issue. It is 
possible that there were real economic causes to the impairment losses taken in the 
telecommunications industry. As these are the most significant impairment losses within 
my sample, this could undermine the validity of the detected relationship between 
impairment charges and CEO properties. To control for this problem, I ran an additional 
regressions, which included both CEO and CFO properties, on my data, while removing the 
entire telecommunication sector. The association between both absolute and relative 
impairment charges, and CEO tenure remained significant at α < .05 (also, when the 
decision not to take impairment charges was disregarded). However, the fit of the model 
measured in R2, decreased significantly to levels lower than 0.10. The CEO prior 
employment variables and both CFO variables were insignificant. 
 
The heterogeneity problem could be addressed through the expansion of the sample and 
the amount of observations. These are of course the obvious limitations of my study, as it 
does cover only two years worth of financial data of a limited number of companies. This is 
an inherent consequence of the nature of the intensive data hand-collection process with 
regard to the information about CEO tenure and prior employment in the European 
context. Furthermore, the sample could be expanded with regard to the amount of 
companies in it. A matter for future research is to consider an entire different sample of 
companies, or consider including financial institutions in the sample. 
 
Finally, based on my own analysis of reporting standards with regard to goodwill 
impairment and predictions formed in prior research about the susceptibility of goodwill 
impairment testing to managerial discretion, I formed expectations about goodwill 
impairment charges to be a likely item to be used for earnings management. This 
assumption can also be a subject for critical review. It could be a subject to future 
research to consider to what degree it is really likely that goodwill impairment test is used 
as a ‘tool’ to manage earnings. Perhaps, other ‘gaps’ in financial reporting standards are 
used relatively more often to manage earnings (on a larger scale), and these ‘earnings 
management tools’ could also be tested for association with executive tenure and 
employment information.  
 
 
8. Summary and conclusions 
The outcomes of this study indicate that the tenure and prior employment of the CEO are 
significantly associated with a company’s financial reporting behavior in relation to the 
magnitude of goodwill impairment. Contrary to my expectations I have found that CEO 
tenure is positively associated with the magnitude of goodwill impairment charges. These 
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results mean that the hypothesis that CEOs tend to take earnings baths in the early stages of 
their tenure, so losses can more easily be blamed on their predecessors, is false for the data 
in my sample. Surprisingly, this outcome contradicts the association described in the prior 
research such as Moore (1973), DeAngelo (1987), Pourciau (1993), Francis e.a. (1996), 
Lapointe (2005), Ramanna and Watts (2007), Zang (2008), Bengtsson e.a. (2007), Masters-
Stout e.a. (2007). 
 
Additionally, compared to CEOs hired from outside the company, internally hired CEOs 
correspond with lager goodwill impairment charges. This falsifies the second type of 
hypotheses of my thesis that compared to their counterparts, internally hired executives 
would impair goodwill by smaller amounts, as they are more ‘personally invested’ in 
previously taken strategic acquisition decisions, and thus would lack a ‘fresh perspective’. 
This outcome is less surprising as the results of prior research on this topic were 
inconclusive (Pourciau 1993, Bengtsson e.a. 2007, Masters-Stout e.a. 2007). 
 
Contrary to my expectation, I have not established a significant association between the CFO 
tenure and prior employment variables and the magnitude of impairment charges. At best, I 
can say that, if the decision not to take impairment charges is disregarded and only the data 
of the remaining subsamples is tested, CFO prior employment is significantly associated with 
the magnitude of impairment charges. Within the subsample compared to CFOs hired from 
outside the company, internally hired CFOs are associated with larger impairment amounts. 
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Appendix: companies in the sample 
 
Company 
Name: 
Ceo Name: Ceo 
appointment 
year: 
Ceo prior 
employment:
Cfo Name: Cfo 
appointment 
year: 
Cfo prior 
employment:
Arcelor Mittal Lakshmi N. 
Mittal 
1989 inside Aditya 
Mittal 
2004 inside 
A.P. Moller - 
Maersk 
Jess 
Søderberg 
1994 inside Søren 
Thorup 
Sørensen 
2006 outside 
Air Liquide Benoît Potier 2001 inside John Glen 2001 outside 
Anglo American Tony Trahar 2000 outside René 
Médori 
2005 outside 
Astra Zeneca David Brennan 2005 inside Jon 
Symonds 
2005 outside 
BASF Jürgen 
Hambrecht 
2003 inside Kurt Bock 2003 inside 
Bayer AG Werner 
Wenning 
2002 inside Klaus Kühn 2002 inside 
BG Group Frank 
Chapman  
2000 inside Ashley 
Almanza   
2002 inside 
BHP Billiton Chip 
Goodyear 
2003 inside Alex 
Vanselow 
2006 inside 
BMW Group Norbert 
Reithofer 
2006 inside Stefan 
Krause 
2002 inside 
BP John Browne 1995 inside Byron 
Grote 
2002 inside 
British 
American 
Tobacco 
Paul Adams 2004 inside Paul 
Rayner 
2002 inside 
Carrefour José Luis 
Durán  
1990 inside Eric Reiss 2005 inside 
Danone Franck Riboud 2006 inside Antoine 
Giscard 
d’Estaing 
2005 outside 
Deutsche Post Klaus 
Zumwinkel  
1990 outside Edgar Ernst 1995 inside 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
René 
Obermann 
2006 inside Karl-
Gerhard 
Eick 
2004 inside 
Diageo Paul Walsh 2000 inside Nick Rose 1999 inside 
EADS Noël Forgeard 2005 inside Hans Peter 
Ring 
2002 outside 
Electricite de 
France (EDF) 
Pierre 
Gadonneix 
2004 outside Daniel 
Camus 
2002 outside 
Endesa Rafael 
Miranda 
Robredo 
1997 outside Jose Luis 
Palomo 
Alvarez 
1991 inside 
Enel Fulvio Conti 2005 inside Claudio 
Machetti 
2005 inside 
 145
Ericsson Carl-Henric 
Svanberg 
2003 outside Karl-Henrik 
Sundstroem 
2003 inside 
Company 
Name: 
Ceo Name: Ceo 
appointment 
year: 
Ceo prior 
employment:
Cfo Name: Cfo 
appointment 
year: 
Cfo prior 
employment:
ENI Paolo Scaroni 2005 outside Marco 
Mangiagalli 
2001 inside 
France Telecom Didier 
Lombard 
2005 inside Philippe 
Jeunet 
2000 inside 
GlaxoSmithKline  Jean-Pierre 
Garnier 
2000 inside Julian 
Heslop 
2005 inside 
Iberdrola José Ignacio 
Sanchez Galán 
2001 outside José Sáinz 
Armada 
2002 outside 
InBev Carlos Brito 2004 inside Felipe 
Dutra 
2005 inside 
Inditex Pablo Isla 
Álvarez de 
Tejera  
2005 outside Antonio 
Rubio 
Merino   
2006 inside 
L'Oreal Jean-Paul 
Agon 
2005 outside Christian 
Mulliez 
2003 outside 
LVMH Bernard 
Arnault  
1989 inside Jean-
Jacques 
Guiony 
2004 outside 
National Grid Roger Urwin 2001 inside Steve 
Lucas 
2002 inside 
Nestlé Peter 
Brabeck-
Letmathe 
1997 inside Paul 
Polman 
2006 outside 
Nokia Olli-Pekka 
Kallasvuo 
2006 inside Richard A. 
Simonson 
2004 inside 
Novartis Daniel Vasella 1999 inside Raymund 
Breu 
1996 inside 
Reckitt 
Benckinser 
Bart Becht 1995 inside Colin Day 2000 outside 
Repsol Antonio 
Brufau Niubó 
1997 outside Fernando 
Ramírez 
Mazarredo 
2006 outside 
Rio Tinto Tom Albanese 2006 inside Guy Elliott 2002 inside 
Roche Group Ranz Humer 1998 inside Erich 
Hunziker 
2001 outside 
Royal Dutch 
Shell 
Jeroen van 
der Veer 
1997 inside Peter Voser 2005 outside 
Royal KPN A.J. 
Scheepbouwer  
2001 inside M.H.M. 
Smits 
2004 outside 
Royal Phillips 
Electronics 
Gerard 
Kleisterlee 
2001 inside Pierre-Jean 
Sivignon 
2005 outside 
RWE Harry Roels 2003 outside Klaus 
Sturany 
1999 outside 
SAB-Miller Graham 
Mackay  
1999 inside Malcolm 
Wyman 
2001 inside 
Saint-Gobain Pierre-André 2005 inside Benoît 2005 inside 
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de Chalendar Bazin 
Company 
Name: 
Ceo Name: Ceo 
appointment 
year: 
Ceo prior 
employment:
Cfo Name: Cfo 
appointment 
year: 
Cfo prior 
employment:
Sanofi-Aventis Jean-Francois 
Dehecq 
1999 inside Jean-
Claude 
Leroy  
2004 inside 
Suez Gérard 
Mestrallet 
2001 inside Philippe 
Jeunet 
2000 inside 
Telecom Italia Riccardo 
Ruggiero  
2002 outside Enrico 
Parazzini  
2001 outside 
Telefonica Cesar Alierta 2000 inside Santiago 
Fernández 
Valbuen  
2002 inside 
Telia Sonera Anders Igel 2002 outside Kim 
Ignatius 
2000 outside 
Tesco Terry Leahy 1997 inside Andrew 
Higginson 
1997 outside 
Total Thierry 
Desmarest 
1995 inside Robert 
Castaigne 
1994 inside 
Unilever Patrick 
Cescau 
2005 inside Rudy 
Markham 
2000 inside 
Vivendi Jean-Bernard 
Lévy  
2005 inside Jacques 
Espinasse 
2002 outside 
Vodafone Arun Sarin 2003 inside Andy 
Halford 
2005 inside 
Volkswagen Bernd 
Pischetsrieder 
2002 inside Hans Dieter 
Pötsch  
2003 outside 
Xstrata Mick Davis 2001 outside Trevor Reid 2002 outside 
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Risk Reporting: An Analysis of the 
German Banking Industry 
 
Laura van Oorschot MSc.1 
 
 
Executive summary 
The recent financial crisis resulted in an increased attention on the risks of banks and their 
financial instruments. This article discusses the outcomes of a study on the quantity and 
quality of market, credit, and liquidity risk disclosures and the relationship 1) between the 
quantity and quality of disclosures, 2) between disclosures and bank size, 3) disclosures 
and bank profitability, and 4) disclosures and time. The 2005-2008 annual reports of a 
sample of German banks are studied and the disclosures are measured by using two 
disclosure index frameworks. The results provide a sound basis for future research like 
capital market research, event studies, and behavioral studies in relation to risk 
disclosures.  
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5413. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
‘Banks are especially unpopular in two circumstances: first, when they are very 
profitable; and second, when they are very unprofitable (Sir Davies, LSE2). 
 
In 2007, and even more in 2008, the world got confronted with an international financial 
crisis, also called the credit crisis. One of the industries that is hit hard by this crisis is the 
German banking industry, that even needed support from the government to survive. 
 
Since the existence of banks these are known to be major risk taking and risk management 
entities. According to Linsley and Shrives (2005, 205) they are therefore “expected to 
release relevant risk-related information to the marketplace, as part of good corporate 
governance”. The annual report is for many years used to communicate firm performance 
with share- and stakeholders and includes, in general, both mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures. Although some suggest that companies will disclose more bad news when their 
financial position is threatened (Darrough and Stoughton, 1999; Suijs, 2005), Linsley and 
                                             
1 Laura van Oorschot studied ‘Business Economics’ at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and is currently 
employed by KPMG Accountants N.V. This article is based on the Master thesis, which was supervised by 
Drs. J. Maat.  
2 Sir Howard Davies, director of the London School of Economics in ‘New banking rules: tread carefully’, The 
Financial Times, September 30, 2008.  
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Shrives (2006, 279) state that banks might wish to keep discussion about their risk levels 
out of the public domain.  
 
The discussion about risk disclosures was already going on for several years due to major 
corporate scandals, but it took the International Accounting Standards Board however until 
2005 to publish an exposure draft to come to regulation to improve the disclosures about 
financial instruments and their risks. From 2007 specific disclosures are required by IFRS 7 
Financial Instruments – Disclosures. Other risk disclosures are required by Basel II pillar 3 
(2008) and for German banks already since 1998 by the Commercial Code and since 2001 by 
the German Accounting Standard 5-10. Comprehensive risk disclosures in the annual 
reports of German banks are therefore expected, even in the years before IFRS 7 and Basel 
II.  
 
Since there are only a few empirical studies on risk disclosures by banks (Basel Committee, 
2001, 2002, 2003; Linsley et al., 2006; Helbok and Wagner, 2006) and the interest in it has 
strongly increased recently, it is interesting and relevant to examine this topic. This study 
focuses on a recent time period and incorporates as one of the first the disclosure 
requirements of IFRS 7. Next to that, a different way of measuring the quality of 
information is developed, as opposed to other studies that use the quantity as a proxy for 
the quality of information.  
 
The problem of this research is defined by the following main research question: 
 
How can differences in the quantity and quality of financial instrument risk disclosures in 
the annual reports of German banks be measured and explained? 
 
In conclusion, this article discusses research on the risk disclosures of financial instruments 
in the annual reports of German banks and analyzes some factors that might be of 
influence on the differences in disclosures over time and between banks. In section 2 some 
information on the background of risk and disclosures is provided, together with the 
discussion of prior literature. Section 3 hereafter provides information on the disclosure 
frameworks used, the developed hypotheses and the way the results are calculated. In 
section 4 the results and analysis are discussed and section 5 includes the limitations of 
this study and the conclusion.  
 
 
2. Background and prior literature 
 
2.1. Background risk and risk disclosures 
Risk is driven by internal and external factors, and both the ASB and ICAEW view risk as the 
“uncertainty as to the amount of benefits” which “includes both potential for gain and 
exposure to loss” (ICAEW, 1998, 5). According to Beretta and Bozzolan (2004, 269) risk 
disclosures can as a consequence of this definition be defined as “the communication of 
factors that have the potential to affect expected results”.  
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Since this research focuses on risk disclosures of financial instruments it is useful to make 
clear what financial instruments are. According to the International Accounting Standards 
this is “any contract that gives rise to a financial assets of one entity and a financial 
liability or equity instrument of another entity” (IAS 32.11) and can be divided into 
primary (receivables, payables, and equity instruments) and derivative financial 
instruments (options, futures, forwards, and swaps). Although the goal of having financial 
instrument is to make a profit on them or prevent losses with it, there is always some 
uncertainty about whether this goal will be achieved. This uncertainty can be divided in 
three main categories: credit risk, liquidity risk, and market risk whereby the latter 
includes currency risk, interest rate risk, and other price risk. 
 
The rationale behind risk reporting can be explained by the agency theory, the information 
asymmetry perspective, the information risk perspective, the Modern Portfolio Theory, the 
political cost perspective and the signalling perspective. Due to their position the 
information that banks and the users of their annual reports have differs. Disclosing part of 
this information will reduce the information asymmetry between the parties and might 
result in reduced costs of capital, better decision making by shareholders, less attention 
from supervisors like the Authority of Financial Markets (AFM) or central banks and the 
prevention of reputation damage. Managers might however be reluctant to release risk 
information since this might be commercially sensitive and can give competitors an 
advantage. Second, there is the issue of forward-looking information which is according to 
the ICAEW “unreliable and could leave directors open to potential claims from investors 
who have acted upon this information” (Linsley et al. 2006, 269).  
 
Although risks in business have always existed, major corporate scandals in the past 30 
years, the increasing complexity of business structures, a changing environment and 
technology, and the current crisis on the financial markets have increased the focus on risk 
and risk management. In the past years different reports gave considerable attention to 
this topic (Cadbury Report, 1992; AICPA, 1995; ICAEW, 1998; Turnbull Report, 1999; 
ICAEW, 1999; ICAEW, 2002) and the disclosures of risks have become less voluntary.  
 
When it comes to comprehensive risk reporting, Germany was a forerunner by introducing 
the Law on Corporate Control and Transparency in 1998. This resulted in amendments of 
paragraphs 289 (1) and 315 (1) of the German Commercial Code, which required companies 
to report in their annual reports about risks, chances and expected future developments, 
including the assumptions for this (HGB § 289 (1) and § 315 (1)). Later on, in 2001, the 
German Accounting Standard Board adopted German Accounting Standard No.5. Risk 
reporting, with GAS 5-10 about risk reporting by banks. Another few years later the 
International Accounting Standards Board revised and enhanced the already existing 
regulation regarding the disclosures of financial instruments (IAS 32) due to the fact that 
“the techniques used by entities for measuring and managing exposure to risks arising 
from financial instruments have evolved and new risk management concepts and 
approaches have gained acceptance” (IASB, 2004, 3). From 2007 companies with financial 
instruments and that report in conformity with IFRS have to comply with IFRS 7, which 
requires specific risk disclosures in the annual report. For banks the requirements of Basel 
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II pillar 3 are added to this since 2008, although a part of these requirements are similar to 
those in IFRS 7. If incorporated into national laws, companies in the EU member states 
already had to report on risks and uncertainties however since 2005, due to a change in 
article 1(14)(a)3. This resulted in similar requirements by the EU as the requirements in the 
German Commercial Code since 1998. 
 
2.2. Prior risk disclosure literature 
The past 30 years many researchers have examined voluntary disclosures in annual reports 
from different perspectives, including the capital market and positive accounting 
perspective. Recent studies focus more specifically on the topic of risk reporting in annual 
reports (e.g. Kajüter and Winkler, 2003; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007).  
 
Most of the research on risk disclosures focuses on non-financial companies in a particular 
country and examine among others the relationship between the level of risk disclosures 
and company size. For instance Linsley and Shrives (2006) who found, in according to a 
study by Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), that for a sample of 79 UK FTSE 100 listed firms 
there exists a positive relationship between the amount of risk disclosures and company 
size4.  
 
A more specific stream of risk disclosure studies focuses on risk disclosures in relation to 
derivatives and other financial instruments by financial and non-financial companies 
(Adedji and Baker, 1999; Rajgopal, 1999; Jorion, 2002; Dunne et al., 2004). Dunne et al. 
(2004) and Dunne and Helliar (2003) thereby found that the implementation of FRS 13 
Derivatives and Other Financial Instruments – Disclosures resulted in an increase in 
disclosures, but also a market reaction. 
 
Studies on risk reporting by German, mostly non-financial firms are performed by Kajüter 
and Winkler (2003), Fischer and Vielmeyer (2004) and Kajüter and Esser (2007). For 
example, by examining the management reports of a sample of 83 German stock-listed 
companies and using content analysis, Kajüter and Winkler (2003, 219-228) found that the 
quantity of risk disclosures increased in the period 1999-2001, but that there was non-
compliance with GAS 5 which became effective in 2001. 
Literature on risk reporting by banks is still rather rare due to the limited amount of 
research on this topic. The literature that is available can be divided in two different 
streams: ‘academic’ research (Basel Committee, 1999, 2000, 2001; Linsley et al., 2006; 
Helbok and Wagner, 2000) and research by audit firms (e.g. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2008; Ernst & Young, 2008; KPMG, 2008).  
                                             
3 Modernisation Directive 2003/51/EC of June 18th, 2003 
4 Company size is measured by taking the natural logarithm of market value and the natural logarithm of 
turnover. The Pearson correlation for market value is 0.467 and for turnover 0.364, both significant at a 
0.01 level.  
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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was the first to study this specific topic by 
analyzing the disclosure levels in the 1999, 2000 and 2001 annual reports of approximately 
55 different banks from 13 countries all over the world. The finding were based on a 
survey of 104 questions in 12 categories about different types of risk in the annual reports 
and were filled in by the national banking supervisors with yes, no or not applicable. 
Conclusion by the Basel Committee were based on the comparison of disclosure rated 
during the years. For the year 2000 for instance they concluded that the internal models 
for market risk are rather extensively disclosed, but that the disclosures of the results of 
stress tests should be improved (Basel Committee, 2002, 7).  
 
Linsley et al. (2006) conducted one of the first studies using content-analysis by counting 
sentences in the 2002 annual reports of a sample of in total 18 British and Canadian banks, 
divided into two groups of 9 banks selected from the database The Banker. By conducting 
this research they examined whether the size, profitability, risk level, and quantity of risk 
definitions of the bank have a positive relationship with the total quantity of disclosure 
levels (Linsley et al., 2006, 274). Hereby they made use of the disclosure model as used by 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Kajüter (2001).  
 
In accordance with the studies by Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2004) of non-financial companies, Linsley et al. (2006) also found a positive relationship 
between bank size, as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets and the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization, and the total quantity of risk disclosures of banks5. No 
association was found between the amount of risk disclosures and bank profitability, and 
the amount of risk disclosures and risk level. Although there was not found a statistically 
different level of risk disclosures between Canadian and UK banks, further research is 
useful before more general statements about risk disclosures by banks can be made. 
 
Apart for the academic studies, audit firms also study the topic of risk reporting and IFRS 
7. For instance KPMG (2008) examined a sample of 25 European bank and 14 insurance 
companies and their 2007 annual reports by using a disclosure index framework. This 
framework consists of 6 types of risk and in total 160 items, which are based on regulatory 
requirements, recommendations, emerging ideas, and best practices (KPMG, 2008, 12). 
One of their results is that credit risk turns out to be the risk area in which disclosures are 
the most developed and another result is that requirements by regulation are in general 
less developed that the best practices by banks.   
 
 
3. Hypotheses development and research design 
 
3.1. Risk disclosure frameworks 
The objective of this research is to examine the risk disclosures of banks and to analyze 
the possible differences is disclosures. In many prior research this is done by using content 
                                             
5 The results show a Pearson-correlation of 0.734 and significance of 0.001 for total assets, and a Pearson-
correlation of 0.615 and significance of 0.015 for market capitalization. For total assets the correlation is 
significant at the 0.01 level and for market capitalization at the 0.05 level (Linsley et al., 2006, 279) 
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analysis (e.g. Kajüter and Winkler, 2003; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 
2006, Linsley et al., 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 2009). This is according 
to Babbie (2007, 319) “the study of recorded human communication” and can be classified 
as unobtrusive research in which social behaviour is studied but not affected.  
One of the approaches of content analysis is the disclosure index study “that specifies ex 
ante a list of items and scrutinise the text for presence, ignoring sections of the text that 
do not relate to this list” (Beattie et al., 2004, 208). For this study this research method is 
used.  
 
In order to measure both the quantity and quality of risk disclosures, two disclosures 
frameworks are developed. One to measure the quantity of disclosures and one to measure 
the quality of disclosures. Since other research does not make use of comparable 
frameworks, for instance Linsley et al. (2006) count the sentences in the annual reports 
about specific risks, new indexes are constructed. The items included in the quantity 
framework are based on IFRS 7.31-42 , which correspond to the requirements of Basel II 
pillar 3 and the German Commercial Code. The items in the quality framework are based 
on the qualitative characteristics of information6 as defined by the conceptual frameworks 
of the IASB (2001) and The Basel Committee (1998). The two frameworks are included in 
appendix A and appendix B.  
 
The frameworks are cross-country and in different industries applicable since they are 
based on worldwide adopted accounting standards and characteristics of information. For 
banks the risk disclosures are however much more important and therefore expected to be 
more comprehensive. In this study the frameworks are not intended to be used as a 
compliance study and no statements about whether a particular bank complies with the 
regulation will be made. The focus will be on a single industry and a single country. More 
research is therefore necessary to examine the differences between industries and 
countries. 
 
For every disclosed item an annual report can score one point. Based on the number of 
items in the framework that are applicable to the annual report of a bank a maximum 
amount of points can be scored7. The quantity and quality of disclosures can be measured 
by calculating a score for every annual report according to the following formula: 
 
 
 
By dividing the sum of the scores of all items of bank B by the maximum score of bank B, 
the result will be a disclosure score between 0 and 1. If for example the number of items 
in the framework is 30 and the maximum score as well, and in the annual report 25 items 
                                             
6 Relevance, comparability, reliability and understandability.  
7 The maximum score for an annual report can differ since not all the items in the frameworks have to be 
relevant for every bank and every year. Therefore not all the items should always be taken into account.  
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are disclosed, the disclosure score is 25/30 = 0,833. After calculating all the scores these 
can be compared with each other since the scores are scaled.  
 
3.2. Sample size and selection of years 
The sample of this study consists of 32 annual reports of the period 2005-2008 of the 8 
German banks as included in table 1. The rationale behind selecting those years is due to 
the fact that from January 1, 2007 the requirements of IFRS 7 are mandatory. Two years 
before and two years after the introduction are therefore selected since an increase in 
disclosures is expected to be shown in the annual reports.  
 
Table 1 Banks included in sample 
 
Commerzbank* Hypovereinsbank 
DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale  KfW Bankengruppe 
Deutsche Bank* LandesBank Berlin Holding* 
Deutsche Postbank* WestLB 
* stock-listed in Germany and/or abroad 
 
 
3.3.Hypotheses 
A limited amount of hypotheses is developed in order to find explanations for possible 
differences in disclosure scores. These hypotheses will be described in short below. 
 
Quantity versus quality 
Since researchers and their studies do not agree on whether quantity is a good proxy for 
quality, two disclosure frameworks are developed to measure both quantity and quality 
aside from each other. Since there is no clear theoretical background for the expectation 
that banks that disclose a lot of information also provide qualitative better information the 
following hypothesis is drawn up: 
 
H1: Banks with high quantity scores do not have high scores on the quality items. 
 
Risk disclosures and bank size 
In general, larger companies attract more attention from share- and stakeholders than 
smaller companies. According to the Political Cost Theory this might lead to higher 
political costs and one way of reducing these costs is to disclose more information. Also 
the problems of information asymmetry, agency costs and higher demand of returns for 
shareholders will be higher for larger companies. In accordance with Diamond and 
Verrechia (1991,1325) larger companies and banks are therefore expected to disclose more 
risk information. The following hypothesis is based on this: 
 
H2a: There is a significant positive relationship between the quantity of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of German banks and bank size in the period 
2005-2006. 
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Since the disclosure requirements are equal for all banks in the period 2007-2008 the 
following hypothesis is drawn up for this period: 
 
H2b: There is no significant positive relationship between the quantity of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of German banks and bank size in the period 
2007-2008. 
 
Larger banks are expected to produce qualitative better annual reports since they have 
more political exposure and in general more stakeholders that make use of the annual 
reports. The following hypotheses are therefore drawn up: 
 
H2c: There is a significant positive relationship between the quality of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of German banks and bank size in the period 
2005-2006. 
 
H2d: There is a significant positive relationship between the quality of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of German banks and bank size in the period 
2007-2008. 
 
Risk disclosures and profitability 
According to Helbok and Wagner (2006a, 11) banks that are more profitable will be early 
adopters of risk disclosures since they want to distinguish themselves from the other, less 
profitable banks. Next to that, the political cost theory gives rise to the expectation that 
more profitable banks will disclose more risk information, although in general mixed 
results are found8. In accordance with the theory and expectations the following 
hypotheses are drawn up, taking into account that from 2007 the risk disclosures are 
mandatory: 
 
H3a: There is a significant positive relationship between the quantity of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of German banks and the relative profitability of 
the banks in the period 2005-2006. 
 
H3b: There is no significant positive relationship between the quantity of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of German banks and the relative profitability of 
the banks in the period 2007-2008. 
 
H3c: There is a significant positive relationship between the quality of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of German banks and the relative profitability of 
the banks in the period 2005-2006. 
 
H3d: There is a significant positive relationship between the quality of risk 
disclosures in the annual report of German banks and the relative profitability of 
the banks in the period 2007-2008. 
 
                                             
8 See Ahmed and Courtis. 1999. Associations between corporate disclosure characteristics and disclosure levels 
in annual reports: A meta-analysis, British Accounting Review 31: 35-61.  
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Risk disclosures and time 
In previous research by Kajüter and Winkler (2003) a positive relationship between the 
quality of risk disclosures in the German annual reports of 1999-2001 of non-financial stock 
listed companies and time was found. This result is consistent with the increase in demand 
of risk disclosures and the general trend that is observed in the disclosures of banks 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 210). Next to that the disclosure scores of the German banks in 
tables 2 and 3 also show at first sight an increase in the quantity and quality of disclosures 
and therefore the following hypotheses are drawn up:  
 
H4a: The quantity of risk disclosures in the annual reports of German banks has 
increased significantly between the period 2005-2006 and 2007-2008. 
 
H4b: The quality of risk disclosures in the annual reports of German banks has 
increased significantly in the period 2005-2006 and 2007-2008. 
 
3.4. Variable measurement and statistical methods 
In order to calculate the correlation between bank size, profitability and disclosure scores, 
the measurement of the variables have to be determined. Since not all banks in the sample 
are stock-listed, bank size is not measured by market value of equity but by total assets, 
and in order to prevent heteroscedasticity by taking the natural logarithm of total assets. 
The relative profitability is measured by the financial ratios Return on (Average) Total 
Assets (ROA) and Return on (Average) Equity (ROE). 
 
Due to the normal distribution of the variables (by excluding possible outliers) parametric 
tests can be applied to all the hypotheses. For hypotheses 1-3 Pearson correlation 
coefficients are calculated at a 95 % confidence interval. For the fourth hypotheses a 
paired samples t-test is used. The average disclosure score of the years 2005-2006 and 
2007-2008 for every bank is calculated and these results are pair-wise compared to each 
other.  
 
 
4. Results and analysis 
Applying the disclosure frameworks and statistical analysis as explained in sections 3.1. 
and 3.4. shows the results as presented in tables 2, 3 and 4.   
 
Table 2 Disclosure scores quantity     Table 3 Disclosure scores quality 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Mean 0,62 0,66 0,83 0,87 
Min 0,29 0,41 0,75 0,81 
Max 0,78 0,81 0,95 0,95 
Stand.dev. 0,16 0,13 0,07 0,05 
 
As opposed to the expectation of no significant correlation between the quantity and 
quality the results show a significant positive relationship (at a confidence level of 99%). 
This can be interpreted as banks that disclosure more items based on the quantity 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Mean 0,75 0,78 0,89 0,90 
Min 0,50 0,67 0,85 0,85 
Max 0,92 0,83 1,00 1,00 
Stand.dev. 0,12 0,06 0,07 0,05 
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framework apparently also provide information of higher quality, for instance by disclosing 
information in a specific way (e.g. including graphs and tables, comparable figure of 
previous years). Since most of the banks score high on quality is it possible that banks 
imitate each other.  
No significant positive relationship between the quantity of disclosures and bank size was 
found for the years 2005-2006, which might be explained by the influence of the German 
disclosure requirements of GAS 5-10. Since these disclosures have been mandatory for 
banks for several years before the introduction of IFRS 7 the disclosures of banks have 
apparently become more similar. Institutional isomorphism or the influence of a large, 
dominant bank might be an explanation but cannot be tested with the obtained results. 
The surprising positive relationship in the period 2007-2008 might be explained by the 
influence of the financial crisis on bank sizes. No unambiguous conclusion can be drawn on 
whether the size of a bank is of significant influence on the risk disclosures in annual 
reports.  
 
Table 4 Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
   Quantity 
All 
Quality 
All 
LnTA 
05-06 
LnTA 
07-08 
ROAA 
05-06 
ROAA 
07-08 
ROAE 
05-06 
ROAE 
07-08 
Quantity 
All 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 
1 0.820**       
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
 0.000       
 N  32 32       
Quality 
All 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 
0.820** 1       
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
0.000        
 N  32 32       
Quantity 
05-06 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 
  0.097  0.078  0.231  
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
  0.720  0.773  0.390  
 N    16  16  16  
Quantity 
07-08 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 
   0.548*  -0.422  -0.343 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
   0.028  0.117  0.211 
 N     16  15  15 
Quality 
05-06 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 
  0.144  0.209  0.305  
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
  0.596  0.437  0.251  
 N    16  16  16  
Quality 
07-08 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 
   0.567*  0.106  0.142 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
   0.022  0.708  0.613 
 N     16  15  15 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 157
As explained above, GAS 5-10 might be of influence on the disclosure levels of banks in the 
period 2005-2006. For profitability there is therefore no significant positive relationship 
shown either in the period 2005-2006. The fact that risk information is commercially 
sensitive and involves a lot of uncertainty might also cause larger and more profitable 
banks not to show significantly more risk information. The non-significant negative results 
for the period 2007-2008 should be interpreted with care and in general no strong 
statements about the relationship with profitability can be made based on these results. 
 
The most interesting result is the significant increase in the quantity and quality of 
disclosure between the periods 2005-2006 and 2007-2008. The paired samples t-test shows 
results of -3,757 and -3,603, with significance levels of 0,007 and 0,0009 for quantity and 
quality. This was already expected since the demand for disclosures has increased and due 
to the introduction of IFRS 7. The financial crisis on the other hand might also be of great 
influence since the focus of banks and their risk has increased greatly. By disclosing more 
information banks might want to avoid discussions and prevent reputation damage. Even 
though according to Linsley et al. (2006, 279) banks rather do not discuss their risk levels 
publicly, the introduction of IFRS 7 is expected to be the main driver behind the significant 
increase. Previous research has also shown that accounting standards are of important 
influence on risk disclosures.  
 
 
5. Limitations and conclusion 
Limitations of this research are subjectivity, a limited amount of selected items in the 
frameworks and the lack of scientific evidence that support the items in the quality 
framework. Next to that, due to the limitation of time only a sample of German banks is 
examined which makes it impossible to make statements about the whole (German) 
banking industry.  
 
Based on this research a number of other studies are however possible. For instance 
whether the capital market becomes more efficient and the cost of capital declines due to 
increased risk disclosures. Also a behavioural study can be done to examine whether 
increased risk disclosures will lead to better decision making and judgements of the users 
of the annual reports, and an event study on the introduction of IFRS 7 and the financial 
crisis. In conclusion, this research is relevant for future research since it provides evidence 
about the development of risk disclosures in the banking sector which might be explained 
by a number of other factors and/or have an effect on the decision making of users of the 
annual reports.  
 
In conclusion, this research has mainly showed that the demand and supply of risk 
disclosures has increased over the years. For the German banking sector the presence of 
regulation (GAS 5-10, IFRS 7) is however the expected main driver for the increased supply, 
and not the size and profitability of a bank.  
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Pay-for-performance? 
 
An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship between Executive 
Compensation and Firm Performance in the Netherlands 
 
 
A.A. (Bart) Bootsma1 
 
 
Executive Summary 
This paper investigates the relationship between CEO compensation and company 
performance for Dutch listed companies for the period 2002-2007. The study examines if 
absolute or relative changes in CEO pay are related to changes in company performance. 
Furthermore, the study investigates if the pay-performance relationship has strengthened 
after the introduction of the Dutch corporate governance code in 2004. The results suggest 
that the Dutch corporate governance code had a positive effect on the pay-performance 
relationship. This effect is mainly driven by the increased use of equity-based 
compensation. Compared internationally, the pay-performance relationship in the 
Netherlands remains relatively low. 
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/6150. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Executive compensation has been a topic of much discussion for a long period of time. 
Continuous debates among employers, employees, regulators and the press about the 
level, structure and role of CEO compensation take place in most industrialized countries 
(Duffhues and Kabir 2008). This political, social as well as academic debate also takes 
place in the Netherlands. It is said that CEO compensation is not sufficiently connected to 
performance: pay-for-failure instead of pay-for-performance (e.g. Couwenbergh 2007).  
 
The main purpose of this study is to examine empirically if there is a relationship between 
CEO compensation and firm performance of Dutch companies listed at Euronext 
Amsterdam during the period 2002-2007. 
 
In the master thesis three research questions have been formulated:  
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1. What are the determinants of the level and structure of CEO compensation? 
2. How strong is the relationship between top executive compensation and company 
performance? 
3. Has the pay-performance relationship strengthened during the period 2002-2007? 
In this paper I will mainly focus on the second and third research question, the strength of 
the pay-performance relationship and its development during the period 2002-2007. The 
results of the first research question will not be presented in this paper.  
 
The research is relevant for several reasons. Previous studies do not show unequivocal 
results. Some studies found a strong positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
company performance (e.g. Hall and Liebman 1998), other research found a weak positive 
relationship (e.g. Jensen and Murphy 1990). There are even a few studies that report a 
negative relationship (e.g. Duffhues and Kabir 2008). 
Few research about this topic has been done conducted on Dutch data. A few notable 
exceptions are the research of Duffhues et al. (2002), Cornelisse et al. (2005), Mertens et 
al. (2007) and Duffhues and Kabir (2008). I hope this study can make a contribution to the 
existing literature, by exploring the topic for Dutch listed companies, an area that has not 
been investigated to its full extent previously.  
It is also of practical relevance to conduct the research for the Netherlands. Since 2004 the 
Dutch Corporate Governance Code (Staatscourant 2004, 250) is effective. This code 
advices a strong connection between compensation and performance of top executives 
(paragraph II.2 of the code). Investigating how strong the relationship is between 
remuneration of top executives and the performance of the company, is useful to monitor 
this aspect of the code (Van Praag 2005).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 will provide an overview of 
prior literature. Hypothesis development, research design and the sample will be outlined 
in section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results. These results will be analyzed in 
section 5. Finally, section 6 summarizes the main conclusions of this paper.  
 
 
2.  Prior literature 
In order to provide a structured overview of the empirical studies it is necessary to make 
choices in which studies are discussed and which not. I use several criteria to delimitate 
the overview. First, studies should refer to Europe or the United States. Furthermore, the 
studies should be based on listed companies in a cross-section of industries. Moreover, 
performance of the company should be measured in current financial performance 
measures. The sample should include CEOs. Another criterion is that the empirical studies 
should explain (components of) compensation with performance. Moreover, studies should 
be recent. Literature published before 1998 will not be discussed. An exception is the 
influential study of Jensen and Murphy (1990).  
The papers are used to find out what is best practice in conducting empirical research of 
the pay-performance relationship. The papers show that the relationship differs in the 
selected countries. The results of selected papers are compared with the results of the 
conducted research in section 5. The selected papers and their main findings are presented 
in table 1 on the next page. 
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Table 1: Brief overview of the main findings in the pay-for-performance literature 
 
Authors and 
year 
Country Period Board position Main findings 
Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) 
US 1974-
1986 
CEOs  The relationship between total pay 
and performance, the PPS, is small, 
but positive and significant. 
Hall and Liebman 
(1998) 
US 1980-
1994 
CEOs  A strong pay-performance 
relationship is found based on four 
different methods. 
Conyon and 
Murphy (2000) 
US / UK 1997 CEOs  The PPS in the US is much larger 
than in the UK, mostly because in 
the US more stock-based pay is 
granted. 
McKnight and 
Tomkins (1999) 
UK 1992-
1995 
Highest paid 
executive board 
members 
There is a pronounced link between 
pay and performance for both the 
short and long term. 
Girma et al. 
(2007) 
UK 1981-
1996 
CEOs The effects of the ‘Cadbury’ reforms 
on CEO compensation are 
disappointing. 
Conyon and 
Schwalbach 
(2000) 
UK / 
Germany 
1969-
1994 
CEOs The relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm size and the 
relation between cash compensation 
and company performance is similar 
in the UK and Germany. 
Kaserer and 
Wagner (2004) 
Germany 1990-
2002 
All executive 
board members 
No stronger pay-performance 
relationship due to corporate 
governance changes. 
Yurtoglu and 
Haid (2006) 
Germany 1987-
2003 
All executive 
board members 
together 
Company size is much more 
important in comparison to 
performance to determine the level 
of executive pay. Moreover, a small 
positive PPS is reported. 
Duffhues  
et al. (2002) 
NL 1996-
1998 
All management 
board members 
together 
Positive relationship between 
fraction of management options and 
accounting performance measures. 
Cornelisse  
et al. (2005) 
NL 2002-
2003 
CEOs separately 
and all 
executive board 
members 
together 
No relationship between cash 
compensation and company 
performance. 
Duffhues and 
Kabir (2008) 
NL 1998-
2001 
All executive  
board members 
together 
Compensation is negatively related 
to both accounting- and market-
based performance measures. 
Mertens et al. 
(2007) 
NL 2002-
2006 
CEOs, CFOs and 
other board 
members 
separately 
Small positive relationship between 
short-term bonus and performance. 
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3. Hypothesis development and research design 
This section is structured as follows. First the theoretical background is described in 
paragraph 3.1. The hypotheses are formulated in paragraph 3.2. The research design is 
described in paragraph 3.3. Finally, paragraph 3.4 is dedicated to the sample. 
 
3.1 Theoretical background 
Executive compensation is part of corporate governance. To gain more insight in what 
corporate governance is, a distinction can be made between a business administrative, 
legal, economical and management control view (Strikwerda 2002). Corporate governance 
will be approached in this paper primarily from the economic point of view. Corporate 
governance is from an economic point of view about “(…) the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p.737). 
 
Agency theory 
If ownership and control are separated in a company, this can lead to conflicts of interest. 
Adam Smith already noticed this in 1776 in The Wealth of Nations (pp.669-700 in Cannan, 
ed. (1937)). The principle of separation of ownership and control has been further 
elaborated by Berle and Means (1932) and has since then played an important role in the 
agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf. This involves for the principal delegating of decision-
making authority to the agent. 
 
Agency theory is based on a number of assumptions: a conflict of interest, information 
asymmetry and different risk characteristics between the principal and agent (Eisenhardt 
1989). The relationship between stockholders and the management of a company is a 
prominent example of an agency relationship. The separation of ownership and control of 
the company with the stockholders as principals and the management as agents gives rise 
to the principal-agent problem. Stockholders have delegated decision-making authority of 
the company to the management. But management has not the same interests as 
stockholders. Stockholders maximize the return on their investment in the company and 
strive to long-term stockholder value creation. For a part management has other interests: 
their own career and welfare. Managers prefer to run large businesses rather than small 
ones, other things equal. This may not be in the best interest of the stockholders, as this 
‘empire building’ may not result in investing in positive net present value projects (Brealy 
et al. 2006). Another problem is managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny 1989). 
Managers will invest in projects that fit with their personal skills, to improve their value 
for the company. This temptation to overinvest, apparent in empire building and 
managerial entrenchment, is called the free-cash-flow problem by Jensen (1986). 
Information asymmetry is also apparent. Management has more information than the 
stockholders. Moreover, management and stockholders have different risk characteristics. 
In general, stockholders hold a diversified portfolio of stocks and are risk-neutral. 
Managers are for their career and human capital dependent on one specific company and 
are for that reason risk-averse (Mehran 1995).  
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Different solutions are possible to solve the principal-agent problem. Examples are an 
internal control system (e.g. Fama and Jensen 1983), the labor market for managers (e.g. 
Fama 1980; Jensen and Murphy 1990), the market for corporate control (e.g. McColgan 
2001; Jensen and Ruback 1983), the financial structure of the company (e.g. Easterbrook 
1984; Jensen 1986) and executive compensation (e.g. Jensen and Murphy 1990; Jensen et 
al. 2004). This paper focuses on executive compensation as solution to the agency 
problem. The application of performance pay can diminish value destruction (agency 
costs). If executive compensation is based on performance measures that align their 
interest with the interests of the stockholders, the conflict of interest between them can 
be diminished.  
 
Managerial power theory 
The managerial power theory dates back to the work of the famous economist Galbraith. 
Galbraith coined the term “managerial capitalism” in the book The New Industrial State 
(1967). This term refers to the view that managers detain more power and influence than 
the stockholders on the decisional and directional process. Recently there is renewed 
interest in this theory (e.g. Bebchuk and Fried 2004; 2006; Bebchuk et al. 2002; Jensen and 
Murphy 2004).  
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) state that there is “pay-without-performance”. The authors 
explain this with their managerial approach to executive compensation. From this point of 
view, the remuneration of top executives is not an instrument to reduce the agency 
problem, but it can be seen as part of the agency problem. Managers of companies with 
dispersed stock ownership have themselves a substantial influence on their own 
compensation. Due to the dispersed ownership, managers can use their influence to get 
high compensation which is in booming times strongly connected to stock prices and in bad 
economic times not (Bebchuk and Fried 2003). So executive compensation should in this 
theory not be seen as a tool to align the interests between stockholders and managers. To 
understand the processes of setting pay the actual conditions under which pay is set should 
be taken into account. In the agency theory optimal contracting is assumed. Executive 
compensation can only take place at arm’s length contracting, which means careful 
processes and procedures in which the contract consists of incentives to maximize 
stockholder value (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
The managerial power approach results in sub-optimal incentives and the associated act of 
rent extraction plays a role. Managers with power are able to extract rents and managers 
with more power can extract more rents. Rents are defined as value in excess of what 
managers would receive under optimal contracting (Bebchuk et al. 2002). The amount of 
compensation that is paid to managers is camouflaged from the eyes of stockholders and 
other stakeholders, so that it is no more related to company performance.  
Although the managerial power approach is from a conceptual point of view quite different 
from the optimal contracting approach, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) note that the former 
cannot replace the latter. Compensation packages will be influenced by both market 
influences, which push toward value maximizing contracts and by managerial influences, 
which push toward directions favorable for managers. 
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3.2 Hypothesis development 
As outlined before, agency theory sees performance-related top-executive compensation 
as a solution to the conflict of interest between stockholders and management. The 
compensation aligns the interest of the management with the objectives of the 
stockholders. So the agency theory is in support of the following hypothesis: 
 
A positive relationship exists between CEO compensation and company performance  (H1) 
 
CEO compensation usually exists of the following elements: base salary, bonus, other 
compensation, pensions, stock options and stocks. The sum of base salary and bonus is 
called cash compensation and the aggregate of all compensation elements is called total 
compensation. The hypothesized positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
company performance is based on the performance-related elements bonus, options and 
stocks. No relationship is hypothesized between base salary, other compensation, pensions 
and company performance. 
 
During the sample period 2002-2007 several changes have been made to the Dutch 
corporate governance system, which may have influenced top-executive pay 
arrangements. Transparency with respect to CEO compensation has increased during these 
years. Until September 2002 the regulation for the disclosure of the remuneration of the 
Board of Directors was very limited. Only the total amount of remuneration to all current 
and former executive and supervisory board members should be reported (Article 383 of 
Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code). The ‘Disclosure on Remuneration and Stock Ownership of 
Executive and Supervisory Directors Act’ took effect on 1st of September, 2002 (Staatsblad 
2002, 225). The Foundation for Annual Reporting (RJ) published guidelines based on this 
act and on IAS 19 Employee benefits, which prescribe that companies provide information 
in the annual report on granted rights and exercised and expired rights during the financial 
year. The RJ (240.111) requires further that Dutch listed companies provide in the annual 
report information on an individual basis of cash compensation, stock option plans, granted 
options and stock-based compensation.  
Since January 1, 2004 the Dutch corporate governance code (Tabaskblat 2003) came in 
place. This code requires additional information in the annual report about the 
remuneration of management board members. Paragraph II.2 of the code is dedicated to 
remuneration of members of the management board. The amount and composition of the 
remuneration packages as well as the transparency of the compensation are discussed in 
this paragraph of the code. Furthermore, the code advises a strong connection between 
CEO compensation and company performance. Based on the aforementioned changes in 
the Dutch corporate governance system it is hypothesized that: 
 
The relationship between CEO compensation and company performance has  
strengthened in the Netherlands during the period 2002-2007               (H2) 
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3.3 Research design 
In order to calculate the strength of the pay-performance relationship two models are 
used: the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) model of Jensen and Murphy (1990) and the 
pay-performance elasticity (PPE) model of Hall and Liebman (1998). 
 
Pay-performance sensitivity 
PPS is an absolute measure. It measures with which amount CEO compensation increases if 
company performance increases with €1.000. The PPS ordinary least squares regression 
model is specified as follows: 
 
Δ (Pay)it = α + β Δ (Perf)it + εit           (1) 
 
The dependent variable Δ (Pay)it represents the change in CEO compensation of company i 
in period t compared to period t-1. In section 4 the PPS of cash compensation (sum of base 
salary and bonus) and total compensation (sum of all compensation elements) are 
reported. Delta stock options is computed with the Black-Scholes (1973) European call 
option valuation model, which is modified for dividends by Merton (1973). The change in 
the value of options is taken into account by comparing the value of the options at the 
beginning of the year with the value at the end of the year after Hall and Liebman (1998). 
Delta stocks is also calculated as the difference in value at time t and time t-1. Delta 
stocks is also based on total compensation (i.e. the change in the value of stocks held by 
the CEO is taken into account).   
The absolute change in firm performance is measured in four different ways: delta 
shareholder wealth, delta sales, delta net income and delta operating income. In 
accordance with earlier empirical literature Δ (Shareholder wealth)it is calculated as 
market capitalization at period t-1 multiplied with total stockholder return (TSR) at period 
t (e.g. Jensen and Murphy 1990, Murphy 1999, Mertens et al. 2007). Besides TSR three 
accounting-based measures for performance are used in this equation. After Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) profit and sales are used. Profit is operationalized as operating income and 
net income (Mertens et al. 2007). The research of Mertens et al. (2007) points out that 
these variables are often used by Dutch listed firms as financial performance measures in 
the period 2002-2006. These three accounting-based measures are calculated as the value 
at period t minus the value at period t-1.  
 
Pay-performance elasticity 
The PPE model is expressed in relative terms. It measures the increase in CEO pay in 
percentages, if firm performance rises with 1%. The PPE model is among others used by 
Hall and Liebman (1998), McKnight and Tomkins (1999) and Conyon and Murphy (2000). 
This model can be specified as follows: 
 
Δ LN (Pay)it = α + β Δ LN (Perf)it + εit                           (2) 
 
Δ LN (Pay)it is the natural logarithm of CEO pay of company i at moment t minus the 
natural logarithm of CEO compensation of firm i in the former period t-1. The 
compensation elements are computed in the same way as in the previous pay-performance 
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sensitivity equation. The difference with the PPS model is that the equation is now in 
relative terms by using the natural logarithm.  
The change in performance is measured as the change in shareholder value. The change in 
shareholder value ignores share issues or repurchases and therefore equals the 
continuously accrued rate of return on common stock (e.g. Murphy 1999, Conyon and 
Murphy 2000). Δ LN (Shareholder value)it is calculated as the natural logarithm of (1+TSR) 
at moment t for company i. This computation is also used by Murphy (1999), Conyon and 
Murphy (2000) and Mertens et al (2007). Again, several accounting-based measures are also 
used as a proxy for company performance: Return on assets (ROA), Return on equity (ROE) 
and sales growth. Sales growth is defined as LN sales at moment t minus LN sales at 
moment t-1. This definition is also used by McKnight and Tomkins (1999). Delta ROA is 
computed as ROA at period t minus ROA at period t-1. The same computation holds for 
ROE. This computation is also used by Kato and Kubo (2006) and Mertens et al. (2007). This 
way of calculating, implies that the changes in ROA and ROE are semi-elasticities.  
 
It might be useful to further elaborate on the econometric method. This can explain why 
no control variables are added to equation (1) and (2). Year-to-year performance related 
changes in CEO compensation are typically modeled as:  
 
(Pay)it = γi  +  αit + βi (Perf)it +  εit                 ,i = 1,2,…,N ; t =1,2,…T          (3) 
 
where γi  is a CEO or firm-specific effect that varies across CEOs but does not vary over 
time for a given CEO, αit is a CEO or firm-specific time trend (company size, CEO age and 
tenure, etc.), Perf is a firm performance measure, βi is the coefficient indicating the pay-
performance relationship and εit represents the equation error.  
For relative small times series (T<10) researchers regularly assume that time trends and 
pay-performance relationships are constant across executives/companies. In terms of the 
model this means αi = α and βi = β. Equation (3) can then be re-estimated using fixed-effect 
methodologies or first differences. The result is, not surprisingly, the PPS-model presented 
by equation (1). See Murphy (1999, p.30-31) and Conyon and Swalbach (2000, p.521-522). 
 
Pay-performance relationship over time 
It was hypothesized (H2) that CEO compensation will show a stronger relationship with 
company performance during the period 2002-2007 due to corporate governance changes. 
An important development in that respect was the  Dutch corporate governance code 
(code Tabaksblat) which took effect from 2004. In this study the period 2002-2003 (the 
pre-Tabaksblat period) is compared with the period 2004-2007 (the period after the code 
Tabaksblat came in place). After Girma et al. (2007) a dummy variable δ is added with 
value “0” in the period 2002-2003 and “1” in the period 2004-2007. This dummy variable δ 
measures differences in the change in CEO compensation before and after the introduction 
of the Dutch corporate governance code. Moreover, an interaction variable is added to the 
PPS and PPE model specifications. This interaction variable is computed as dummy variable 
δ times the performance variable. If the link between pay and performance has increased, 
then a statistically significant positive coefficient (i.e., β2 > 0) will be observed on this 
variable.  
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The PPS equation is then adjusted as follows: 
 
Δ (Pay)it = α1 + β1 Δ (Perf)it + α2 δ + β2 (δ *Δ (Perf))it + εit                      (1’) 
 
The PPE equation is then reformulated as follows: 
 
Δ LN (Pay)it = α1 + β1 Δ LN (Perf)it + α2 δ  + β2 (δ * Δ LN (Perf))it + εit              (2’) 
 
I use cash compensation (after Girma et al. 2007) as well as total compensation (after 
Kaserer and Wagner 2004) as dependent variable in these equations. Corporate 
performance is measured as discussed previously for the PPS and PPE model. 
 
3.4  Sample 
The data on CEO compensation have been collected from the website 
<http://www.veb.net/bestuursvoorzitter/> of the Dutch Investor’s Association (VEB). The 
crude assumptions the VEB uses for the parameters of the Black-Scholes formula (risk-free 
interest rate, expected dividend rate and expected volatility) are adjusted. The data to 
calculate the performance-related variables have been collected from the financial 
databases Datastream and Worldscope.  
The original sample consists of 160 companies listed at Euronext Amsterdam during (some 
part of) the sample period 2002-2007. These funds can be listed at the AEX or AMX index or 
are Small Caps or local funds. The total sample consists of 685 year observations (on 
average 4 observations per company). Companies for which compensation or financial data 
were not available for one or more years are eliminated from the sample for those years.  
The regression results are based on CEOs that have been in function during the whole year. 
Comparing compensation for the whole year t with part of t-1 (because the CEO was 
appointed during that year) or with part of t+1 (because the CEO left the company during 
that year) would have a distortive effect on the results. Extrapolating compensation for a 
part of the year would also be arbitrary, especially for variable compensation elements.  
Furthermore, extreme observations are eliminated from the final sample, because they 
have a distortive effect on the results. Outliers are defined as cases which deviate more 
than three standard deviations from the median (Wiggins 2000). The influence of this 
elimination procedure on the number of observations is limited. In none of the models 
more than thirteen observations are deleted due to extreme observations.  
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5. Analysis 
The indicator variable (Dummy) measures changes in the level of CEO compensation before 
and after the introduction of the Dutch corporate governance code. This variable is 
statistically significant in 12 out of 16 model specifications. The interaction variable 
(Dummy*DeltaPerf) is statistically significant in 10 out of 16 model specifications. In one of 
these cases (for the PPS of cash compensation) a negative relationship is found. In all other 
statistically significant cases the interaction variable is positive. These findings indicate 
that the PPS and PPE have changed significantly between the period 2002-2003 and 2004-
2007. The PPS and PPE have increased in the latter period compared to the former.  
 
The results on the PPS model for cash compensation are reported in panel A. The figures 
should be interpreted as follows. In the pre-Tabaksblat period (2002-2003) the CEO 
receives 6,5 eurocents extra per €1.000 increase in shareholder wealth. In the post-
Tabaksblat period (2004-2007) the CEO received 4,2 eurocents less per € 1.000 increase in 
shareholder wealth. So, overall the CEO received 6,5 – 4,2 = 2,3 eurocents extra per €1.000 
increase in shareholder wealth. The overall PPS of cash compensation amounts 1,4, 9,1 and 
4,8 eurocents extra per €1.000 increase in sales, net income and operating income 
respectively. These figures are comparable with the findings of Mertens et al. (2007). 
These authors report a PPS for cash compensation of 2,7, 1,6 6,5 and 4,2 for each € 1.000 
increase in shareholder wealth, sales, net income and operating income respectively. 
The results on the PPE model for cash compensation (panel B) show that the CEO receives 
in the pre-Tabaksblat period 0,207% extra cash compensation for a 1% increase in 
shareholder wealth. In the post-Tabaksblat period the CEO receives 0,086% less cash 
compensation for a 1% increase in shareholder wealth. However, this finding is not 
statistically significant. For the whole period 2002-2007 the PPE amounts then 0,2047 – 
0,086 = 0,121. For sales, ROA and ROE the PPE amounts 1,155, 0,004 en 0,002. Again, 
these figures are in line with the findings of Mertens et al. (2007). The PPS and PPE of cash 
compensation have decreased after the introduction of the code Tabaksblat for delta 
shareholder wealth. This finding does not hold for the accounting-based measures.  
The results on the PPS model for total compensation (panel C) show that CEOs received in 
the pre-Tabaksblat period 11,6 euro cents total compensation for a €1.000 increase in 
shareholder wealth. In the post-Tabaksblat period the CEO receives 16,1 euro cents extra 
total compensation for each €1.000 increase in shareholder wealth. So, the PPS for total 
compensation amounts 11,6 + 16,1 = 27,7 euro cents for an increase in shareholder wealth 
of €1.000. The PPE relationship between shareholder wealth and total compensation 
(panel D) amounts in the pre-Tabaksblat period 0,138. The PPE has increased with 0,434 to 
0,572 in the post-Tabaksblat period. The accounting-based measures do also show 
increases after the introduction of the Dutch corporate governance code. 
 
Changes in the value of options and stocks contribute to a large part to the total PPS and 
PPE. The increase in the PPS and PPE for total compensation is mainly driven by the 
increased use of equity-based compensation in recent years in the Netherlands (cf. 
Swagerman and Terpstra 2007). For cash compensation, mainly driven by bonus, no large 
increases (even a decrease for delta shareholder wealth) are reported after the 
introduction of the code.   
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Although the results should be interpreted carefully due to the limited number of years 
that are compared, they suggest that corporate governance changes have improved the 
pay-performance relationship in the Netherlands. This is in contrast to the findings of 
Kaserer and Wagner (2004) for Germany and Girma et al. (2007) for the UK. However, the 
pay-performance relationship still remains weak compared to the US. Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) report a PPS of about 30 dollar cents for every $1.000 increase in shareholder 
wealth. The overall PPE measured by Hall and Liebman (1998) for US companies is ranging 
from 1,2 in 1980 to 3,9 in 1994. 
 
The explanatory power of the PPS and PPE models that are used to investigate the strength 
of the pay-performance relationship is comparable to previous research. The limited 
overall explanatory power (Adjusted R2) has several reasons. In the first place, only 
financial performance measures are analyzed. Qualitative/individual objectives are not 
included in the regression analyses. As pointed out by Mertens et al. (2007) the ratio 
quantitative/financial versus qualitative/individual measures amounts in the Netherlands 
around 70%/30%.  
Another possible explanation is given by Perry and Zenner (2001). This explanation is 
especially relevant for bonuses. Bonus is measured as a linear function of performance. In 
reality bonus-plans are fixed-target plans in which executives do not receive any payoff 
until they reach a lower bound of the performance measure. Between the lower and the 
higher bound, the bonus increases linearly with the performance measure. Beyond the 
higher bound and the maximum bonus, additional performance is not reflected in the 
bonus. Such features can reduce the explanatory power of the models.  
 
Hypothesis 1, assuming a positive relationship between CEO compensation and company 
performance, and hypothesis 2, assuming a stronger relationship after the introduction of 
the Dutch corporate governance code in 2004, can not be rejected based on the empirical 
results presented in this paper. 
 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
This study contributes to the growing literature on CEO compensation by analyzing data 
from the Netherlands. The timeframe 2002-2007 provides an interesting scenario for the 
Netherlands. The Dutch corporate governance system changed significantly during this 
period of time. An important development with respect to CEO compensation in the period 
has been the introduction of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code in 2004. Since 1998-
2001, the research period of Duffhues and Kabir (2008), the level of corporate governance 
in the Netherlands has improved.  
 
The available theoretical framework and previous empirical studies do not provide a clear-
cut picture on the pay-performance relationship. On the one hand, the agency theory 
assumes a positive pay-performance relationship. On the other hand, the managerial 
power theory will not necessarily result in a positive pay-performance relationship. 
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The remuneration data of CEOs of a large sample of Dutch listed firms during the period 
2002-2007 is analyzed. The strength of the pay-performance relationship has been 
investigated based on the PPS model of Jensen and Murphy (1990) and the PPE model of 
Hall and Liebman (1998). The sensitivity and elasticity of cash compensation (i.e. the sum 
of base salary and bonus) are mainly driven by delta bonus. Changes in the value of options 
and stocks contribute largely to the PPS and PPE of total compensation (i.e. the aggregate 
of cash compensation, options and stocks).  
Although the results should be interpreted carefully, the data suggest that the Dutch 
corporate governance code, which took effect in 2004, had a positive effect on the pay-
performance relationship. Compared internationally, the pay-performance relationship in 
the Netherlands remains relatively low. 
 
This study is subject to several limitations. These limitations are mentioned in such a way 
that they can be addressed in future research.  
First of all this research is only based on CEO compensation. In reality, firms are run by 
teams of managers. It may be interesting to extend the research with other members of 
the management board (e.g. Aggarwal and Samwick 2003).  
Another limitation concerning the data is the relative small size of the sample and the 
limited time period for which compensation data are available (since 2002). This will result 
in a lower quality research compared to American studies like Hall and Liebman (1998). 
This study has focused solely on financial (accounting and market-based) performance 
measures. However, recent evidence indicates that companies make increasingly use of 
non-financial performance like for instance customer satisfaction and market share (e.g. 
Ittner et al. 1997; Banker et al. 2000). These non-financial performance measures affect 
CEO (cash) compensation as indicated by Davila and Venkatachalam (2004). 
Endogeneity may be a problem in this study. Future research can use a simultaneous 
equation framework to mitigate the endogeneity problem. 
Finally, stock option valuation is a major limitation of this study. Several more or less 
trivial assumptions had to be made in order to use the Black-Scholes formula to value stock 
options. The estimation of the value of stock options is not controlled for conditional 
compensation. Conditional compensation means that during the vesting period of the 
options several performance criteria have to be met and the actual number of options 
awarded depends on the extent to which the performance criteria are met. The 
conditionality can be based on the rank in a peer group, earnings per share, (relative) TSR, 
etcetera. Especially after the introduction of the Dutch corporate governance code 
(paragraph II.2.1 and II.2.3) in 2004 this conditionality is more common in compensation 
contracts in the Netherlands. 
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Adaptive Communication as a Means 
toward better Performance   
 
Can fit for purpose communication capability building activities help 
organizations in communicating to deliver strategy and to improve 
performance? 
 
Mariska Schipper1  
 
Executive Summary 
The focus on the success factors for excellent performance has been growing in the last 
decades. One of the factors that is generally believed to have a positive relationship with 
organizational performance, is the internal communication process. Even though many 
practitioners and academics believe that there is a relationship between internal 
communication and organizational performance, there is little scientific evidence 
supporting this relationship. This study attempted to fill this gap in literature, by providing 
a definition on the concept of communication capability building and by empirically testing 
the existence of a relationship between communication capability building and 
organizational performance.  
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5446. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1  Context 
Nowadays we live in a world with extreme competitiveness, globalization, rapid 
technological developments, improved accessibility worldwide, economic liberalization, 
more and bigger acquisitions, and clients and citizens who have become increasingly 
demanding. Organizations are facing a tough world, though managers are still expected to 
deliver excellent results. They have to deal with trends and developments in a flexible 
manner, gain money out of it, while at the same time control costs, increase quality and 
service and satisfy stakeholders. Due to these developments, managers are keen to find 
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out more about the characteristics that could lead their organization to better 
performance than their peer groups (De Waal, 2007). 
Several authors have tried to identify factors that have a relationship with 
organizational performance. The influence of one of the aspects of management control 
systems that has not been examined very often is the impact of internal communication on 
performance. This seems extraordinary since the role of communication within in any 
organization cannot be overemphasized. A lot of organizational problems and conflicts 
arise from a lack of communication (Ogunsanwo, 1991). Internal communication is vital for 
the performance of any organization (Richmond, McCroskey & McCroskey, 2005), especially 
in the last decades, where managing communication has become increasingly complex due 
to technological changes and changed social practices.  
 
1.2  Research Question 
This research is an exploratory study to the influence of communication capability building 
on organizational performance. The study examines which aspects of internal 
communication, if at all, contribute to organizational performance. To this end, the 
following research question is formulated: 
 
‘Do the organizational communication capability building activities have a positive 
relation with organizational performance?’ 
 
Although there is no excess supply of literature on the process of communication capability 
building, there are some studies which provide evidence for a positive relationship 
between effective internal communication and organizational performance. The Watson 
Wyatt Worldwide Reports (2007/2008) revealed that effective organizational 
communication leads to superior financial performance. For that reason, I expect that the 
organizational communication capability building activities do have a positive relationship 
with organizational performance. This study attempts to provide evidence on which 
communication capability building aspects contribute to organizational performance. It is 
aiming at building knowledge, for the provision of knowledge to both academics and 
practitioners.  
 
1.3   Outline 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second chapter gives a brief 
overview of the theoretical framework used to structure this study, the Resourced Based 
View of the Firm. Also the two concepts of interest, communication capability building and 
organizational performance, will be discussed within this chapter. Chapter three contains 
the research design , followed by the results in chapter four. Finally, chapter five contains 
the conclusions for this study, limitations and suggestions for further research.   
 
2. Prior literature 
2.1   Resource Based View of the Firm 
A possible framework that can be used for augmenting the conceptual analyses of 
communication capability effects on organizational performance is the Resource Based 
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View (RBV) of the firm. The RBV of the firm belongs to the research stream that believes 
that the fit of organizational characteristics with the environment determines 
organizational success. The organizational research paradigm suggests that managers of an 
organization can influence their employees in a positive way, and thus increase 
organizational performance, by taken into account factors as  the formal and informal 
structure, planning, control, information systems, skills and the relation of these factors to 
the environment (Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989). 
Within the RBV, the organization is seen as a bundle of valuable resources, or in 
other words, a bundle of strengths and weaknesses (Wernerfelt, 1984). Caves (1980) 
defined resources more formally as the tangible and intangible assets which are tied semi-
permanently to the organization. The RBV is relevant in the scope of this thesis because it 
offers an explanation for excellent organizational performance, by attributing superior 
performance to the organization’s attributes and resources (Barney, 2001). Resources that 
are valuable, rare, hard to imitate and not-substitutable, can generate sustainable 
competitive advantage for organizations (Barney, 2001). Resources can include assets, 
knowledge, organizational processes and capabilities (Bharadwaj, 2000). Grant (1991) 
differentiates between resources and capabilities, Figure 1. 
 
           
Figure 1 – Grant’s differentiation between resources and capabilities. 
 
By assembling the resources that work together to build organizational capabilities, 
organizations can create competitive advantage (Grant, 1991; Bharadwaj, 2000). 
Capabilities are defined in this setting as the ability of organizations to assemble, 
integrate and deploy valued resources, generally in combination of co-presence (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993; Schendel, 1994; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Bharadwaj, 2000). Valued 
resources refers in this context to ‘the resources that are valued by the firm for their 
potential to contribute to competitive advantage’ (Oliver, 1997, p. 701). Capabilities 
include organizational competencies which are embedded in the business processes and 
routines (Prahalad & Hamal, 1990). According to Grant (1991), capabilities are related to 
the capacity for a team of resources to perform certain tasks or activities. These 
capabilities ‘involve complex patterns of coordination and cooperation between people, 
and between people and resources’ (Grant, 1991, pp. 122). It is obvious that people are of 
main importance in communication processes.  
Organizational communication is a process by which people stimulate meaning in 
the minds of other people in the formal context of an organization (Richmond, McCroskey 
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& McCroskey, 2005). Communication processes fit the definition of organizational 
capabilities of Grant, since communication involves coordination and cooperation between 
people and people and resources. Therefore the communication capability building process 
can be qualified as part of the organization’s attributes and resources. When the 
organizational communication capability building activities increase the value of 
communicational attributes and resources, they should be able to attribute to 
organizational performance as well. 
 
2.2  Organizational Performance 
Organizations distinguish themselves from other systems by the primary orientation on goal 
attainment (Parsons, 1956). Usually the objectives of the organization are equal to the 
objectives of the owners of the organization (Zimmerman, 2006). For-profit organizations 
usually have the common objective of maximizing owner’s equity, that is maximizing total 
profits.  
Performance measurement models provide value for all the contracting individuals 
within the boundaries of an organization: owners, employees, suppliers, consumers and the 
community as a whole – figure 2. These models provide a framework against which the 
contracting parties can understand and evaluate their contributions and expectations 
(Atkinson, Waterhouse & Wells, 1997). 
 
User Purpose 
Manager Learning & Self-Improving 
Lateral partners Dynamic coordination of actions and continuous 
improvement 
Supervisors Create aggregated or corporate wide measures 
Monitoring subordinates 
Feeding reward system 
All actors within an organization Establishing a ‘sense of belonging’ 
Feed discussions for continuous improvement 
External Stakeholders 
   Shareholders 
   Customers 
   Suppliers 
   The community 
   Financial Institutions 
   Regulatory Agencies 
Desire to know how well the organization is doing and how 
well the organization is likely to perform in the future 
 
Figure 2 - Organizational Stakeholders according to Lebas (1995, p.24) 
 
‘Performance measurement is intended to produce objective and relevant information on 
program or organizational performance, that can be used to strengthen management and 
inform decision making, achieve results and improve overall performance, and increase 
accountability’ (Poister, 2003, pp.4). The need for performance measurement is pointed 
out by an analogy to sport by Hatry (1978, pp. 28): ‘Unless you are keeping score, it is 
difficult to know whether you are winning or losing’. Measuring performance makes it 
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possible to compare the organization’s performance with its peer groups and it provides 
information with respect to the effectiveness of the organization’s operations. Additionally 
it makes it possible to separate between ‘success’ and ‘failure’ which is necessary for the 
rewarding of ‘success’ and correction of ‘failure’ (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). 
 
Organizational performance can be measured by a broad variety of measures. Within this 
study, organizational performance is measured by 2 variables, Return On Assets [ROA] and 
the Ratio of Revenues to Expenses [RRE]. Both variables are financial ratio’s. Financial 
ratios are frequently used for analyzing purposes for their ability to control for the effects 
of size differences over time and across different organizations (Foster, 1986). Since a 
broad variety of organizations have participated in this study, it was important to choose 
two variables who could give a reliable reflection of organizational performance in all kind 
of organizations. The measures should be able to reflect performance of both profit and 
nonprofit organizations. 
 
The first measure, ROA, is a measure of actual financial performance. This popular 
measure for performance is related to the economic aspects of organizational performance 
(Ansoff, 1965; Bourgeois, 1980; Gale, 1972; Dess & Robinson, 1984). Hax et al. (1984), 
found similar results, ROA is most widely used in profitability analyses.  ROA indicates how 
profitable an organization is relative to its total assets. It provides information with 
respect to the effectiveness of management’s use of invested capital – assets – in order to 
generate profits. Even though non-profit organizations do not have profit-related 
objectives, ROA still can be used to assess performance in these organizations (Barros & 
Nunes, 2007). 
ROA is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. (Core et 
al., 1999; Barros & Nunes, 2007) 
 
  Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
ROA =      x 100 % 
      Total Assets  
 
The second variable for organizational performance is most often used in nonprofit 
organizations, but is applicable to profit organizations as well. RRE is calculated as total 
revenue divided by total expenditures (Siciliano, 1996, 1997; Brown, 2005). 
 
         Total Revenues 
RRE  =    x 100% 
         Total Expenditures 
 
The second measure for organizational performance, RRE, is chosen for balancing reasons. 
ROA is a measure often applied in profit organizations, RRE is a measure often applied in 
non-profit organizations.   
 
2.3  Organizational Communication 
Organizational communication can be defined as: 
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‘{...} organizational communication [is] the process by which individuals stimulate 
meaning in the minds of other individuals by means of verbal or nonverbal messages in the 
context of a formal organization.’ (Richmond, McCroskey & McCroskey, 2005, p.20)  
Organizational communication can be divided in external and internal communication. The 
focus in this study will be on the internal communication processes, communication within 
the organization. Internal communication is the two-way communication that takes place 
within a company and flows into two directions, horizontal and vertical (Richmond, 
McCroskey & McCroskey, 2005).Vertical communication takes place between hierarchical 
positioned people, and involves both upward and downward information flows (Baker, 
2002). Horizontal, or lateral communication, involves communication between people who 
do not stand in a hierarchical relation with each other (Baker, 2002). 
 
Organizational communication has become increasingly important for overall 
organizational functioning and performance (Baker, 2002). One of the reasons for this is 
the direct contribution of organizational communication to organizational and employee 
learning, which is qualified as an critical factor for competitive advantage (Gargiulo, 
2005).Due to the enormous challenges offered by worldwide competition, there is an 
increasing mandate to reduce the barriers of understanding for managing these enormous 
challenges (Jackson, 1993; Porter, 1990; Thurow, 1992; Tyson, 1992). Organizational 
communication can decrease barriers of understanding, so that knowledge can flow 
throughout the organization.  Knowledge establishes the basis for efficiencies and 
competitive advantage (Tucker, Meyer & Westerman, 1996).  
Organizations are also confronted with changes that made organizational 
communication both more complex and more important to the overall performance of 
organizations. Work has become increasingly complex and requires more interaction and 
coordination among employees. Additionally, the pace of work has become faster and 
workers are more distributed. 
Another major change that is observable in organizations is that organizations have 
become more multicultural. That implies that organizations are more diverse in terms of 
gender, race, ethnicity and nationality than in the past (Cox, 1991). Part of this 
development generates substantial potential benefits for organizations, such as more 
creativity and innovation, improved decision making, and more flourishing marketing to 
different groups of customers. However, there are also potential costs involved with 
multicultural organizations, like interpersonal conflicts and communication breakdowns 
(Cox, 1991). Research found evidence for a negative relation between demographic 
diversity and communication effectiveness (Triandis, 1960; Lincoln & Miller, 1979). This 
implies that when the members of organizations become more dissimilar, the 
communication process becomes more complex.  
 
2.4   Communication Capability Building 
Organizational capabilities are the collective abilities of an organization to execute its 
strategy. In other words, the things a business has to do very well (Shaffer, 2008). 
Communication management is also a capability and it refers to the entire organization’s 
capability to manage the communication system. Organizations should create the space, 
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opportunity and capability needed for people across the organization to make meaningful 
connections with each other, small or large. 
Communication Capability Building is a rather new concept, there still is a lack of 
literature on this subject. For that reason, there is no clear definition on this concept 
available from literature. Together with Lindsay Uittenbogaart, president elect of de Dutch 
branch of the International Association for Business Communicators, I propose the 
following definition: ‘Organizational Communication Capability Building is the creation of a 
‘connectivity support framework’, consisting out of 10 inter-woven aspects: 
1: Value and priority of communication 
2: Organizational communication learning resources 
3: Commitment of onboard staff to learning resources 
4: Single fit-for-purpose knowledge sharing tools 
5: Single fit-for-purpose content feedback methods 
6: Collaborative team-working tools and practices 
7:  Social Media strategy 
8: Recognition and encouraging of parallel communication role concept 
9: Reward and recognition incentives 
10: Regular ‘cascade routine’. 
 
A formative model is used to operationalize the concept of organizational communication 
capability building – figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Formative Model Communication Capability Building 
 
Communication Capability 
Building 
1A : Emphasis on value and priority of 
organizational communication 
1B : Leadership messages that promote 
organizational communication 
1C : Leadership messages that 
demonstrate best com. practices. 
2 : Organizational communicational 
learning resources 
3A : Familiarity of new staff with the 
available learning resources 
8B : Recognition of staff’s parallel 
communication role  
7A : Social Media  
 
4 : Single fit-for-purpose knowledge 
sharing tools 
8A: Definition of clear statements that 
define and expose parallel com. role 
9 : Incentives that reward and recognize 
model communication behavior 
7B : Social Media Strategy 
 
5 : Single fit-for-purpose content 
feedback tools 
6 : Collaborative team-working tools and 
practices 
3B : Encouraging staff to use 
communicational learning resources 
10 : ‘Cascade Routine’ 
 
 192
Formative models are causal indicator models (Bollen, 1989; Bollen & Lennox, 1991). This 
implies that the direction of causality is from the different aspects to the construct of 
communication capability building. These aspects, which are indicators of the construct, 
define the characteristics of communication capability building. The observable indicators 
A1A – A10, are separate aspects that define the unobservable construct communication 
capability building. When there is a change in the indicators, a change in the construct 
itself will be caused as well. 
 
3.  Hypotheses setting and research design 
3.1  Hypotheses 
Tucker, Meyer & Westerman (1996) argue that organizational communication systems have 
a direct relation to financial performance and competitive advantage. The Watson Wyatt 
Worldwide Rapport: ‘Secrets of Top Performers: How companies with highly effective 
employee communication differentiate themselves (January, 2008), found similar results; 
organizations that communicate effectively are four times as likely to report high levels of 
employee engagement in comparison with organizations that communicate less effectively. 
The same report showed a direct relation between communication and performance as 
well. One of the key findings of this rapport is that effective employee communication is a 
leading indicator for financial performance. The study amongst 264 participants worldwide 
revealed that a significant improvement in communication effectiveness is associated with 
a 15.7% increase in market value.  
To test empirically whether the identified communication capabilities have a 
relationship with performance as well, several hypotheses are formulated – figure 4.  
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Figure 4 – Hypotheses 
 
Because it is believed that communication has a positive influence on performance, I 
expect that the different communication capabilities, presented in Chapter 2 as valuable 
resources of organizations, are positively related to performance.  
3.2  Research Design 
This study can be qualified as a theory building, exploratory study on the relationship 
between communication capability building and organizational performance. The objective 
of this study is providing evidence on this not very often studied subject, by empirically 
testing this relationship. 
 
Libby’s Predictive Validity Framework for describing hypotheses testing processes and for 
explaining the determinants of internal and external validity of a research design is used to 
present the constructs of this study (Libby et al., 2002) – figure 5. The top part of this 
figure shows the conceptual level in which theory identifies the constructs of 
communication capability building and organizational performance. Link 1 represents the 
relationship between the two constructs and is the specification of the research question 
of this paper.  
 
1A : Emphasis on value and priority of organizational communication
1B : Leadership messages that promote organizational com.
1C : Behaviors that demonstrate best communication practices
2 : Organizational communication learning resources
4 : Single fit-for-purpose knowledge sharing tools 
3B : Encouraging staff to use communicational learning resources
3A : Familiarity of new staff with available learning resources
7B : Social Media Strategy
7A : Social Media 
6 : Collaborative team-working tools and practices
5 : Single fit-for-purpose content feedback methods
10: ‘Cascade Routine’ 
9: Incentives that reward and recognize model com. behavior
8B : Recognition of staff’s parallel communication role 
8A : Definition of clear statements - parallel communication role
Organizational Performance
+
+
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Figure 5 - Predictive Validity Framework 
 
The research moves from the conceptual to the operational level by the translation of the 
constructs into operational variables that measure the variability that is associated with 
the constructs of the research (Bisbe et al., 2007). Link 2 relates the construct 
communication capability building to the independent operational variables, the 
communication capabilities. Link 3 relates organizational performance to the dependent 
operational variables, ROA and RRE. The theory will indirectly be tested by the collection 
of data that will be subjected to statistical methods. Link 4 tests the consistency of the 
data with the predicted relationships between the 2 constructs by performing a multiple 
regression on the variables.  
However, there are also other factors which might affect the dependent variable 
besides the explanatory variables (link 5), for this reason there will be controlled for 5 
Dependent Variables Independent Variables
1A : Emphasis on value and priority of 
organizational communication 
 
1B : Leadership messages that promote 
organizational communication 
 
1C : Behaviors that demonstrate best 
communication practices 
 
2 : Organizational communication learning 
resources 
 
3A : Familiarity of new staff with available 
learning resources 
 
3B : Encouraging staff to use 
communicational learning resources 
 
4 : Single fit-for-purpose knowledge sharing 
tools 
 
5 : Single fit-for-purpose content feedback 
methods 
 
6 : Collaborative team-working tools and 
practices 
 
7A : Social Media 
 
7B : Social Media Strategy 
 
8A : Definition of clear statements that 
define and expose the parallel 
communication role 
 
8B : Recognition of staff’s parallel 
communication role 
 
9: Incentives that reward and recognize 
model communication behavior 
 
10: ‘Cascade Routine’ 
Firm Size
Leverage 
Firm Age 
Industry 
Geographic Location 
 
Return to Assets 
Ratio of Revenues to Expenses 
Conceptual Communication Capability Building Organizational Performance 
Operational 
Link 3Link 2
Link 1
Link 4
Link 5
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control variables. The control variables will be included in the regression equation as 
independent variables. The control variables industry and geographic location are dummy 
variables. The variable industry represents the different types of organizations included in 
this study: financial institution, manufacturing organization, service organization, 
commercial organization, foundation, association and governmental organization. Since 
the participating organizations were located in different countries, a broad separation was 
made by dividing them into the categories: Africa, Australia, Canada, Europe and United 
States of America, to control for the influence of geographic location on organizational 
performance. 
 
The research method applied in this study is a survey, which employs a standardized 
approach for the collection of information from organizations to make inferences for the 
entire population (Birnberg et al., 1990). This empirical research method is applied 
because it can assist in gathering evidence in exploratory studies and because of the 
potential of a big response group, which can increase the generalizability of this research. 
The data is gathered by sending questionnaires randomly to members of the 
International Association for Business Communicators (IABC). I used the survey-tool of the 
IABC for the support it can offer in the collection of enough data. The IABC consists out of 
a network of almost 16.000 business communicators in over 70 countries. This implies that 
all of the respondents are not only interested in communication, they also have functions 
that are highly related to communication. Additional knowledge on communication related 
subjects  is an advantage, since some of the concepts on communication capability 
building are rather complex, and hard to understand for employees who are not interested 
in communications. 
This anonymous questionnaire includes questions on the presence of communication 
capabilities, organizational performance and some control variables. The presence of the 
communication capability building aspects within organizations will be measured by the 
use of a graphic continuous line segment from 0,0 to 100,0 (Russel & Bobko, 1992). 
 
0           100 
 
Respondents must indicate how much they agree with the statements by imagining a mark 
and translating that mark on the line into a percentage. When they think that their answer 
is in the middle, they should score approximately 50%, while when they feel that their 
answer falls mainly on the right hand side of the line, they could fill in  73%, 81% and so 
on. 
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3.3  Research model 
To test the hypotheses formulated in 3.1, a multiple regression model will be applied. 
 
Yi {ROA / RRE} = α0 + β1 Aspect1Ai + β2 Aspect1Bi + β3 Aspect1Ci + β4 Aspect2i + β5 
Aspect3Ai + β6 Aspect3Bi + β7 Aspect4i + β8 Aspect5i + β9 Aspect6i + β10 Aspect7Ai + β11 
Aspect7Bi + β12 Aspect8Ai + β13 Aspect8BAi + β14 Aspect9i + β15 Aspect10i + β16 SIZEi + 
β17 LEVi + β18 AGEi + β19 FIN + β20 MANU + β21 SERV + β22 COMM + β23 FOUND + β24 
GOV + β25 AFR + β26 AUS + β27 CAN + β28 EUR + β29 USA + εi 
 
Independent Variables: 
Aspect x = Aspect x for organization i, measured by the score on a continuous line segment 
from 0,0 to 100,0.  
Control Variables: 
SIZEi = The size of organization i, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. 
LEVi = Debt leverage of organization i, measured as the ratio of long term debt to total 
assets. 
AGEi = The age of organization i, measured by the natural logarithm of the number of years 
since the organization’s interception. 
Industry 
FIN = Dummy Variable: Organization i is a financial institution = 1, otherwise 0. 
MANN = Dummy Variable: Organization i is a manufacturing organization = 1, otherwise 0. 
SERV = Dummy Variable: Organization i is a service organization = 1, otherwise 0. 
COMM = Dummy Variable: Organization i is a commercial organization = 1, otherwise 0. 
FOUND = Dummy Variable: Organization i is a foundation or association = 1, otherwise 0. 
GOV = Dummy Variable: Organization i is a governmental organization = 1, otherwise 0. 
Geographical Location 
AFR = Dummy Variable: Organization i is located in Africa = 1, otherwise 0. 
AUS = Dummy Variable: Organization i is located in Africa = 1, otherwise 0. 
CAN = Dummy Variable: Organization i is located in Canada = 1, otherwise 0. 
EUR = Dummy Variable: Organization i is located in Europe = 1, otherwise 0. 
USA = Dummy Variable: Organization i is located in United State = 1, otherwise 0. 
εi = Error Term 
 
4.  Results 
4.1  Average score on communication capability building aspects. 
Before I could run the regression I first had to check whether I had to omit some of the 
variables out of the research model. The first test I applied to the data was the calculation 
of the average score on the communication capability building aspects. If there were 
aspects that scored a value of zero on average, they should be omitted since they clearly 
wouldn’t reflect the communication behavior of organizations. Figure 6 summarizes the 
average scores  
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Figure 6 – Average score on communication capability building aspects  
 
The mean scores on the aspects are all above zero. The smallest score is the score on the 
aspect related to the social media strategy, with an average score of 30,08. These results 
indicate that there is no reason to omit one of the communication capability building 
aspects of the research model.  
 
4.2  Difference in score between profit and nonprofit organizations 
Since there were both profit and nonprofit organizations included in the sample group for 
this study, it is relevant to test whether there is a significant difference in the mean scores 
on the communication capabilities between the profit and nonprofit organizations. 
Aspect Content Profit Nonprofit 
1A Value and priority of communication; 65,91 57,84 
1B Leadership messages that promote best practice communication; 60, 68 48,45 
1C Leaders demonstrating best practice communication behaviors; 55,52 45,32 
2 Learning Resources; 55.30 60,00 
3A Familiarity of new staff with available communicational learning 
resources; 
42,43 48,16 
3B Encouraging staff to use the communicational learning resources  44,49 43,97 
4 Single fit-for-purpose knowledge sharing tools 41,42 38,13 
5 Fit-for-purpose feedback methods 47,10 36,68 
6 Collaborative team-working tools and practices 58,59 59,16 
7A Social Media 34,78 30,51 
7B Social Media Strategy 32,22 25,32 
8A Staff recognizes their parallel communication role 36,78 35,06 
8B Presence of clear statements that define and expose the parallel 
communication concept 
32,77 26,06 
9 Reward and recognition of model communication behavior 42,28 39,61 
10 Regular ‘cascade-routine’ 58,42 45,81 
 
Table 1 – Average score on communication capabilities profit and non-profit organizations. 
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As visible in the table, the average scores for profit and non-profit organizations seem to 
be more or less equal. Furthermore, it seems that profit organizations score a bit higher on 
the aspects, since profit organizations score higher on 12 out of 15 aspects. Remarkable 
are the aspects 1A, 1B, 1C and 10, there is a significant difference between the scores on 
these aspects. For that reason I applied an additional test by comparing the means on the 
two independent groups (profit and non-profit) statistically. Levene’s test for equality of 
variance and an independent sample t-test revealed that there is a significant indication 
that profit and non-profit organizations score the same on most aspects of communication 
capability building. The results were significant, except for the aspects 1B and 1C. These 
results however can only give an indication, since the response group of 100 used in this 
test is rather small, and since the distribution of profit and non-profit organizations in the 
response group is not equal, respectively 69 and 31.  
Even though it is still possible to conclude that at least there is an indication of equality 
between the scores of profits and nonprofits. I conclude that there is a significant 
indication that the mean score on aspects 1A and 2 till 10 is equal for profit and nonprofit 
organizations, and that the mean score on aspects 1B and 1C is not equal for these two 
groups. 
 
4.3  Difference in scores on ROA and RRE 
I also had to test whether the profit and non-profit organizations scored differently on the 
two performance indicators used within this study – ROA and RRE. The results of Levene’s 
test for equality of variances and an independent sample t-test indicated that there is a 
difference in score on the organizational performance indicators. The control variable 
industry controlled for these differences by including two categories, governmental 
organizations and foundations / associations, who made up 97% of the total amount of 
nonprofit organizations included in the sample. 
4.4  Multicollinearity 
After an extensive correlation and multicollinearity analysis I had to conclude that the 
statistical phenomenon of multicollinearity was present within this model. Multicollinearity 
is a special case of correlation. A high correlation between the independent variables in a 
multiple regression makes the identification of the individual contribution of each variable 
in predicting the dependent variable difficult. In the case of multicollinearity the 
independent variables predict the same variance in the dependent variable. When 
multicollinearity increases, the standard errors for the independent variables become 
larger. As a consequence of this, the overall p-value for the model may be significant while 
the p-values for the predictor variables are not significant. The presence of 
multicollinearity does not imply that the model is useless, since the assumptions of 
ordinary least squares are not violated by multicollinearity.  
I applied a correlation analysis, a tolerance and VIF value analysis and an analysis of the 
eigenvalues to detect the presence of multicollinearity. After these tests it was clear that 
the model had to be adjusted. Multicollinearity seemed to be present within the following 
couples of aspects: 1A-1B-1C, 3A-3B, 7A-7B, 8A-8B. Therefore I combined the aspects into 
the variables 1, 3, 7 and 8. Before the three sub aspects could be transformed into one 
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index variable, first it had to be determined whether the sub aspects measure the same 
aspect. Items can only form one scale when they measure more or less the same thing, the 
items should be highly correlated with each other (Bland & Altman, 1997). A coefficient for 
addressing the internal consistency between items is Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach’s alpha is 
an index for reliability that determines the internal consistency of the items applied in a 
questionnaire for research purposes. The value of Cronbach’s α indicates the degree in 
which the items measure the same concept. The coefficient of Chronbach’s alpha was high 
for al the couples of aspects, so I could combine them into the following 4 index variables: 
Variable 1 :  Recognition of and emphasis on the value and priority of organizational 
communication has a positive relationship with organizational performance. 
Variable 3:  Commitment of all onboard staff to the available communicational learning 
resources has a positive relationship with organizational performance. 
Variable 7:  The use of social media has a positive relationship with organizational  
performance. 
Variable 8:  Staffs’ recognition of their parallel communication role has a positive 
relationship with organizational performance. 
 
The last adjustment that had to be made to this research model was the elimination of the 
control variable SIZE. When  SIZE would have been included in the model, the constant in 
the regression equation would mainly be determined by this control variable. The results 
of a new multicollinearity analysis revealed that there was no indication for 
multicollinearity after the adjustments were made to the model. 
 
4.5  Multiple Regression 
4.5.1 Assumptions 
A multiple linear regression can only be applied when the assumptions inherent to this 
regression are not harmed. This assumptions are: linearity, normality, homoscedasticity 
and reliability. The first assumption is that the relationship between communication 
capability building and organizational performance is linear. Although it is not possible to 
confirm this assumption in the real world, it is possible to produce a scatter plot to make 
sure that an evident curvature in the data is absent. One of the methods to detect non-
linearity is examination of the residual plots (Pedhazur, 1997). In SPSS a plot is made of 
the standardized residuals as a function of the standardized predicted values. The plots for 
ROA and RRE suggest that it is admissible to assume a linear relationship between the 
independent variables of the model and organizational performance. The second 
assumption of multiple linear regression is the assumption of normal distributions of the 
variables included in the model (Moore et al., 2003). Variables that are non-normally 
distributed can cause distortions in relationships and significance tests. To check whether 
the variables are normally distributed, Q-Q plots were made for each variable included in 
the research model. Non of the Q-Q plots gave reasons to doubt the applicability of the 
linear regression model. The assumption of homoscedasticity refers to the variance of 
errors. The variance of errors should be the same for all levels of the independent 
variables. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (1996), small heteroscedasticity does not 
have a serious impact on significance tests. Remarkable heteroscedasticity however can 
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lead to serious distortions in the findings of the regression. To examine whether the 
assumption of homoscedasticity is valid in this context, a plot of the standardized residuals 
(*ZRESID) against the standardized predicted values (*ZPRED) is made. The residuals in the 
plots made to test homoscedasticity seem to be completely random, so the assumption of 
homoscedasticity was applicable to this research model. The last assumption is reliability. 
The model must be reliable, which means that the model must be consistent. The 
regression equation must give similar results for the same organizations over time.  
Cronbach’s alpha determines the reliability of the independent variables included in this 
model. The tests indicated that the reliability assumption for multiple linear regression 
was also satisfied.  
 
4.5.2 Hypotheses 
To test whether there is a relationship between the communication capability building 
aspects and organizational performance, the following null hypothesis is tested: 
 
H0 : There is no relationship between the independent variables and organizational 
performance. 
 
The null hypothesis states that the fit of the observed values of the dependent variable to 
those predicted by the multiple regression is not better than could have been expected by 
chance. 
 The null hypotheses above can be separated into two hypotheses, since there are two 
dependent variables measuring the concept of organizational performance, ROA and RRE. 
 
H01 : There is no relationship between the independent variables and ROA. 
H02 : There is no relationship between the independent variables and RRE. 
 
Next to the null hypotheses concerning the entire regression equation, there are also null 
hypotheses for each independent variable. These null hypotheses state that adding the 
independent variable does not improve the fit of the regression equation to any further 
extent than would have been expected by chance. 
 
H0 i : Variable i does not explain the variations in organizational performance beyond 
the variation explained by the other variables included in the model.  
With i = independent variables included in the model.   
 
4.5.3 Results of the regression 
The results of the regression equation indicated that at best it is possible to say that there 
is a slight indication for a relationship between communication capability building and 
organizational performance, since the overall regression equation of the independent 
variables with ROA was significant. The individual contribution of the communication 
capabilities and the sign of the relationship with organizational performance can not be 
determined since the parameters reported for these independent variables all lacked 
significance. The insignificant results on the independent variables are most likely caused 
by multicollinearity problems, which imply that all the results should be interpreted with 
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vigilance. The regression on RRE indicated that there is no relationship between 
communication capabilities and organizational performance at all, since the overall 
significance of the regression equation and the independent variables relating to 
communication capability building were all highly insignificant. The different conclusions 
for the regression analysis with ROA and RRE point out that the results are also subject to 
the choice of the dependent variables measuring the concept of organizational 
performance. The overall conclusion is that there is an indication of a relationship 
between communication capability building and organizational performance, but that the 
results indicate that this relationship is very weak. Also the contribution of the individual 
aspects is undetermined, since they all were negative. This would imply that they do not 
contribute at all, but since the overall regression equation with ROA was significant, it is 
possible to conclude that the independent variables might contribute, but how and how 
strong these relationships are can not be revealed by this study.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
The results of the multiple linear regression analysis are used to formulate an answer on 
the research question: 
 
‘Do the organizational communication capability building activities have a positive 
relation with organizational performance?’ 
 
The regression with ROA indicated that there is a slight significant relationship between 
the total concept of communication capability building and organizational performance, 
since the adjusted R-square amounted approximately 16%. This result however should be 
interpreted with caution since the contribution of the individual communication capability 
building aspects to this relationship cannot be determined since they are all highly 
insignificant. The results on the regression with RRE revealed no relationship at all. The 
answer on the research question of this study would be:  
‘No, there is no relationship between the communication capability building activities and 
organizational performance’. 
Based on the regression with ROA there is some indication that there might be a 
relationship between overall organizational communication capability building and 
organizational performance, but the direction and the strength of the relationship with the 
individual communication capability building activities are undetermined. 
 
Combining the results from the two regressions leads to the conclusion that the results 
should be interpreted with great caution, since the two performance measures gave 
different results. The overall model with ROA was significant, except for the individual 
contributions of the communication capabilities, while both the overall model with RRE as 
the individual contributions of the communication capabilities were insignificant. This 
relationship must be studied more in dept to draw any valuable conclusions. 
 
The answer on the research question however might also be influenced by the limitations 
of this study. First the research does not include the relationship between communication 
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capabilities and organizational performance for a period of years. As a consequence, 
results may be biased because of extraordinary performances of organizations. Especially 
in these times, where the global economic crisis is affecting the results of all 
organizations.  
Another important shortcoming is related to the multicollinearity problem. The presence 
of multicollinearity after the adjustments is assumed since the overall regression equation 
for the relationship between the communication capabilities and organizational 
performance was significant, while the individual contributions of the variables could not 
be determined since they lacked significance. 
Moreover, the results may be biased as a consequence of the relative small sample group 
included in the study. Also the sample selection might have impacted the results.  
The presence of both profit and nonprofit organizations in the response group might have 
altered the results of the study as well. 
Specification errors with respect to the concept of communication capability building and 
the performance measures chosen to define the concept of organizational performance 
might have had an influence on the results.  
 
The unclear results of the regression analysis and the various limitations however do not 
imply that this study is of no value. The contribution of this thesis to current literature is 
mainly attention directing. This thesis deals with a topic that currently did not received 
attention from academics. This study might perform as a starting point for future research 
to provide clear answers on the existence of a relationship between the communication 
capability building activities and organizational performance, as well as on the strength 
and direction of the relationships with the individual communication capabilities. 
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Managing Performance of the Offshored 
Services 
 
 
Dina Abrahamovna Michaeva MSc1 
 
 
Executive summary: this paper will provide a short summary of a bigger research work that 
was performed to: 1. to develop a management tool that would enable the management of 
offshore operations to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the offshored services, 
2. to test this tool empirically. The research was started as a result of real-life 
observations that pointed out high management dissatisfaction with offshore counterparty 
performance, especially where it concerned less structured activities. This paper, 
therefore, will address the current flaws in the observed performance management 
framework, and it will propose a new approach that will address observed inconsistencies 
in current approach.  
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/4969. 
 
1.  Introduction 
The topic for this paper was formed as a result of real-life observations at a big financial 
organization that had offshoring practices in different areas of operations, from IT to 
Financial and Management Accounting. The first observations pointed out that the less 
structured and organized the offshored activities are, the less satisfied is the onshore party 
with offshore counterparty’s performance. Furthermore, this dissatisfaction was not 
expressed in formal evaluations, which implied that the daily work was performed 
satisfactorily by offshore counterparty. The main problem seemed to be the discrepancy 
between what was measured and evaluated and what management expected from offshore 
counterparty. 
 
The existing literature on the management of the offshore services at the time was also 
confirming the initial findings by citing the following statistics. The actual savings on 
labour costs for financial firms in 2008 could range from 20% to 70%, depending on the 
effectiveness of the management of the offshore services (knowledge@emory, 2008). 
Another citation from sandhill.com (2007) states “many sourcing deals that 
underperformed have been effectively diagnosed to have had weak and ineffective 
governance processes and structures”. Unfortunately, the remedies that the articles 
provided were mostly based on “best practices” and not on a rigorous scientific research. 
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Another problem was that very often different parts of the overall offshoring strategy 
would be addressed without explaining how a remedy for that particular part would fit in 
the overall offshoring strategy of the firm. For example, one frequently cited tool that 
would help to manage offshore services better was “more communication”. However, 
more communication also means more costs and more effort and, therefore, it does not 
necessarily fit in the overall approach of a firm. Therefore, the all-inclusive guidance was 
required for the management of the offshored services to address challenges in this area. 
 
The all-inclusive approach that will be analyzed in this paper is referred to as 
“performance management framework (or PMS)”. The main research question that is to be 
answered at the end of this paper is “How performance management system for offshore 
operations should be structured in order to increase efficiency and effectiveness of 
offshore operations?” To answer this question the following steps will be performed next.  
 
In part one a theoretical research will be done to explore the previous works in this area 
and to see how other works can contribute to the topic of this paper. This research will de 
done for different part of the performance management system and it will address the 
following questions: 1. Overall offshoring strategy, 2. What to offshore? 3. How to control 
offshore activities? 4. Offshoring approach in time perspective. All questions will be 
consistently approached from 3 different perspectives: transaction-based economics (TCT), 
resource-based view (RBV), and trust-based view. All three views try to explain how to 
minimize the threats of opportunistic behaviour, information asymmetries, and uncertainty 
while planning and executing on offshoring strategy.  
 
The end-result of theoretical research will be a development of a management tool, 
performance management system for the offshored services. This system will integrate 
different parts of PMS that are described in part one. Next, PMS framework will be tested 
high-level using the financial firm where the initial real-life observations were done. The 
overall approach to this test as well as sample choice and research design will be 
elaborately discussed in part two of this paper. The goal of this qualitative test is to get 
the first impression on how real-life cases are reflected in the created framework, and 
what type of analysis can be performed based on this framework. 
 
The results of the empirical research will be presented in part three, and part four will 
follow with a detailed analysis of the results. The results will be compared with the initial 
expectations that are documented in the developed PMS framework. Any deviations from 
this framework will be highlighted and elaborately discussed. Finally, in section five of the 
paper conclusions and recommendations will be made. Conclusions and recommendations 
will be addressed to the financial firm that is subject to the case study.  
 
Next, a theoretical research on performance management system for the offshored 
services is presented. 
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2. Prior literature 
The research in offshoring area in prior literature concentrates around three main 
perspectives: transaction cost theory (TCT), resource-based view (RBV), and trust-based 
view. The research in these areas will be used in this section to analyze how it impacts 
different components of performance management framework for offshore services: 
overall strategy, activities, governance structure and controls. Next, conclusions will be 
drawn on how this research can be used to create a cohesive performance management 
tool for offshore services. Finally, a performance management framework for offshore 
services will be developed at the end of this section based on prior research. 
 
2.1 Offshoring strategy 
Offshoring strategy sets the overall direction regarding offshoring practices and provides an 
overall guidance for a firm on how these practices should be managed, measured, and 
evaluated. Operational objectives, performance measures, and control mechanisms should 
all be traceable back to the overall strategy and business objectives. This section will 
describe what basic offshoring options are available to firms and what trade offs, in terms 
of risks and benefits, are considered when setting the overall offshoring strategy.  
 
A choice for a certain mode of operation depends on management perceptions regarding 
the following offshoring benefits (Kedia & Mukherjee, 2008) 
- Disintegration advantages, which are achieved by unbundling of activities from 
the value chain vis-à-vis integrated firms serving in the same industry. 
These advantages include reduced coordinating costs; better focus on core 
capabilities; increased flexibility, speed, and responsiveness due to modular 
structure 
- Location. Assuming condition one is satisfied, it must be more advantageous for a 
firm to procure resources from outside the country to perform certain functions 
then executing the same in the country. 
The advantages include labour, time, and knowledge arbitrage; country level 
advantages in terms of, for example, economic deregulation and liberalization   
- Externalization. Assuming condition two is satisfied, it must be more 
advantageous for a firm to externalize those functions to foreign providers or 
internalize those functions to be performed in-house in the foreign land by setting 
up centre. 
The advantages include co-specialization and organizational learning and reduced 
costs by tapping into specialized supplier capabilities 
 
Offshoring risks relate to foreign country risks and to the flaws of imperfect markets that 
give rise to adverse selection and moral hazard within offshore transactions.  
- Adverse selection refers to the situations where bad offshore agent is selected by 
accepting lower fees in the markets where perfect information about agents and 
agent pricing is not available to the principals 
- Moral hazard refers to the situations where offshore agent has more information 
about actions and the results of those actions than the principal. This can lead to 
opportunistic behaviour from agent side when the interests of principal and agent 
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are not perfectly aligned and agents’ actions cannot be perfectly monitored by the 
principal 
 
Finally, the operational risks also increase when operating from offshore location. 
Operational risks arise when tasks are achieved with less efficiency and quality than 
onshore. This can be due to either transitional phase in offshoring strategy execution or 
the limitations of communication transmission system, presence of cultural gap, or 
geographical separation. 
 
Kedia and Mukherjee (2008) use the following framework to show and describe how firms 
make a decision with regards to offshoring strategy and a mode of operations based on 
above described considerations. 
 
Firms that strive for offshoring advantages in terms of co-specialization and organizational 
learning and that are less concerned with loss of control or operational inefficiencies will 
chose for either domestic (I) or offshore outsourcing (II). It will give these firms the 
possibility to focus on their core capabilities and to increase their competitiveness through 
increased service and/or product quality, and decreased time to market for their products 
or services. Firms that go for domestic option (I) in this case will consider the risks of 
having operations in foreign country higher that the advantages that foreign location has to 
offer. 
 
Quadrant I and IV represent offshore bystanders that can either have domestic mindsets or 
lack of experience in managing from distance (Carmel & Agarwal, 2006). Some other 
reasons could be that these firms do not have a more demanding skills challenge at home, 
or they operate in an industry that is characterized by non-differentiated products (Boyer, 
2007). It can provide firms with sustainable competitive advantage and remove the 
incentive to gain this advantage by tapping into global opportunities.  
 
 210
Finally, quadrant III, which refers to the case study in this research, represents firms that 
are willing to take advantage in terms of labour, time, and knowledge arbitrage that 
offshore locations present. However, these firms are either restricted in their activities by 
rules and regulations, or they consider the risks in terms of loss of control or operational 
failures to be very high. Therefore, they try to internalize location advantages and to 
manage it within the existing hierarchy through captive offshoring. This mode of 
operations requires availability of strong management skills and tools to be able to manage 
internal operations from a long distance and to ensure a similar level of control. 
 
Strategic decision gives a direction to further definition of activities and processes that can 
be considered for offshoring. The higher are the risks and uncertainty perceived by a firm 
with regards to offshoring, the more conservative it will be regarding what activities to 
offshore. Next section will discuss the main determinants behind the decision what 
functions and what activities to offshore while bearing in mind the strategic requirements 
for captive offshoring.  
 
 
2.2 What to offshore? 
The question what activities to offshore will be answered in this section using prior 
research in three different areas, transaction cost theory, resource-based view, and trust-
based view and a captive offshoring as a mode of operations. The examples that will be 
used for illustrational purposes all come from financial industry because offshoring 
practices in this industry are already at a very advanced stage, these practices are very 
diverse in nature, and the case study in this article also concerns a big financial institution. 
 
Transaction costs theory. Williamson (1975, 1986) defined transaction costs as those 
associated with an economic exchange that vary independently of the competitive market 
prices of the goods or services exchange. A simpler definition for it is “a cost incurred in 
making an economic exchange” (answers.com). In the context of this research transaction 
costs will concern the costs of monitoring and managing activities.  
 
According to Nicholson et al. (2006) these costs differ per activity depending on the 
following characteristics:  
- Uncertainty or the degree of specifiability of intended performance. The more 
uncertainty is involved in a certain transaction, the more will be the need to 
extensively monitor and manage this activity from a long distance 
- Asset specificity or the degree of customization required to perform a certain task. 
Customization refers to a specific knowledge or skills that are required to perform a 
certain transaction. High degree of customization can give rise to opportunistic 
behaviour from offshore agent. Extensive monitoring will be required to prevent it 
- Frequency of the transaction. This factor in combination with highly uncertain and 
highly customized transactions can increase the costs of transactions dramatically 
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Nicholson (2006) argues further that the financial activities higher in the organizational 
hierarchy (e.g. management accounting) are characterized by high uncertainty and high 
asset specificity. These activities are highly customized to business’ internal and external 
environments, are prone to frequent adjustments, and produce highly sensitive data. They 
are, therefore, less suitable for offshoring because they will create a prohibitive level of 
transaction costs in terms of extensive management and monitoring of these activities. 
 
Youngdahl and Ramaswamy (2008) support this view by introducing the “knowledge 
embeddedness” factor in process description. Processes with higher level of information 
embeddedness will contain a higher amount of tacit knowledge, which refers to “the 
elements that cannot be captured in repeatable routines that can be codified and 
transferred.” As the level of knowledge embeddedness increases, operations progress from 
performing simple transactional services to providing more complex solutions. This also 
means that the complexity of managing the process of offshoring such delivery increases. 
 
Kehal and Singh (2006), also argue that processes with a fairly high degree of codifiablity 
and, therefore, low uncertainty, are suited for offshoring the best. Another variable they 
introduce is the degree of interconnectedness of offshore processes with core processes. 
The preferable candidates for offshoring are processes with low to medium degree of 
interconnectedness with core processes. Offshore operations then will require less 
communication and coordination efforts. In addition, core processes will be less subject to 
stoppages in processing pipeline due to infrastructural or communicational failures.  
 
Finally, the processes to be offshored should also be labour intensive (Stratman, 2008) or, 
in other words, they should require a fair amount of manual processing in order for 
offshoring case to make commercial sense. 
 
To conclude, TCT and its proponents concentrate on minimizing the costs that are required 
to conduct offshore transaction. Therefore, the processes that should be brought offshore 
are the ones that not only minimize the costs of direct labour, but also require minimum 
effort in terms of monitoring and managing it. These activities are characterized by low 
knowledge embeddedness, low interconnectedness with core processes, high codifiability, 
high labour intensity, low uncertainty, low asset specificity, and high frequency of 
transaction. However, captive offshoring is not only done to capture cost and time 
arbitrage but also knowledge differential advantages. Next section will explore this topic 
further. 
 
Resource-based view. While TCT concentrates mostly on negative market conditions and 
structures to eliminate those, RBV builds on the notion of a bounded level of trust in every 
market: “the expectation that the partners will not always be opportunistic even if they 
have the opportunity and the incentives for it” (Vivek, et al., 2009). This view 
concentrates more on a value creation through proper resource management and firm’s 
ability to create unique and non-transferable core competencies. The competencies will 
then constitute firm’s sustainable competitive advantage.  
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The proponents of RBV argue that firms can create sustainable competitive advantages 
through collective learning because collective learning in the organization eventually 
results in process optimization and technology integration. To build collective learning 
firms need to increase the knowledge intensity of offshore processes. That requires shift 
from transaction specific investments, which aim to minimize coordination and monitoring 
costs, to core specific investments, which increase onshore party involvement in process 
flow (Vivek, et al., 2009). 
 
Offshoring processes with high knowledge embeddedness, medium/high uncertainty, high 
asset specificity, and high interconnectedness with core processes gives both parties a 
chance to collectively learn more about process flow and to add value to it through smooth 
migration, improvement initiatives, and redesign. Besides, it gives resources the 
opportunity to improve their coordinating and integrating skills, which makes resource pool 
unique and non-transferable. Talent-based advantage will also compensate for reduced 
labour arbitrage due to wage inflations, currency fluctuations, and offshore government 
initiatives. 
 
Trust-based view. Vivek et al. (2009) refers to it as a view that “blurs the firm boundaries 
opening the door for evolutionary and ever changing organizational form.” Joint value 
maximization takes precedence over single firm cost maximization and activities that are 
transferred offshore focus on continued association between onshore and offshore partners 
(Vivek et al., 2009). These activities can include sharing of strategic planning and 
knowledge at this stage. Transaction costs mediating mechanisms are partially or 
completely replaced by a notion of trust in offshore party gained through partner 
experience (Dekker). 
 
To conclude this section, the processes that firms offshore will depend on: strategic focus 
in terms of costs, time, and knowledge arbitrage; onshore experience in managing offshore 
activities; offshore partner experience. The next step in performance management 
framework is to determine what controls to apply to monitor and manage offshore 
activities. This topic is analyzed in the next section. 
 
 
2.3  How to control offshore activities? 
TCT. Management accounting scholars have been using transaction cost theory to analyze 
current offshore governance and control practices and to explain it from the perspective of 
transaction costs control for different service exchange events. Spekle (2001), for 
example, argues that control suitability for a certain transaction is a function of the 
following three characteristics (Nicholson, 2006): 
- the ease of ex ante programmability (or predictability) of the outcomes 
- the degree of asset specificity 
- the extent of information impactedness 
Based on these characteristics a choice can be made between five categories of controls: 
market controls, arm’s length controls, machine controls, exploratory controls and 
boundary controls.   
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Machine control is a preferable option for activities with high degree of ex ante 
programmability of outcomes. It means that for these activities it will be fairly easy to 
associate required actions with desired outcomes and controls, therefore, can be defined 
in terms of desired outcomes or required actions. Result-driven controls will involve clearly 
pre-defined performance targets and performance-linked rewards system. Action-driven 
controls will involve standardization of behaviour, the setting of codified norms and rules, 
close monitoring, rewards for obedience, and punishment for disobedience. 
 
Another proponent of TCE view, Stratman (2008), suggests enterprise resource planning as 
control mechanism for offshore activities where the main goal is cost reduction. ERP is an 
example of advanced machine control. It deploys common data structures that facilitate 
communication between corporate management and sub-units. It allows for easier 
monitoring and reduces coordination costs and transaction risk by limiting the potential for 
opportunism and eliminating information asymmetry. 
 
Arm’s length controls will be used for activities with moderate level of ex ante 
programmability (moderate uncertainty). They are articulated in terms of market-based 
performance benchmarks and ex-ante contractual provisions. Performance is assured by 
enforcing the adherence to contractual arrangements, and arbitration is stipulated in 
contracts to resolve conflicts. 
 
Exploratory or boundary controls are applied to transactions with low levels of ex ante 
programmability and high level of uncertainty. Exploratory controls are defined as very 
informal arrangements with very little explicit guidance. The focus is mainly on peer 
pressure within the group that results from high interconnectedness of activities. Boundary 
controls intend to prevent cases of irremediable and “incorrigibly high levels of” 
information impactedness. They focus on prescriptive code of conduct, ethical behaviour 
and activities that are off limits for the prevention of a limited set of undesired outcomes 
and unwanted behaviour that can be anticipated ex ante. Boundary controls are stated in 
negative terms as minimum standards (Nicholson, 2001) 
 
All above-described controls refer to transactions with moderate to high levels of asset 
specificity or transaction customization to customer needs. Spekle (2001) argues that 
transactions with low asset specificity, irrespective of their level of uncertainty, can be 
handled the best by market forces as market pressures are relatively high on the providers 
of these services (Nicholson, 2001). 
 
RBV. RBV adopts a more dynamic view on a firm as opposed to a static TCT view. While 
TCE focuses on discrete transactions and decisions related to it at a certain point in time, 
relational view concentrates on continuity of association or social exchange between 
onshore and offshore parties in the future. This has its major implications on control 
objectives and mechanisms. 
 
While TCE proponents focus on outcome controls and strive to ensure deliverability against 
the lowest costs possible, RBV proponents argue that firms should manage for development 
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of core specific assets in order to create competitive advantage. Core specific assets are 
expressed in terms of “the extent to which resources contribute to the competitive 
advantage of the firm” (Vivek, et al., 2008). These core competencies must be unique and 
non-transferable in order to contribute to firm’s competitive advantage. 
 
In order to develop core competencies management should switch its control focus from 
deliverability and time management to management for quality, knowledge development, 
and process improvement. Control focus shifts from outcome control to process monitoring 
and development of complimentary capabilities. Deliverability becomes a hygiene factor. 
Technology and training drive quality of the process (Vivek, et al., 2008). This shift 
reinforces the learning curve within offshore entity. 
 
Next, control mechanisms such as machine controls and highly specified service level 
agreements will be replaced by a more extensive use of exploratory and boundary controls. 
These controls set a minimum process requirement and behavioural expectations but they 
also stimulate cooperation and knowledge sharing between onshore and offshore party. 
 
Trust-based view. Trust based view goes even further than RBV and argues that as time 
passes managerial control from onshore site decreases in its importance and mutual 
strategic planning and cooperation emerge. Onshore party increases its relation-specific 
investments in mutual strategic planning and cooperation, managerial control, bilateral 
governance, and knowledge intensity of the processes. These investments in offshore 
partner development increase mutual dependence (Vivek, et al., 2008), which constitutes 
a very strong control mechanism. 
 
Mao et al. (2008) tested offshore vendor perceptions on trust and control. His findings 
show that clients’ control over vendor, in terms of cultural blending and goal setting, had 
a significant impact on cost control but had no impact on project quality. On the other 
hand, trust building in terms of effort invested by onshore party in information sharing, 
quality of communication, and inter-firm adaptation had a significant impact on project 
quality as measured by client satisfaction, quality of results, and standards set. However, 
it did not have any significant impact on cost control. 
 
To conclude, above research suggests that control objectives, focus, and mechanisms 
evolve together with the evolvement of onshore-offshore relationship. TCE and its 
principles play important role at the onset of the relationship where agent principle 
problems have to be mitigated by stringent control measures. As relationship develops, 
TCE controls will be gradually replaced by core- and relation-specific investments and trust 
will start to play an increasingly important role as control mechanism. Next section will 
discuss the evolution in onshore-offshore relationship and performance management 
framework in more detail. 
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2.4 Offshoring approach in time perspective 
Different authors argue that offshoring event is not static but very dynamic in its nature. 
Research by Kehal and Singh (2006) shows that as time passes the focus of offshoring 
activities gradually shifts from simple repetitive tasks to more uncertain and complicated 
tasks. 
 
Another research by Yuongdahl and Ramaswamy (2008) illustrated that offshoring expertise 
gradually grows from simple tasks processing in process centre to unique capability centre 
with knowledge intensive processes and core capabilities. The strategic focus in process 
solution centre shifts from executing certain services to transforming these services 
through increased knowledge-based capabilities. 
 
As offshore activities evolve so should also the mechanisms that control these activities. 
Vivek et al (2009) explain in their research that as firm’s strategy changes from reducing 
transaction costs to developing new competencies and resources, the focus of control 
mechanisms is also adjusted to reflect this shift. The primary goal of this adjustment is to 
add value to existing processes through bilateral governance and increased strategic 
cooperation.  
 
Forrester Research in IT industry (2003) showed that offshoring follows four stages of 
development, from bystanders to experimenters, to committeds, to full exploiters. 
Governance mechanisms shift from establishing the overall offshoring strategy to 
encouragement to increase the use of offshore services (e.g. cultural blending). Finally, as 
full exploiter, client concentrates on upgrading offshore processes and methodologies using 
offshore expertise (advancement stage) and shares the risk/rewards resulting from it.  
 
To conclude, offshoring cannot be researched as a static event as this strategy evolves 
over time. Therefore, the dynamics of offshoring will be taken into account in the next 
section, where the performance management framework for offshore services will be 
developed. 
 
2.5  Performance Management Framework for offshore services 
This section brings together the items discussed above in a coherent performance 
management framework for offshore services. Similar to the views presented above, 
different opinions exist on how performance management framework should be created 
and used.  
 
One view represents a static approach where key objectives are defined first. They are 
then translated into strategies and plans, the performance targets are set and the 
reward/punishment system defined and implemented. Information flows are defined to 
accommodate “learning organization”, employee empowerment, and emergent strategy 
(Otley, 1999).  
 
On the other hand, the proponents of RBV propose a more dynamic approach to PMS. Henri 
(2006) argues that strategy should not be taken as a given to derive the rest of PMS from 
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it. Instead, performance management system should be designed to influence strategy via 
the development of distinctive and valuable capabilities: market orientation, 
entrepreneurship, innovativeness, and organizational learning. He proposes to combine the 
diagnostic use of PMS, which focuses on mistakes and negative variances, with the 
interactive use, which is used to expand opportunity seeking and learning throughout the 
organization. This combination creates tension which will lead to the development of 
organizational capabilities.  
 
The PMS framework that is presented below integrates TCT, RBV and trust-based views to 
define characteristics for strategy, objectives, activities, and controls at different stages 
of offshoring. The model assumes that at the beginning of offshore relationship the 
offshore centre is mainly used for cost cutting purposes. This centre gradually develops 
into important contributor to global knowledge, skills, and core capabilities base as 
relationship evolves. Frequent evaluations should be done by onshore partner to determine 
at what stage of development the offshore relation is and how to manage it properly. 
 
The first column in the below presented framework represents the initial stage in 
offshoring that is covered by TCT and its principles. Offshoring here is mainly done for cost 
cutting purposes and the objectives are to minimize direct and indirect transaction costs. 
To achieve that, manual, repetitive processes with little interaction requirements and low 
knowledge embeddedness are brought offshore. These activities are governed by result- or 
action-driven controls that focus primarily on timely and accurate delivery of pre-defined 
products. 
 
The second column represents a more advanced stage in offshoring relationship governed 
by RBV and its principles. The shift to this column can be driven by internal and external 
factors. Internally onshore party gains more experience in managing global resources. 
Externally competitive pressures increase and offshoring for cost cutting objective does 
not constitute a sustainable competitive advantage any longer. Strategic shift is, 
therefore, required to capitalize on offshore location advantages in terms of knowledge 
differential to improve product or service quality and time to market. 
 
When above-mentioned factors are present, the following changes will occur in PMS. 
Onshore involvement in offshore operations increases. The knowledge embeddedness of 
offshore processes and its interconnectedness with core onshore processes increase, and 
the processes become more business specific. Controls that will be applied at this stage 
are ex-ante contractual provisions and performance benchmarks. Gradually more use will 
be made of exploratory and boundary controls to stimulate information exchange. Controls 
will also have to be complemented by interactive use of PMS and social measures, that 
keep focus on collective goals and objectives. Control focus shifts from results 
deliverability to quality of delivered results, knowledge development, and process 
improvement. 
 
Last column in PMS framework is covered by trust-based view and its principles. Earlier 
shifts make sure that the level of expertise by offshore party increases; offshore party is 
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more attached to a company and pursues collective goals; onshore trust in offshore partner 
increases. The next step in the relationship is to advance core capabilities that contribute 
to company’s competitive advantage. Core capabilities represent not only executing but 
also managing functions at this stage. Managing global network of differing skills set 
becomes one of the most important contributors to company’s competitive advantage. 
 
At this stage offshore processes are not only transferred from onshore location but they 
are also developed offshore. Processes that are transferred from onshore refer to strategic 
decision making and business partnering. Trust and social controls become the most 
important governance mechanisms, and offshore partner is made co-responsible for 
company results. Social controls enable social interaction, cooperation, social attachment, 
information exchange and they stimulate discussion, which is necessary for company 
dynamics. 
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Above discussion is summarized in below PMS framework. This framework will be evaluated 
empirically in the next section using a real case example. 
 
Cost/Time arbitrage   Knowledge arbitrage 
 Transaction costs theory Resource-based view Trust-based view 
Assumptions 
No previous experiences  
with offshoring 
Offshore over-performance on key 
control metrics 
Full trust in offshore  
party's capabilities 
  
Distrust of foreign operations & 
institutional framework 
Positive personal experiences  
onshore about offshore party 
Full trust in offshore  
party's work ethics 
  
High perceived macro- and 
micro risks 
Competitive pressures to increase 
quality, time-to-market, flexibility 
Integrated process execution 
& monitoring 
  
No managerial experience 
in global operations 
Increased global management  
capabilities 
Advanced global management  
capabilities 
Strategy 
Minimizing costs of non-core 
activities 
Develop global operating base for 
non-core & core processes 
Leverage global core capabilities 
to create competitive advantage 
  
Concentrating on & developing 
core activities onshore 
Develop unique & non-transferable 
global core capabilities 
Leverage global core capabilities 
to develop new opportunities 
  Clearly defined and fixed Frequent re-adjustments  Constantly evolving 
Objectives  
Reduce operating costs for  
non-core processes 
Increase internal pressures for high 
performance 
Reduce costs through better 
problem-solving skills 
  
Reduce management costs for 
non-core activities 
Improve coordinating and 
integrating skills 
Enhance cooperative and trusted 
environment 
  
Increase flexibility of non-core 
cost base 
Streamline and optimize core  
processes 
Leverage core processes to 
enhance competitive position 
Activities 
Processing jobs, highly 
predictable outcomes 
Analytical work, hardly predictable 
outcomes 
Strategic planning, unpredictable 
outcomes 
  Transaction specific investments High core asset specific investments Relation specific investments 
  
Low interconnectedness with 
core onshore processes 
High interconnectedness with core 
onshore processes Integrated core processes 
  Low knowledge embeddedness  High knowledge embeddedness  
High strategic knowledge 
embeddedness  
  High degree of codifiability Low degree of codifiability Uncodifiable activities 
  Sequential or pooled order Reciprocal execution order Unstructured activities 
  High frequency of operations Regular frequency of operations Periodical execution 
Governance  Internal hierarchy Sharing of managerial control Bilateral governance 
Control focus 
Deliverability of process 
outcomes Quality of processes and outcomes Goal & planning achievability 
  
Standardization of processes 
& behaviour 
Increasing knowledge-intensity of 
the processes 
Increasing strategic knowledge-
intensity of the processes 
  
Achievement of targets set, 
feedback function 
Expanding opportunity-seeking & 
learning 
Expanding organizational borders & 
possibilities 
Control  
mechanisms 
Mainly quantitative  
performance metrics 
Quantitative & qualitative 
performance metrics 
Increasing use of qualitative 
performance metrics 
  Outcome-oriented Process-oriented Strategic target-oriented 
  Result-driven machine controls Exploratory and Boundary controls  Boundary controls 
  Action-driven machine controls Vertical integration Social controls 
  
Punishment for 
underperformance Non-monetary incentives Trust & Cooperation 
  ERP 
Technological process  
improvements 
Technology relates to seamless  
process integration 
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3. Methodology 
The following factors had to be taken into account when considering different methods for 
empirical study on this topic. First, performance management framework in a random 
company will not be a result of elaborate scientific study but a result of direct and indirect 
interaction between a certain firm and its particular environment. A basic understanding 
of firm’s context and environment is, therefore, required to draw conclusions. Second, this 
study involves personal interactions across firms, or inter-firm relationships, over time. A 
detailed analysis of individual firm’s interactions over time is required to account for this 
factor. 
 
Taking into account the above-mentioned factors and the novelty of the topic the research 
methodology chosen was, first, to perform a detailed case study of a single organization to 
appreciate the context in which it operates and the reciprocal impact of context and 
organization. Second, to perform a semi-structural survey within the case study to test the 
inductive generalizations made (Otley, 1999). As this study is not longitudinal, firm’s 
archival data and records helped to understand the context in which a firm operates 
today. Survey was used to fill in the blanks in the model left out by archival analysis. 
 
Sample. Finance department of a big financial firm was chosen for empirical testing of the 
presented PMS framework. This approach helps to concentrate on diverse processes that 
can be ranked according to their complexity within Finance organization and can then be 
placed in one of three PMS pillars for further research. Finance activities in this research 
include procure-to-pay (AP), management accounting, financial accounting, cost 
accounting, balance sheet, and product control processes. 
 
Archival data analysis contains a thorough analysis of firm’s initial offshoring strategy, 
objectives, control framework and mechanisms. Next, firm’s top management evaluations 
of its offshore practices and regular operational reviews using key performance indicators 
are used to draw conclusions on different perceptions in the organization. Finally, a semi-
structured survey is used to complement archival analysis. To prevent bias in response 5 
employees from different departments and different hierarchical levels were interviewed. 
Departments interviewed were cost, revenue, balance sheet and intercompany accounting. 
Each interview took 1-1,5 hours on average. 
 
Questionnaire. Different components of presented PMS model were operationalized using 
previous researches described above. Each model component was broken down into 
characteristics that the previous researches used to construct that component and to place 
it into TCT, RBV or trust-based perspective. As this research is highly qualitative in its 
nature, multiple-choice questions were used to determine component absence, presence, 
or relative stage in its evolution/growth. In addition, the respondents were asked to 
indicate if any other option was applicable in their situation. 
 
Based on archival analysis and the results of questionnaire the following picture emerged 
for the offshoring practices of this firm. 
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4. Results 
 
A detailed analysis of the above results follows in the next section. 
 
Cost/Time arbitrage Knowledge arbitrage
  Transaction costs theory Resource-based view 
Assumptions 
Simultaneous implementation of offshoring in multiple 
departments/no gradual approach 
Onshore party is highly satisfied with offshore party's 
performance on current key performance indicators 
  
High perceived operational risks in terms of employee 
retention, key man exposure, loss of control over 
offshore activities, no process improvements offshore 
Offshore parties are very consistent and consequent 
in their performance and task prioritization 
 
  
Limited managerial experience in global operations 
due to local "Netherlands" scope of operations 
Competitive pressures exist onshore due to scarcity of 
qualified finance professionals 
  
Onshore reorganization and unstructured handover  
offshore activities    
  
Onshore party is dissatisfied with overall offshore 
performance   
  
Distrust in offshore party's capabilities to perform 
complex tasks   
Strategy 
Cost reduction for finance activities, realization of 
targeted cost savings controlled by tight budgets   
  
Concentrating on feasible opportunities for offshore 
operations based on already offshored operations    
  
Strategic benefits in terms of scope enlargement of 
already offshored functions   
Objectives  
Reduction of operating costs for administrative, back 
office tasks Processes were described and codified by handover  
  
Reduction of management costs for administrative, 
back office tasks   
Activities 
Management accounting (revenue management, 
product control), financial accounting (balance sheet), 
cost accounting, intercompany reconciliations 
The actual outcomes of offshore processes depend on 
data/process quality and data/process knowledge  
 
  
Processing parts of multiple onshore activities are 
offshored/no end-to-end processes including 
responsibilities 
Frequent and intensive communication between 
onshore and offshore parties is required to achieve 
acceptable process results 
  
Investments are done in handover of onshore 
transactions and training of offshore personnel to 
perform the highly defined tasks 
Knowledge of business, processes, rules and 
regulations is required to be able to perform activities 
independently 
  
Knowledge of process steps is required to perform 
current offshore tasks 
High key man exposure 
 
  
High degree of codifiability given current process 
description 
High information impactedness as onshore party has a 
very limited knowledge of offshore operations 
    
Reciprocal execution order as onshore and offshore 
counterparties work in parallel 
    
Regular frequency of operations = monthly closing 
activities 
Governance  Extended team model Sharing of HR control 
  
Effective management control resides onshore  
Functional expertise is kept onshore 
Effective operational control resides offshore 
 
Control focus Timely delivery of process outcomes Quality of outcomes is also considered 
  Enhancing predictability of outcomes  
  Achievement of targets set, feedback function  
Control  
mechanisms 
Operational key performance indicators 
 
G-SAT index 
 
  
Timeliness, turnaround time, documentation 
 
Includes process, knowledge, quality, and proactive 
attitude orientation 
  
Punishment for underperformance = lower KPI 
scores/bonuses   
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5. Analysis 
Archival analysis shows that offshoring practices in this organization started in 2004 with 
the clear goal to realize costs savings. To achieve that goal as many finance activities as 
possible had to be transferred from onshore to a captive offshoring centre in India. The 
only two other factors that had to be considered were the feasibility of the transfer, in 
terms of HR and regulatory restrictions, and a strategic fit within existing Finance 
organization. 
 
The governance model chosen was that of an extended team per region per offshore 
function. Each onshore team was replicated at offshore location but control and expertise 
over deliverables were to be retained onshore. Cost control was achieved by setting clear 
targets and performing yearly budget evaluations. Operational control was achieved by 
defining and documenting key performance indicators in terms of timeliness, turnaround 
time, quality (accuracy), and documentation. Management control was achieved by 
introducing index that would determine management satisfaction scores using questions. 
These questions refer also to knowledge embededdness and process enhancement at 
offshore location. 
 
Activities that were transferred offshore represent a mix from different functions, starting 
from accounts payable and intercompany reconciliations to cost, financial and 
management accounting. Furthermore, according to service level agreements, these 
activities represent steps in end-to-end reporting processes, with onshore party providing 
input and controlling output of the overall activity. Offshore activities belong to different 
levels in financial hierarchy and require different levels of expertise and interaction.  
 
Thus, archival analysis shows a mixed picture for offshore activities. On one hand, there is 
a clear cost cutting strategy and objectives, supported by the “extended team” 
governance model and clear operational KPIs with the focus on timely deliverability. On 
the other hand, some of the activities transferred require a lot of interaction with onshore 
team, subject expertise, and frequent adjustments. In addition, the index introduced for 
management control purposes includes items that question knowledge embededdness and 
process enhancement at offshore location, factors that clearly belong to RBV prospective.  
 
Furthermore, management index shows highly unsatisfactory scores, whereas KPIs exhibit 
very high scores for offshore performance. Onshore party indicated during interviews that 
offshore performance is very low where it concerns process change management, process 
improvement, and proactive attitude with regards to task prioritization and problem 
resolution. One of the reasons is that offshore party tries to avoid “overt” conflicts and 
interruptions in the processes because it can potentially harm their KPI scores. Another 
reason is that onshore party avoids transferring additional knowledge or ad hoc requests 
due to high perceived risks and finance process complexities. 
 
During interviews it also became clear that offshore party possesses more knowledge about 
offshore processes, which results in high information impactedness and high key man 
exposure offshore. In fact, the effective control over offshore operations resides with 
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offshore party. Next, offshore processes are subject to frequent adjustments in internal 
and external environments and they require frequent interaction with onshore party to 
enable process execution but, also, to guarantee proper process outcome. This frequent 
interaction does not support current cost cutting objective of the company.  
 
In terms of management controls, it effectively resides with onshore party and offshore 
party involvement in overall decision making is very limited. Furthermore, onshore party 
uses scorecards to control offshore operations. Time aspect, responsiveness, and error 
limitation are indicators of performance that deserve a lot of attention in these cards. 
These indicators are well and narrowly defined in service level agreements. The narrow 
definition and a clear focus on deliverability of operational controls cause a big gap 
between KPIs and scorecards on one hand and a much broader defined index on the other 
hand. KPIs do not cover the full potential of current offshore processes. 
 
The results of this analysis are summarized in PMS framework, presented in section three. 
They show a certain degree of incoherence in current approach. Even though the company 
tried to position itself entirely in TCT perspective, there are certain important elements 
that fall into RBV column based on performed analysis. This will be discussed in the next 
section, where conclusions and recommendations will be made. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and recommendations  
This research looked at offshoring practices from three different perspectives, transactions 
costs economics, resource-based view, and trust-based view. Based on prior research and 
taking into account the dynamics of inter-firm relationships, a performance measurement 
framework was created for offshore services. This framework included the following 
components: assumptions, strategy and objectives, activities, governance and controls, 
and it assumed that all components develop over time due to changes in internal and/or 
external environment. However, to achieve high performance in offshore services the PMS 
should retain a certain degree of coherence through all changes.  
 
Using this framework the empirical study was performed within finance organization of a 
big financial firm. The initial results clearly showed that even though the offshore services 
scored high on daily operations, the management of the firm was not satisfied with the 
overall performance of offshore partner. Based on the analysis of archival records and 
semi-structured interviews with firm’s employees the PMS framework was filled with data 
for this company. The conclusion was that this company’s approach to its offshore 
operations shows a certain degree of incoherence that causes management dissatisfaction. 
 
While the overall company strategy is to minimize costs by offshoring as many processes as 
possible, in reality most of the financial processes offshore do not support this objective 
due to high degree of uncertainty, information impactedness, knowledge embededdness, 
and high interaction requirements. These process characteristics are also not reflected in 
narrowly defined operational key performance indicators for offshore services. Thus, while 
offshoring strategy is focused on cost cutting and operational controls support it, the 
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processes exhibit more potential and cause high agency costs and management 
dissatisfaction.  
 
To increase management satisfaction with offshore services, the overall approach should 
be re-evaluated and it should be determined if: 
- cost cutting strategy is still relevant given internal and external developments 
- offshore processes are fully exploited in terms of their contributed value to overall 
firm’s performance 
If based on above evaluation the company decides to move away from cost-arbitrage, 
current strategy, objectives, governance and operational controls should be moved more 
towards RBV driven approach. It will involve re-evaluating current offshore employees’ 
capabilities and compensation packages; increased involvement of onshore party in 
offshore processes; increased transfer of managerial control to offshore location; 
introduction of qualitative, process-oriented performance metrics and cultural trainings. 
 
When company decides to further pursue the cost-cutting strategy, current offshore 
processes should be re-evaluated and structured to minimize interaction requirements and 
information impactedness. In addition, different, more structured and standardized 
manual activities could be considered for offshoring for scale purposes. This will bring back 
the coherence in overall approach by placing it in TCT-driven column. As a result, 
management expectations regarding offshore services will decrease and satisfaction will 
increase. 
 
Given these recommendations there are certain opportunities for future research. A more 
quantitative research can be performed to empirically test the relationship between PMS 
constructs (individual and combined), the degree of coherence between constructs, and 
the actual firm satisfaction with offshore performance. Larger and more diverse samples 
can be used by translating the semi-structured questionnaire into structured questionnaire 
using the insights gained in this research. Future empirical research can help to better 
quantify and generalize the results over multiple industries, companies, and functions.  
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Hospital Management in a Partly 
Competitive Environment  
 
Niels T. den Uil MSc1 
 
 
‘The greatest danger in times of turbulence is not the turbulence, it’s to act with 
yesterday’s logic’. 
-Peter Drucker 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the relevant planning & control components for hospitals’ 
management while the Dutch Healthcare sector is in the transition from not-for profit to 
(regulated) market competition. For this purpose a conceptual framework focussing on 
management based on integral results is developed. Subsequently, this model is tested 
through interviews and meetings with hospitals and other experts in the field. The results 
indicated that the model principally holds in the selected settings. However, innovative 
and appropriate components or critical success factors could not be found, suggesting that 
this thesis, relating to current practice, might still be one bridge too far. 
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5672. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1  Background 
The Dutch healthcare sector has been under reform for several years. The sector is faced 
with some drastic political and economical reviewing charged by the Dutch government. 
The purpose of the significant system reform is to gradually implementing market 
competition concerning healthcare institutions. It is expected that market competition will 
decrease the costs associated with the healthcare sector concerning the society as a 
whole. 
These reforms are corresponding with fundamental changes regarding financing, budgeting 
and reimbursement within the Dutch healthcare sector. However, the most significant 
change the sector has to deal with is the transition process from a supply to a demand 
driven market system by the governmental introduction of managed competition by means 
                                             
1 The study described in this paper was performed to obtain a MSc-degree in Business Economics at Erasmus 
University Rotterdam. The study is supervised by E.A. de Knecht RA (Erasmus School of Economics), and drs. A. 
Hakbijl RA, and drs. T.J.M. Overdijk RA (PwC). Currently, the author is doing a second master programme in 
Commercial Law at Erasmus School of Law. 
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of a performance-based finance system (Oostenbrink & Rutten, 2006:5). From an 
international perspective, performance-based finance systems have already demonstrated 
their value (Cardinaels & Smith, 2005). Concerning the cure sector (hospitals and medical 
specialists) the tool to realize demand-driven and performance-based products and 
services are Diagnosis Treatment Combinations (hereafter: DBCs).  
DBC-products can be defined as: the whole set of activities and interventions of the 
hospital and medical specialist resulting from the first consultation and diagnosis of the 
medical specialists in the hospital (DBC-maintenance institute, 2009). The new DBC system 
will replace the current budgeting system, whereby every health care supplier was ensured 
concerning at least a part of its profits. 
Although, the new system does not have the objective to alter former social positions of 
the different institutions involved (Zuurbier & Steinbusch, 2005:3), traditionally non-profit 
oriented hospitals are confronted with a profit motive in order to survive and continuing 
their business. The development of an increasing free-market structure concerning the 
cure sector has lead towards a strong increase in organizations’ risk profiles (PwC, 2008).  
 
1.2  Research objective and problem statement 
The aforementioned risks associated with the new system will affect the overall objective 
of Dutch hospitals, which could be described as guaranteeing the continuity of healthcare. 
Hospitals are already confronted with increased pressure on their financial means and it is 
even possible that they will fall into bankruptcy. Hence, in order to achieve better 
financial performance and ultimately accomplishing their social mission, hospitals with a 
negative result from operations or a negative equity capital may need another 
management model concerning controlling their operational and financial performance. 
The research objective of this thesis is to identify the planning & control components 
concerning successfully managing results. Therefore the main question to be answered is: 
 
Which planning & control components are relevant concerning managing results of 
Dutch hospitals within the DBC-structure? 
 
Since financial continuity of an entity is the core value, managing financial risks remains 
crucial (Knechel, 2006). In addition, Paterson & Wendel (1996) state that business and 
financial risks should be closely monitored, if budgeting and reimbursement systems within 
the healthcare sector are altered. Nevertheless, the term hospital results cover more 
subjects (e.g. care quality) that will also be part of consideration. 
  
1.3  Outline 
This article proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 describes relevant institutional settings and 
prior literature, resulting in a conceptual framework. Chapter 3 elaborates on the research 
design and methodologies applied. The results are presented in chapter 4. Based on the 
presented empirical results, analysis is performed in chapter 5. Finally, chapter 6 
stipulates the conclusions of this paper and note some suggestions for future research.  
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2.  Hospital financing and prior research 
 
2.1  Hospital financing 
In the Dutch situation, hospitals are principally financed by the health insurers. Introduced 
in 1988, the Functional Budgeting (FB) system was supply-oriented and regulated. Due to 
inequalities of historical budgeting, the system’s main goal was to realize a justified 
allocation mechanism concerning the available means (Lapré et al., 2001. Within the FB-
system, the hospital’s budget is determined through four components (figure 1). 
 
Component Cost-category Budget parameters Determination 
parameter’s scale 
Availability 
 
Fixed # adherence 
population 
Determined through 
policy guidelines and 
admission orders   
Capacity Semi-fixed #  medical specialists 
#  beds 
 
Infrastructure Location 
dependent  
depreciation 
interest 
capital costs 
 
Production  Variable # consulting hours  
# hospitalizations 
# bed days 
# outpatient visits 
# special functions 
Production agreements 
between hospitals and 
insurance companies 
 
Figure 1: Composition FB-Budget (Source: Schaepkens, 2004:6; Lapré et al., 2001:55) 
 
Generally, the FB-system was principally aimed to control expenditures and incentives to 
increase production or quality of care were almost absent (Oostenbrink & Rutten, 2005:4). 
Since the demand of care is growing, the system has lead towards increasing waiting lists 
(Asselman, 2008). In the system, the hospitals production function is valued at the actual 
production level through subsequent calculation. This development slightly introduced 
performance-based financing, but only focussing on the variable part of the FB-budget 
(VWS, 2005). Because only a particular part of the delivered services was involved in the 
hospital’s budget, the causal relationship between the reimbursement and the delivered 
services by the hospital belonging to particular clinical pathway was mainly absent. The 
lack of understanding of cost prices belonging to delivered services hindered management 
control regarding revenues and results. Hence, the need for a new performance-based 
finance system was born. And as of 2005, the DBC system was implemented in the Dutch 
cure sector. 
 
The DBC-system can be considered as the tool concerning gradually implementing market 
competition. The chief aim of competition forces is to establish an aligned financing 
structure for hospitals and medical specialists based on the delivered services and the 
 229
associated costs. These delivered services are recorded and subsequently billed to the 
health insurers by means of DBCs. The system is aimed to generate a ‘fee-for-service’ 
model (Zuurbier & Steinbusch, 2005:3). However, due to the system’s distinction in DBCs 
with fixed prices (A-segment) and freely negotiable prices (B-segment), currently the 
system is between a case-payment model situation and the fee-for-service model situation. 
The A-segment contains DBCs belonging to heterogeneous care products (e.g. top clinical 
care) that are faced with too much market inefficiencies and hence market competition 
will not fit. Since only DBCs are billed by the hospital, the distinction does not make sense 
with respect to the recording and the billing processes. The distinction is relevant 
recognizing hospitals’ revenues. 
DBCs belonging to the A-segment have fixed prices set by the Dutch Healthcare market 
authority (hereafter: NZa). Those prices are based on the parameters belonging to the 
former FB-system. Within the B-segment production level, price and quality of delivered 
services are the result from a negotiating process between the hospitals and the health 
insurers. Within this segment, hospitals’ total revenues (34% in 2009) are the number of 
recorded and billed DBCs (Q) multiplied by the agreed price (P). That way market 
competition is introduced to the cure market and hence hospitals are principally faced 
with financial risks regarding their production within the B-segment. From an international 
perspective, it appears that financial risks will also cause social risks (Beaver et al., 1998).  
 
In order to conclude feasible contracts with health insurers, hospitals should understand 
the revenues and cost prices associated with their product mix (total amount of all types 
of DBCs). Within this scope, cost accounting could serve as a tool to facilitate the 
negotiation process between hospital and its stakeholders with different interests involved 
(Zuurbier & Steinbusch, 2005:2).  
Since the DBC-system facilitates cost-price accounting, it is expected that the system 
cause incentives to decrease hospitals’ costs. Prior condition concerning allocating costs 
from cost-headings to cost-units is the existence of a causal relationship between them 
(NZa, 2006). However, in hospitals, this relationship is frequently far from clear and hence 
hospitals have difficulties in employing cost-accounting (Asselman, 2008). This 
development leads to unrefined cost categorizations and the supposed cost-homogeneity 
and causal relationship between the various cost centres is mainly absent. Once the 
distinction between fixed and variable costs is understandable, cost-price fluctuations, due 
to under- or overproduction, are explained in terms of marginal costs. Subsequently, these 
insights can be employed concerning investment and make-or-buy decisions. 
The cost-accounting directive of the NZa together with the increasing competitive 
environment hospitals are acting in requires the use of other cost-drivers like ‘activity’ in 
the ABC-method and other modern cost-accounting techniques. From an international 
perspective it has been proved that the ABC-approach provides relatively better material 
concerning price setting strategies and hence quality issues and demand-driven 
management within hospitals (Ross, 2004). However, the lack of experience with advanced 
cost-accounting techniques within hospitals had led to a relatively easy to maintain and 
understandable production centre approach in many cases.  
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Adjacent to this, cost-accounting concerning A-segment DBC products is principally based 
on the FB-system, while these DBCs are already recorded and billed in terms of DBCs. As a 
result double accounting processes are employed. 
 
Since the introduction of the DBC-system involves a new method of hospital financing, it 
might have several consequences concerning hospitals’ financial accounts. Especially on 
the short term, several risks o can be identified (Asselman, 2008, Cardinaels & Smith, 
2005). 
1. Turnover risk 
Due to gradually abolishing the FB-system, differences between hospitals’ defrayment 
and reimbursement will no longer exist. Since hospitals have to negotiate with the health 
insurers about their production, they are faced with an increased risk regarding their total 
revenues. 
2. Financial margin risk 
Since cross-subsidisation possibilities are reduced due to increasing output financing of 
some hospitals’ key-tasks (e.g. teaching status) and the increasing supervision of the 
market authority, through negotiation possibilities, the financial margins of hospitals will 
increase. Opposite, financial margins are shrinking. 
3. Liquidity risk 
Since during the transition phase DBCs can only be billed after they are closed 
(frequently after one year since the patient’s first consult in the hospital) this is an 
inherent risk of the system. Besides, failures due to untimely, incorrect and incomplete 
recording of DBCs are also relevant. 
4. Credit risk 
The DBC-system involves the abolishment of health insurers’ obligation to conclude 
contracts with hospitals and hence prospective payments will no longer exist. 
Consequently, health insurers may not reimburse treatment costs exciding a (pre-
determined) level and the patient may not afford those costs.  
5. Information-asymmetry risk 
Since the system is supposed to provide a detailed registration of information, over 30.000 
different DBC-products are identified. Concerning this amount of products, it is difficult to 
establish (cost) forecasting and the account ‘works in progresses’ will increase. Hence, the 
information asymmetry between the hospital’s management and external parties will 
increase, resulting in higher risk assessments by those parties. 
In order to deal with all those risks hospitals have to alter and adapt their management 
structures. This will be elaborated in the next paragraph. 
 
2.2  Management structures 
Keuning & Eppink (1996:9) define managing as: those actions that set people within an 
organisation into work and subsequently control their behaviour to fulfil the organisations 
objectives. 
Simplified, managing is the act of getting people together to accomplish desired pre-
determined goals. Within this scope, management comprises a process, which consists of 
key-elements often classified as: (1) planning, (2) organizing, (3) staffing, (4) leading (5) 
controlling and (6) motivating (Keuning & Eppink, 1996:15). Based on those core values of 
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managing, Keuning & Eppink (1996:16) distinguish three principal management functions: 
(1) strategic management, (2) establishing an organisational structure and (3) controlling 
the entity’s business processes (operational management).  
Since market competition is gradually implemented within the cure sector and 
consequently financing systems are altered, hospitals are faced with increased risk profiles 
(chapter 1). Hence, managing risks by hospitals’ management can be considered as ‘risk 
management’. 
From a business enterprise perspective, Knechel (2006:29) defines risk as a threat that 
reduces the likelihood that the organisation one or more of its objectives will achieve. 
Within this scope, management is aimed at identifying and quantifying these risks. 
Adjacent to this risk management involves the implementation of control measures. 
Control activities refer to any actions taken by a company or individual to reduce the 
likelihood or significance of risk (Knechel, 2006:32).The whole set of these control 
activities is known as internal control. The effectiveness of an internal control measure is 
determined by the ability of a control measure to provide a reliable and timely warning of 
potential problems and to the potential bias inherent in the execution of a control 
measure (Knechel, 2006:32). Kocken (1997:226) identify two primary objectives of 
corporate risk management. On the one hand, future revenues have to be maximized, 
while at the other hand liquidity risks should be minimized.  
 
Due to limited attention to risk management within the healthcare sector, a connection 
with other professions has to be made. From international accounting and other business 
literature, several useful concepts and frameworks are provided. 
In order to ensure that risks are addressed by higher management and the board of 
directors, organisations are adopting ERM as a formal process that affects all levels of an 
organisation (Knechel, 2006:29). A common-used framework concerning ERM is issued by 
COSO (2004), which includes the following definition of ERM: 
A process, enacted by an entity’s board of directors, management, and other personnel, 
applied in a strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential 
events that may affect the entity, to manage risks to be within its risk appetite, and to 
provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives (COSO, 
2004:7). 
The three-dimensional COSO ERM cube builds on the former one, but also emphasizes the 
importance of identifying and managing risks across the enterprise. ERM is an iterative, 
continuous process that involves identifying, assessing, and managing key risks that 
threaten an organisation’s strategic, operational, compliance and reporting objectives at 
all levels of an organisation (Knechel, 2006:30). Summarized, the cube identifies four 
organisational objectives, four organisational levels and eight components. Based on this 
framework, 128 (4 x 4 x 8) strategies of risk management are possible. 
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Figure 2: COSO cubes (source: COSO, 2004). 
 
Although all the signalled components are relevant, since it lays the foundation concerning 
the other elements, the internal environment is critical. With respect to this internal 
environment, also hospitals’ management has to issue a so-called ‘in control statement’. 
A disadvantage of the framework is that it only provides reasonable assurance regarding 
the ‘in control status’ of a particular entity. Besides, control is inherently limited by the 
quality and integrity of people working within the organisation. Lastly, the model is 
extensively and hence requires much effort regarding implementation by a given hospital. 
Despite inherent limitations, the basic assumptions of this model regarding control and risk 
management are commonly used in accounting literature.  
 
2.3 Managing hospitals 
In the literature, frequently a distinction is made between internal and external 
management & control. External management comprises possibilities to control the 
environment outside the entity. Since hospitals are forced to negotiate with health 
insurers about their production prices, the enhancing B-segment emphasize external 
control (Asselman, 2008:23). 
Since the cure sector is faced with the implementation of market competition and broad 
range of laws and regulations, concerning hospitals, market forces and macro-economic 
developments are important controlling the external environment. In order to determine 
the relevant aspects Knechel (2006) use different models from ‘strategic management’ 
literature. A useful model determining market forces is the ‘Five Forces Model’ of Porter 
(Porter, 1980; Simons, 1995). Macro-economic developments are analyzed by the PEST-
factors developed by Johnson et al. (2006:65-68). The five forces (rectangles) and the 
macro-economic developments (rings) are together presented in figure 3. 
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Figure 3: external risk factors (source: Knechel, 2006:162) 
 
The Five Forces-model enables a hospital as ‘competitor’ to determine the scale and 
nature of its competitors and hence its strategic objectives. In general, the hospital’s 
strategy has to be determined by the hospital’s management in consultation with their 
medical specialists (Peeters & Krabbe, 2004:42). Therefore, alignment concerning the 
strategy between those groups is crucial and makes the situation as a whole relatively 
complex. Strategic objective setting and risk-assessments are also considered as key-
elements within the COSO ERM-framework. 
 
Most external factors, risks and choices have a predictable link to activities within the 
organisation determining its success (Knechel, 2006:175). Those activities can be classified 
into three central themes: (1) financing, (2) performance and (3) quality of care. Hence, 
an integral hospital management approach functions as a road map concerning the 
distributing responsibilities and tasks to all medical specialists and other departments, 
identifying critical performance indicators (PIs) and addressing tasks and accountability to 
all different levels within the hospital. 
The implementation of the DBC-system and associated integral prices requires an integral 
approach with respect to costs and revenues. Managing the performance of the product 
mix or hospital departments becomes relatively more important. A tool concerning 
managing the performance of particular hospital departments can be establishing result 
centres. Within the hospital environment, a result centre is not a shop within the shop, but 
it is accountable and is only a part of the hospital’s total performance. That way the 
results centres are aligned with the hospital’s strategy and objectives striving to a better 
level of cooperation and performance of the entire hospital. 
Since the content of the term ‘result’ covers profit, production volume, quality, culture, 
innovation, education and customer satisfaction, a result centre is not only accountable 
concerning profits. Nevertheless, distributing costs and responsibilities remains difficult 
due to complex clinical pathways involving activities of several result centres. Within the 
hospital medical specialises and supportive specialises can be classified as result centres, 
whereas overhead and other staff departments can be classified as cost centres. Result 
centres should identify their patient groups by means of DBC-products and subsequently 
associate them with adequate cost-drivers within the hospital. Cost centres can charge 
their performances to result centres by means of easily parameters in terms of m² or FTEs.  
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The hospital’s organisation structure in terms of result and costs centres affects the span 
of control and hence the hospital’s management process. This process differs per 
performed activity, due to the different nature and scale of care activities.  
 
Based on the previous paragraphs a conceptual model concerning managing hospital results 
has been developed (figure 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Conceptual hospital management model 
 
In order to ensure that a hospital can manage its performance, an appropriate planning & 
control cycle should be implemented to control its business processes. In scientific 
literature, various definitions and approaches are presented about ‘planning & control’, 
which apply to organizations both within and outside the healthcare sector. Generally, the 
planning & control cycle comprises all decisions, structures and procedures aimed at 
effectively and efficiently realizing the pre-determined goals of an entity (Jans, 2001).  
Anthony and Young (1988:4) distinguish three different types of planning & control 
activities: (1) strategic planning, (2) management control and (3) task or operational 
control. Each activity involves both planning and control, but the emphasis varies with thy 
type of activity and entity. In hospitals, controlling pharmacy inventory is much different 
from controlling patient care on the wards.  
Idealized the internal control system is part of this management control process or cycle, 
which consists of four principal steps (1988:17):  
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(1) Programming, 
(2) Budget formulation, 
(3) Operating and measurement and 
(4) Reporting and evaluation.  
The two first steps could be considered as planning activities, while the two latter could 
be considered as typical control activities. These four principal steps together give shape 
to controlling the entity’s business processes as an ongoing cycle. This planning & control 
cycle consists of a regulatory component (measurements implemented to mitigate threats 
regarding goal-congruence), a retrospective component (accountability and evaluating 
goal-congruence) and a prospective component (planning and decision making aimed at 
realizing settled objectives).  
Concerning hospitals or other healthcare institutions, the cycle contains relatively more 
synchronization moments than concerning a private company. Synchronization moments 
are distinguished in longer term and shorter-term moments that are mutually influencing 
each other. The strategic plan developed by the hospital’s board of directors and approved 
by the supervisory board incorporates the longer term, while the yearly budgeting process 
involves the shorter term.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Planning & Control cycle in hospitals 
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3. Research design 
 
3.1 Structure 
Since the research’s objective is to identify and to define the appropriate planning & 
control aspects concerning managing results in Dutch hospitals, this research will apply to 
the methodology of a design-oriented and exploratory research.  
According to Van Aken (1994), two different cycles (figure 6) are relevant within the scope 
of design-oriented research: the regulative cycle and the reflective cycle. The regulative 
cycle is designed to control concerning a unique or special problem (Van Aken, 1994:19).  
The reflective cycle is a tool to develop clinical knowledge, which contains knowledge 
about both problems and the used methods concerning solutions, all examined in a given 
context (Van Aken, 1994:21). In order to test and to generalize designed knowledge, 
multiple case studies are used within the reflective cycle.  
This study focuses on the unique and specific problem of the gradually implementation of 
performance based financing and competition forces within the Dutch cure market. Since 
these developments will create financial risks to hospitals, by hospitals management it is 
necessary to anticipate effectively to these developments. In order to develop knowledge 
about the relevant planning & control aspects, it is justified to use the regulative and the 
reflective cycle concerning this research. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The regulative and reflective cycle (source: Van Aken, 1994) 
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3.2   Methods 
 
Literature study 
In order to get sufficient insight into the background and context of the formulated 
problem, a literature study has been explored. Besides, the literature will serve as a base 
concerning the conceptual model framework presented in chapter 2.  
 
Case studies 
In order to get a more comprehensive understanding of the subject, qualitative research is 
applied in the empirical part of this study. Qualitative research will enable the investigator 
to examine an actual subject in depth.  
Which research method or strategy should be used, is determined by the following 
conditions: (1) the type of research question posed, (2) the extent of control an 
investigator has over actual behavioural events and (3) the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events (Yin, 2003:5). Within the scope of design-
oriented research, a case study is an important research method. Yin (2003:13) defines a 
case study as: ‘a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, which relies on multiple sources of 
evidence’.  
Since the implementation of performance-based financing and market competition in the 
Dutch cure sector concerns a contemporary phenomenon, concerning this study, case study 
research will be conducted. The before signalled developments will alter the (financial) 
environment Dutch hospitals are acting in. However, the degree to which these 
developments influence the environment and financial performance of Dutch hospitals is 
not clear. Currently the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not 
evident. By using interviews with the members of the hospital’s board, planning & control 
managers and other experts by market authorities, data and information on the 
phenomenon will be gathered in a real-life context. 
A primary distinction in conducting case studies is the choice between single case study 
design and multiple case study designs. Since analytical benefits and conclusions using two 
of more cases may be substantial and more powerful, in general, multiple case designs are 
preferred over single case design (Yin, 2003:53). In order to have possibilities to validate 
the findings, this study will employ multiple case study design (Van Aken, 1994:23). As 
figure 7 indicates, the case study is essential within the reflective cycle to generalize the 
acquired knowledge and results. 
Bowling (2002:403) signals the possibility to employ the triangulation principle while 
conducting case studies. The triangulation principle implies that bias or systematic errors 
of acquired information are reduced because of (1) the applied research method, (2) the 
chosen research approach and (3) subjective observation by the researcher. Combination 
of several research methods and multiple case study design enables the researcher to 
analyse the unique research setting as a coherent and consistent group and to clarify the 
context of the identified problem. 
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Consensus development panel 
Before developing an appropriate model it will has a useful effect to judge planning & 
control aspects arising from theory or identified previously. Testing and judging the 
preliminary model will provide better insights into the targets, needs and assumptions the 
final model has to comply with. 
In order to test and to judge the preliminary model, the method of ‘consensus 
development panel’ (Bowling, 2002:407) is explored in this study. The method involves 
organising a meeting with a panel of experts in the field of curative healthcare, brought 
together to discuss the specific research objective or developing a consensus. The meeting 
of the panel was attended by three advisors or consultants and the researcher.  
 
3.3  Sample 
In the Dutch situation, three different types of hospitals are primarily distinguished: 
academic hospitals, general hospitals and categorical hospitals. Consequently, general 
hospitals are classified once more into ‘top clinical hospitals’ and ‘basic hospitals’. 
Generally, all these different hospital types provide to a certain degree three core tasks: 
care in terms of medical treatments and nursing, research and education.  
Each hospital type should react on the before signalled phenomena and hence all types are 
identified as case objects. Furthermore, each selected hospital is representative 
concerning the target population and hence no selection bias will occur. The chosen 
composition of case objects enables the researcher to use comparisons and formulate 
conclusions and expectations. In figure 7, a set of depersonalised key-data and prefixes 
corresponding to the selected hospitals are presented. 
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3.4  Reliability and validity 
The reliability of this research refers to the reproducibility and the consistency of the 
employed methods (Bowling, 2002:147). The reproducibility and the consistency of the 
qualitative research methods is principally guaranteed by the triangulation principle 
applied to the data resources and through the judgement of the research findings by 
external assessors (Seegers, 2002). The reliability of this research is enhanced, by means of 
discussing the preliminary findings with the advisors of PwC and the hospitals involved. 
Validity is an assessment of whether an instrument or method measures what it aims to 
measure (Bowling, 2002:147). By means of exploring different methods concerning data 
sourcing the degree to which this research is internal valid has increased. Besides, acting 
in conformity with the triangulation principle reduces the possibility of informational 
systematic errors. External validity refers to the ability to generalize the research findings 
to a wider population of interest (Bowling, 2002:150). Although it can be questionable 
whether material generated through case studies can be generalized (Bowling, 2002), they 
are often undertaken with a view to an understanding of wider situations. Since the 
central problem statement of this research will apply to the whole cure sector, this 
research also intends to obtain an  general understanding. The quality of the study is 
determined by whether or not the presented model is applicable to a specific setting as 
well as to the entire sector. The last matter is embedded in this study through using the 
regulative and reflective cycle (figure 6).  
 
4.  Results 
The basic shape of the preliminary model (figure 5) held in the selected settings. Proposed 
adjustments were primarily meant concerning refining the model or making the model 
more applicable to a particular setting. However, the results do not imply that hospitals 
already have the ability to manage results in an effective way.  
Since the DBC-product structure and market competition are gradually implemented, all 
interviewed hospitals admitted the increasing necessity of managing results to guarantee 
continuity of care. The feasible method to perform managing based on results is under 
development in all hospital settings. Nevertheless, the degree to which a particular 
hospital demonstrated the ability to adapt to the changing circumstances varied within the 
research sample. Hospitals with a relatively bigger B-segment production or a negative 
result from operations showed relatively more awareness of the increased financial risks 
and hence the necessity to manage their results. Opposite, one of the categorical hospitals 
and the academic hospitals showed little appreciation of the concept managing results 
primarily due to their other financial or historical funds.  
 
Managing results required several adjustments to the hospitals’ management model to 
distribute adequately responsibilities and tasks in the organisation. It appeared that 
establishing results centres is a common-used approach in most hospitals. Nevertheless, 
several hospitals had trouble with implementing this particular management structure. 
Within this scope, the statement that an appropriate management model concerning a 
particular setting always involves a sophisticated model was frequently heard as an excuse 
concerning the absence of a well-functioning model.  
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In addition, with respect to managing results, strategic choices and the demand of care 
affect hospitals’ management model. However, in many cases it appeared that no obvious 
and tangible strategic objectives were formulated and once they have been formulated, 
measuring accomplishment was frequently omitted. Another signalled problem with 
respect to hospitals’ strategy was the existence of outdated strategic plans.  Concerning 
the demand of care, the majority of the respondents did not agree with the narrowed one-
dimensional bar as popped up in the model. Although the respondents pretended to know 
the factors making up demand, the ability to perform demand-driven management 
appeared limited.  
 
Several hospitals within the sample indicated that adjacent to the identified pillars 
finance, performance and quality, primarily the pillar ‘people’ was missing in the model. 
Since people or the organizational culture is an important critical success factor the 
hospitals’ processes need, this component was thought to be relevant.  
Furthermore, the respondents were asked about the hierarchy or sequence of the 
identified pillars finance, performance and quality. With respect to the categorical 
hospitals, quality and more or less performance were the leading components. Concerning 
the academic hospitals, it appeared that meeting the costs (finance) is in the lead due to 
the different tasks and separate financial funds those hospitals were faced with. One of 
the top clinical hospitals explicitly indicated that the pillar ‘finance’ is in the lead. The 
selected general hospitals agree relatively more with the classification of the pillars than 
the other hospital types, primarily due to the absence of a sophisticated managerial 
model.  
It appeared that almost all hospitals were managing finance in a broad sense, because they 
were more or less focussing on meeting the costs given a particular production and service 
level. In addition, hospitals with relatively less performance-based production 
demonstrated less awareness of managing (financial) results. 
With respect to performance, only in one setting operational excellence was found as a 
significant objective. Although most hospitals pretended to have insights into the 
performance of their product mix, those insights were not considered as a sound basis 
concerning managing the entity. Further, the majority of the hospitals had trouble with 
managing their occupation degree in an appropriate way. Moreover, several respondents 
did not agree with the presented central role of the planning & control cycle under the 
headings of performance in the model. Since the planning & control cycle should primarily 
guarantee the functioning of the management model, it is recommendable to present the 
cycle as surrounding the whole model.  
Concerning care quality, several critical comments were made by the respondents. First, 
medical specialists were not considered as an important aspect concerning quality only. If 
they are not under paid employment of the hospital, the model does not express the 
exceptional status medical specialists have in relation to the hospitals’ management 
model.  Further, the same critics were addressed to ‘risk management’ as another aspect 
under the headings of quality. Risk management was also thought to be relevant 
concerning the other pillars of the model. Since hospitals have to afford all their 
investment activities by themselves, risk management apply to being ‘in control’ as a 
broader perspective than care quality.  
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With respect to managerial information, several respondents emphasized the importance 
of a well functioning basis register system in the hospital. Several hospitals appeared to 
have troubles with generating appropriate management information due to deficiencies in 
their information systems. Nevertheless, incorporating the hospitals’ basic register system 
as a separate component in the model was thought to be irrelevant.  
 
5.  Analysis 
The basic assumptions and the preliminary conceptual model proven in those hospital 
settings confronted with relatively more market competition or with a relatively bigger 
sense of urgency to manage results, is the most prevalent conclusion that can be derived 
from the interviews. Hospitals faced with relatively more market competition are those 
hospitals involved with a significant part B-segment production in comparison to their total 
production. A relatively bigger sense of urgency regarding managing results was found in 
those hospitals confronted with a negative operation result or otherwise having financial 
difficulties not necessarily due to market competition as such. Other possibilities are the 
altered method of financing capital expenditures, poor financial management from the 
past or the need for financing upcoming big investment projects.  
In general, the conducted interviews pointed out that production volume, costs, and 
investments are separately managed and hence nothing is actually changed to the former 
situation in which performance-based financing was mainly absent. A possible explanation 
could be that hospitals have to acclimatize during the transition from not-for profit to 
market competition. For the sake of simplicity and safety regarding being in control, they 
may explore the management methods they got used to.  
Nevertheless, performance-based financing and more in particular market competition 
require an integral managerial approach to manage results (figure 8).  
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Figure 8: Adjusted conceptual model 
 
In line with the presented model concerning integrally managing results, hospitals should 
at least address the following aspects in their management model and planning & control 
cycle. 
Strategic choices are explicitly derived from the hospitals overall strategic plan. 
Since the accomplishment of the strategy should be secured on lower organisational levels, 
alignment exists between the hospital’s management and the medical board. Concerning 
this reason, to identify the appropriate performance-indicators a bottom-up approach can 
be applied. The interview results did not provide joint or new performance-indicators 
relevant concerning the research’s subject. Since most hospitals had difficulties regarding 
this topic due to a lack of experience within hospitals, nevertheless, the interviews 
pointed out that translating the strategy into tangible objectives by performance-
indicators remains critical. 
The necessity of alignment between the hospitals’ management and their 
employees or self-employed medical specialists is partly demonstrated by adding the 
additional pillar ‘people’. Next to it, the results of this research pointed out that the 
organisation’s ability to successfully perform change management is expected to be fully 
dependent of the hospital’s people irrespective their function. The alteration from 
management primarily focussing on being cost covering to actively managing results 
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requires cooperation of people within the organisation. Complicating factors in hospitals 
are the lack of medical specialists and identifying the appropriate incentives, not 
necessarily financially oriented. Incentives can be incorporated in management contracts 
involving a broad scope like research possibilities, education and visitation trips. 
A useful method to reach alignment between management and the medical 
specialists on the condition that profits are shared, is implementing organisational 
structures like profit or result centres. Other useful approaches could be involving medical 
specialists in the hospital’s board of directors or implementing a cooperative approach.  
Such management structures secure that responsibilities and tasks are distributed to lower 
or operational levels into the hospital organisation. Through profit centres medical 
departments or medical specialists as operational managers are integral responsible 
concerning the profitability of their products, quality of performed services and financing 
their needed investments. Exploring those management approaches will mitigate the 
threat the pillars are managed in a separate way.  
Due to the ongoing changing circumstances concerning hospital financing and the 
environment they are acting in, applying risk management will be a useful concept. The 
results pointed out that hospitals have already settled down the concept concerning their 
performance and finance, but regarding care quality it is under exposure. The red vertical 
line connecting quality to risk management emphasizes the importance to implement risk 
management also in relation to quality of care as a part of the overall concept. Since 
political and social pressure coming from several incidents in the past, hospitals should 
properly secure quality of performed activities to mitigate reputation damage and 
ultimately financial risks. 
As another prevalent conclusion from the interviews can be derived that the investigated 
hospitals have still not or just slightly implemented the before formulated aspects. The 
following factors will increase the adoption of the presented conceptual model in different 
hospital settings: 
1. Eliminate the current partitioning walls in hospital financing by the government, 
creating a market competition in terms of a relatively bigger B-segment.  
2. Create a level playing field between hospitals by the public and by the market 
authorities. 
3. Less regulated market competition by decreased legislative pressure of the 
government and let critical developments (e.g. the possibility that hospitals will fall into 
bankruptcy) be handled by the discipline of the market. 
4. Facilitate possibilities to distribute profits even outside the healthcare sector. 
This development would attract private investors who want to see return on investments 
to a certain degree. 
 
 
6. Summary and discussion 
 
6.1  Summary 
As of 2005, Dutch hospitals are confronted with the DBC-product structure as the tool 
concerning gradually implementing competition market in the cure sector. Market forces 
are expected to decrease hospitals’ costs and to increase efficiency and care quality within 
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the healthcare sector. The DBC-system involves a performance-based finance system that 
replace the previous finance and reimbursement system in which each hospital was 
primarily ensured of its revenues (Zuurbier & Steinbusch, 2005).  
DBCs in free-market based model are considered as negotiate products between hospitals 
and health insurers all having their own interests. As a result, hospitals are faced with 
increased risk profiles (PwC, 2008) and hence a profit motive to secure continuity of 
services. Gradually implemented market competition through a system involving integral 
tariffs negotiated by the hospitals themselves, may threaten hospital’s continuity as a care 
supplier. In addition, given the poor financial position of many hospitals current practice 
shows the urgency to alter the hospital’s managerial approach from supply-oriented to 
demand-driven through actively managing results. Actively managing results requires 
adjustments in the hospitals’ management model and planning & control cycle.  
This research could not find those components already proven relevant for managing 
results. Although support regarding the content of the conceptual model was found, the 
empirical findings indicated that the urgency to integrally managing results was generally 
limited in the investigated settings. Only some hospitals performing relatively more B-
segment production or having a poor and risky financial position showed urgency to 
develop a managerial approach focussing on results. Slightly implemented aspects thought 
to be relevant are the organizational structure in terms of establishing profit or result 
centres. In addition, distributing responsibilities in terms of financial and medical decisions 
to lower organisational levels creating a bottom-up approach, directly converting the 
hospital’s strategy by means of identifying performance-indicators and performing analysis 
of departments, clinical pathways and composition of care profiles through lean 
management. Another relevant component is establishing a franchise network to sell and 
share knowledge and production methods.  
Since costs, production and investments are managed in a separate way, opposite, 
hospitals in which managing results is beyond question yet control principally concerned 
about sub-areas. Those findings are primarily caused by the fact that competition market 
in the health care sector is still limited primarily caused by the system’s distinction in A-
listed and B-listed DBCs. Further, market forces raise the dilemma of the solidarity-
principle (not everything should explicitly be paid) versus a commercial attitude of 
hospitals. Other dilemmas hospitals are faced with are care quality, transparency and 
people. Above all, the final purpose and conditions concerning introducing market 
competition in the cure sector by the government are far from clear and change over time.  
 
As a result, hospitals have difficulties with the transition from not-for profit to profit and 
may play a waiting game. Hence, as the most prevalent conclusion could be drawn that 
appropriate planning and control components to manage results are under exposure or 
slightly under construction. Current practice actually indicates that this study may yet be 
one bridge too far. 
 
6.2  Limitations and suggestions for future research 
This research is not different from any other scientific research and hence the work 
presented in this thesis is faced with limitations and restrictions. One of the boundaries of 
design-oriented and exploratory research approach is that it will only go as far as exploring 
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the research’s subject. A specific solution to the formulated research question is not 
available. Outcomes of this research principally serve as recommendations and suggestions 
for future research. Without extensive field research in terms of a relatively bigger 
sample, it will be tough to identify the planning and control aspects concerning managing 
results from other characteristics and developments the Dutch cure sector is confronted 
with on a continuous base. Examples of other characteristics may be political and social 
opinions. 
With respect to case studies as one of the chosen research methods, also some 
shortcomings could be noticed. First, since obtained data principally refer to a specific 
case and only 9 out of more than 80 hospital cases were selected, it will be hard to 
generalize the findings to a wider population of interest. Second, obtaining data through 
interviews is not free from the researcher’s subjective assessments. However, adequate 
selection of hospital types, and exploring multiple-case design as well as the triangulation-
principle applied, and reviews of the research findings by external assessors and experts 
will enhance the ability to generalize the research findings.  
 
The outcomes of the conducted research will provide some recommendations for future 
research. Further research could take the form of a longitudinal study to examine the 
functioning of the conceptual model while market competition is increasing in the future. 
Furthermore, it could be examined whether the extension of the B-segment will actually 
cause the urgency to manage results. In addition, one can investigate what are the 
minimum requirements of managerial information concerning management based on 
results. Once has been determined which managerial information is required for managing 
results, hospitals may be facilitated to perform management based on integral results.  
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The Impact of Service Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) on IT Auditing 
 
F.S. (Farida) Chotkan1 
 
Executive Summary 
This study investigates the impact that SOA has on IT Auditing. Service-oriented 
architecture emerged as new technology in literature since 1996 and it has been a hype in 
the Netherlands between 2006 and 2007. The development of new technologies is faster 
than the developments in IT auditing profession. IT auditors have stated in interviews that 
they are aware of the impact that SOA has on their profession and that SOA will need 
another audit approach, because the environment is different than the traditional IT 
environments on which audit programs are based on. Auditing SOA is a complex process, 
but by approaching it from the business processes and stages in the Software Development 
Life Cycle process, the auditor can gain more insights to audit this complex environment. 
 
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5102. 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Research background, problem and questions 
The first publications of service-oriented architecture came out in 1996 by Gartner. Since 
then a lot of companies decided to adopt this new architecture. It has been a phenomenon 
for already thirteen years and we still see that documentation on the supply side of this 
technology is more than on the demand side. There is not much literature about successful 
implementation of SOA and neither of the impact that SOA has on management and 
internal controls. 
  
In 2008, SOA could be found in the “slope of enlightenment” in the Gartner hype. This 
means that SOA is now mature and a lot of knowledge and experience about SOA is 
available in the IT branch. In different Dutch researches the expectations of organizations, 
the success factors and the pitfalls of SOA implementations were published in 2007. In the 
Netherlands SOA was a hype between 2006 and 2007. 
 
                                             
1 Master thesis Economics & Informatics (E&I). Supervised by dr. M.W. Guah and F. Frasincar. 
Currently working at Mindbench Services Group B.V. as an audit/compliance consultant and following a second 
master program in Business and Economics at the Erasmus University, Rotterdam. 
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There are many publications and researches done on SOA, but most of them are focused on 
technical aspects. Because there is a lack of literature about SOA and IT auditing, the 
opportunity has been taken to put the focus of this research on the impact that SOA has on 
IT auditing. 
 
There are a lot of definitions for SOA, some from a technical perspective and some from a 
business perspective. The definition that will be used in this thesis is the one according to 
Marks and Bell [2006]:  
 
“SOA is a conceptual business architecture where business functionality, or 
application logic, is made available to SOA users, or consumers, as shared, 
reusable services on an IT network. Services in a SOA are modules of business or 
application functionality with exposed interfaces, and are invoked by messages.” 
 
Furthermore, the SDLC Software Development Life Cycle) process has been chosen to point 
out the importance of an IT auditor during software development activities. The SDLC 
process is a process that is underestimated by organizations. They forget that this is the 
process they need to follow to build their systems and it is also a process that can be used 
to control efficiency. According to the Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
(ISACA) [2003] the systems development life cycle can be defined as:  
 
“the process involving multiple stages (from establishing the feasibility to carrying 
out post implementation reviews), used to convert a management need into an 
application system, which is custom-developed or purchased or is a combination of 
both.” 
This process is being underestimated by organizations. IT audit also focuses on the SDLC 
process. This process became important to organizations and auditors since both groups 
realize that auditing a system after implementation is inefficient and this inefficiency 
could be decreased by auditing the SDLC process, which means auditing systems during the 
development process. 
 
The scientific relevance of this research is related to the fact that research in the field of 
SOA focused on IT auditing and compliance has not been conducted. This research aims to 
identify the changes the IT auditing world will need, to be able to audit service-based IT 
environments. It also aims to make the IT auditing world aware of their position and their 
importance for organizations. 
 
The business relevance of this research is more related to companies that have or will have 
a SOA environment and also to accounting firms who are delivering IT audit and 
compliance services to other organizations. This research aims to make the accounting 
firms aware of the changes SOA brings for organizations, so they can adjust their audit 
approach without forgetting the objective of an audit: collecting and evaluating evidence 
to determine whether a system safeguards assets, maintains data integrity, achieves 
organizational goals effectively, and consumes efficiently. It also aims to remind 
organizations that the SDLC process is an important process that should not be 
underestimated. 
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To be able to reach the above mentioned aims the following research question is addressed 
in this study: 
  
Would SOA have an impact on IT auditing and if so how are related IT auditing aspects 
affected?  
 
Sub-questions that support the main research question, also addressed in this study are: 
• How does SOA differ from a traditional IT environment?  
• Is the SDLC process an important process for organizations and IT audit?  
• How are technology, people and processes related to IT auditing and SOA?  
• What effects does new technology have on the future of IT auditing? 
 
1.2  Outline 
This article consists of six sections, as illustrated in figure 1-1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1: Outline article 
 
The first section gives a brief explanation of the research background, objective and the 
questions. The second section contains the prior literature, it explains the different IT 
architectures, the SOA aspects that have impact on IT auditing, the SDLC process within 
SOA and the IT auditing profession. The third section explains the research methodology 
used for this study and the research design, which explains how the different parts of this 
study are related to each other. Section four provides the results of the research and 
section five the analysis of the results. The last section, section six, contains the main 
findings and the conclusion on the research. 
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2.  Prior Literature 
2.1  Different IT architectures 
To be able to get an overview of the different IT architectures that have been existed and 
still exist, it was necessary to go back in time. More than forty years ago organizations 
establish their own IT departments using different kind of systems with their standard 
application functionalities and they had their own data centre. In the 70s and 80s modules 
in business systems became popular. These modules were supplied by software supplier or 
were developed in house as custom-made applications [Vessiliadis et al., 2006]. In the 90s 
and the following years organizations began to use third parties for the delivery of 
application functionalities and IT outsourcing became a hype. The reasons for outsourcing 
are shown in figure 2-1 [ITGI, 2005]: 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Reasons for outsourcing [ITGI, 2005] 
 
Different outsourcing techniques are [Butler, 2008]:  
• ASP (application service provision): third parties (application service providers) 
offer, host and manage applications remotely at a central location (data centre) on 
a one-to-one basis to customers; 
• Saas (Software as a service): service providers develop, offer and deploy software 
applications that can be accessed by multiple service consumers over the internet. 
 
The first publications of SOA were in 1996 by Gartner. In a SOA there is a collection of 
numerous services from different sources (internal or external or a combination of both). 
These services are integrated and can interact and communicate with each other.  
Aspects that will influence the auditor’s activities in the different IT architectures are the 
place where applications and data are hosted, associated risks and who is responsible for 
the controls. These aspects are different in each of the IT architecture previously 
mentioned. The differences in the IT architectures are illustrated in below figure 2-2 
[Butler, 2008]. 
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Figure 2-2: Differences in IT architectures [Butler, 2008] 
 
In different literature ([Artus, 2006], [Marks & Bell, 2006], [Thomas, 2007]) it is explained 
that SOA is chosen because of its flexibility within the business processes, but still the 
figure above shows SOA as a complex environment.  
The differences between SOA and the other IT architectures are [Butler, 2008]:  
• SOA is process-oriented and heterogeneous and traditional architectures are 
functionality – and application driven;  
• Life cycles in SOA are shorter than in traditional architectures. A lot of changes are 
made in a SOA environment and this supports flexibility;  
• SOA is based on messaging and traditional architectures on objects.  
 
Looking at the first difference of SOA between the traditional IT environments, the auditor 
will have to change his strategy in a SOA environment [Butler, 2008]. Because SOA is 
process-oriented, the auditor will have to focus on testing the business process from the 
beginning till its end. He/she will also have to audit each business process that can include 
different services, individually. This means that the auditor must gain an understanding of 
the environment and must have an overview of all services in the SOA environment.  
Looking at the second difference mentioned above, it can be said that although a SOA 
environment creates flexibility for businesses, it creates complexity for auditors. A SOA 
environment is a complex audit environment, because it continuously changes.  
The third difference brings along technical challenges for the IT auditor as a SOA 
environment is message-oriented. Knowledge of security aspects within messaging will be 
required.  
Furthermore, Haines [2007] stated that SOA brings along changes in developer skills, roles, 
tools, processes, and organizational culture. 
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2.2 SOA aspects that have impact on IT auditing 
As already described in section 2.1 there are several differences between SOA and 
traditional IT environments. In previous section 2.1 the impact on IT auditing is approached 
from the three differences mentioned. The challenges for the IT auditor will be discussed 
further in this section [Butler, 2008]:  
1. Because SOA is a complex environment, the auditor will need technical skills. As 
already mentioned, difference number three, messaging, will require technical 
knowledge to be able to audit the security aspects within SOA. The auditor must 
understand the environment; 
2. Flexibility is one of the key adoption factors of SOA. Where SOA creates flexibility 
for businesses, it creates complexity for IT auditors. SOA changes a lot, because of 
internal factors (scalable and manageable systems) and external factors 
(competitive issues and global markets). A continuously changing audit environment 
will affect the nature, timing and extent of the audit approach; 
3. Risk assessments will still be an important activity of the IT auditor. The risks 
related to SOA are: security, insufficient segregation of duties, data confidentiality, 
integrity, and business continuity;  
4. Service level agreements define services in a SOA environment. They describe the 
relation between the service consumers and service providers. An IT auditor is 
required to understand the SLAs, as they describe the services involved, and the 
obligations and responsibilities of the parties involved;  
5. The SOA enabling layer is a very important part of the environment. This is also a 
challenge for the auditor, because this layer integrates the components in the SOA, 
controls the messaging, and access control and security elements can be defined 
here;  
6. Besides the aspects already mentioned above, there’s another aspect that is also 
very important and it may have impact on the activities of the auditor. A successful 
SOA environment also depends on the technical skills of employees and the ability 
to plan, coordinate and effectively manage the environment. 
 
2.3 SDLC in SOA 
The SDLC process is mostly forgotten by organizations. This process is being audited in 
organizations, where they have to comply with rules, regulations and legislations. This 
chapter aims to discuss the differences there are between the SDLC process of a SOA 
environment and the SDLC process of a traditional IT environment.  
ISACA [2003] provides an IS guideline for reviewing/auditing the system development life 
cycle. In this guideline all aspects that need to be reviewed are summarized. According to 
literature [ISACA, 2007], this process is being audited, by reviewing documentation of each 
phase. Whether this is an effective and efficient way of auditing this process is not 
evident. The differences in SDLC activities will be outlined in table 2-1 from the traditional 
SDLC point of view, by looking at the ways in which the traditional life cycle activities 
change in an SOA environment [Lewis et al., 2008]. 
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Traditional SDLC phases  SOA SDLC  
Requirements  In an SOA environment, this requires a business process 
management (BPM) focus and it includes a large number of 
stakeholders. One of the characteristics of SOA is that it aligns 
the business with IT. During this phase it is important to look at 
the inventory of business processes and services.  
 Architecture and 
Design  
Activities during this phase in an SOA environment involve:  
• setting up responsibilities of service consumers, service 
providers and the service broker. This decision must 
lead to loose coupling;  
• making decisions which technology and standards to 
use. Standards for a SOA based environment are still 
emerging;  
• implementing quality of service attributes;  
• determining the degree of service reusability to get the 
most benefit out of the architecture.  
 
Testing  Testing in a SOA based system must be done from the service 
provider’s as well as from the service consumer’s perspective. 
From a service consumer’s perspective it is very important to 
test on the exception handling as services could become 
unavailable and disappear without notifications.  
From a service provider’s perspective the service will need to 
be tested on direct user’s level and on the level of users of the 
service interfaces. Test cases must cover all business processes 
that use one service. Because there are SLA’s between the 
service provider and the service consumer all tests need to 
consider the agreements in the SLA’s.  
Implementation  In an SOA environment implementation activities include 
checking on loose coupling and the common infrastructure 
components such as security, service repository management, 
and data transformation. As in any other distributed system 
development, there is no guarantee that the system will work 
in production (run time). This is also a problem in a SOA based 
system due to technology and standards that support the 
execution of the system.  
Maintenance  Maintenance activities in an SOA environment are very complex 
and this can increased when external service consumers and 
providers also have access. Service providers have to consider a 
set of unknown users if tracking the service consumers in the 
SOA infrastructure is not possible. There are direct users of the 
old systems and users of the service interfaces. Besides user 
management the configuration management also becomes 
complex, because it is very difficult to decide what to put 
under configuration management; there are a lot components, 
e.g., service interfaces, configuration files, test instances etc.  
 
Table 2-1: SDLC differences [Lewis et al., 2008] 
 
According to Lewis et al. [2007] SOA has a major impact on SDLC because of the following 
characteristics: business agility, reuse of legacy systems, adaptability of applications, and 
interoperability of systems. He also stated that there are misconceptions about SOA that 
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make organizations believe that developing SOA is not different from developing 
traditional IT environments. 
 
Gu and Lago [2007] has proposed a service life cycle management, see figure 2-3, that 
consists of three stages to build their SDLC model. The three stages are:  
• design time: this is the life cycle of a service before it is being used;  
• run time: this is the life cycle where services are put into production;  
• change time: this is the life cycle when services need adjustments. 
 
Each stakeholder will be responsible for the activities within these three stages. 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Life cycle activities associated with services in SOA [Gu & Lago, 2007] 
 
2.4  IT auditing 
 
Drivers of IT auditing  
It auditing now, is not what it was years before. Years ago auditors were accountants who 
gave second opinions on the integrity (quality, completeness, accuracy) of a company’s 
finances. The objective of an audit was delivering assurance to stakeholders and 
authorities [Hinson, 2007].  
Because IT plays a significant role these days in organizations and transactions are done 
through IT systems, the business risks on the level of information security threats and 
vulnerabilities have increased. This is one of the reasons why an IT audit became part of a 
financial audit and why organizations began to invest little by little in IT audits.  
 
According to ISACA [2008] and IT audit can be defined as:  
“any audit that encompasses review and evaluation (wholly or partly) of 
automated information processing systems, related no-automated processes and 
the interfaces between them.”  
As mentioned before, the technical advances in IT is one of the reasons why the demand of 
IT audits increase. Another reason that can be seen as a driver for IT audit is the interest 
in governance, risk and compliance. After economic scandals like the WorldCom and Enron 
scandals governments began to set compliance regulations to which companies have to 
comply with. Frameworks like COSO and COBIT became popular because organizations 
interest in IT controls became bigger than before. The third reason is related to changes in 
the way organizations began to use IT. There was suddenly an IT explosion and IT became a 
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department on its own in organizations. Companies became aware that they can use IT for 
their business and strategic changes and business-IT alignment started to increase. 
 
Audit standards  
IT auditors use techniques, methods and tools to perform their activities. In different 
literature [Hinson, 2007, ISACA, 2008] the techniques, methods and tools are described. 
Besides these there are also audit standards to which the auditor needs to comply with 
when performing an audit. Audit standards guide the auditor during his audit activities. 
The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) has setup the 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA). These standards provide the auditors the 
necessary guidance to address those issues of greatest concern to the public as well as the 
markets [IAASB, 2007]. Over the years, countries are using and are adopting or 
incorporating these ISA’s into theirs national auditing standards. 
 
SWOT analysis on IT audit  
Hinson [2007] has performed a SWOT analysis on the IT auditing profession. This analysis 
describes the positives and negatives of IT auditing and gives an overview of IT auditing in 
time. The past, present and future of IT auditing can be derived out of this analysis. The 
following figure 2-4 shows the SWOT analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4: SWOT analysis IT auditing [Hinson, 2007] 
 
Besides the SWOT analysis, Hinson [2007] also explained future directions for the IT 
auditing professions. According to him the following needs attention of IT auditing:  
• New technologies will be a challenge for IT auditors as the risk landscape changes 
and this will make that IT audit specialism will emerge;  
• Added value of IT auditors must be more than only identifying risks in IT systems. 
Therefore they should have business and technology skills;  
• IT auditors must not only focus on the technology, but also on processes and 
people. They need people to give them a better understanding of the environments 
and therefore they will also need people skills as well; 
• There must be more cooperation between different auditors. 
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3.  Research Design 
3.1  Research methodology 
The research is a qualitative research. According to Myers and Avison [2002], it is a 
research method  
"developed in the social sciences to enable researchers to study social and cultural 
phenomena". 
 
Qualitative research can help the researcher to understand people and the social and 
cultural contexts within which they live according to the authors. Qualitative research 
consists of different qualitative research methods and qualitative data sources. Examples 
of qualitative research methods are action research, case study research and ethnography. 
This research is based on the case study method. According to Benbasat et al. [1987],  
"a case approach is an appropriate way to research an area in which few previous 
studies have been carried out". 
 
A multiple-case design is used, as different IT auditors will be interviewed. Furthermore, 
this case study research is an interpretive study since the opinions and experience of IT 
auditors are interpreted with help of the interviews and questionnaire. 
 
3.2  Research design 
The first step during this research was gaining more information about service-oriented 
architecture and IT auditing. This is done by reviewing literature. The second step was 
setting up interview questions. The third step was conducting the interviews and collecting 
the empirical data. The interviews are recorded and there is a transcript of each 
interview. Empirical data is analyzed by comparing the reflections and opinions of the 
interviewees using critical thinking. The last part of this research will be the conclusion. 
The opinions of the auditors will be compared with the literature review and a conclusion 
will be drawn. 
This process is illustrated in figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1: Qualitative research 
 
 
4.  Results 
As explained in the research design, interviews were conducted. Ten auditors were 
interviewed and they are from different organizations. The interviews are ordered by these 
different organizations: 
• two auditors of an international manufacturing firm (This firm has to comply with 
SOX regulations and is on it is listed on the US stock exchange); 
• two auditors of a Dutch consulting firm (This firm delivers only IT audit and 
compliance services to other organizations and is specialized in SOX compliance. It 
is a SME); 
• two auditors within the Dutch government (The Dutch government has its own IT 
audit organization); 
• three auditors of different accounting firms (These firms deliver IT and Financial 
audit and compliance services to organizations); 
• one auditor of a Dutch university (This auditor is a professor at the Dutch University 
and coordinates the IT Audit Post-Initial programs). 
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The auditors gave their opinions on 6 different topics related to SOA, SDLC and IT auditing: 
• auditing SDLC 
• service-oriented architecture 
• audit standards 
• people 
• processes 
• future 
 
In the complete study2 a detailed description of each interview can be found. Important 
statements and arguments are selected from the interviews and are used within the 
analysis of the collected data. 
 
5.  Analysis 
The different point of views of the interviewees are described and evaluated in this 
section. The purpose of this is to find correlation and relevance to different themes. 
Arguments that will support this process are illustrated in figure 5-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Arguments supporting the data analysis themes 
                                             
2  The complete study can be found here: http://thesis.eur.nl/thesis/index/783769483 
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 Importance of the SDLC process 
The SDLC process is a very important process that could help organizations during their 
development and implementation activities. Many organizations are not aware of this and 
they underestimate this process. This process is a standard and organizations are using it 
differently. Organizations are not aware of the fact that this process can guide them 
through the implementation process of internal controls. Therefore it can be considered as 
a very important process. When implementing governance controls, application controls, 
data controls and management controls during the SDLC process, management of the IT 
environment will be much more efficient. During this process a lot of other management 
processes are being used for example project management. These processes guide the 
devolvement team and after implementation the organization can be ensured of a system 
that 
 
works well. All the interviewees have stated that the SDLC process is very important and 
that internal controls can be implemented during this process.  
As mentioned before, the SDLC process is a standard and organizations use it differently 
and they even create their own SDLC process. This depends on the organization and the IT 
environment. Service-oriented architecture is a new technology where the development of 
services based on business processes is one of the activities. The SDLC processes in such 
architecture would be different than one in a traditional IT architecture where developing 
applications was the core. The first difference is the end product; in a traditional IT 
environment the end product is an application and now in a SOA it is a service. Besides this 
difference, there will be more differences in the activities of each phase of the SDLC 
process. These differences are caused by differences in the environment and tools to be 
used. The interviewees have stated several differences that will occur during the 
performance of the activities, e.g., differences during the testing phase and requirement 
phase. The following table 8.1 shows some differences in activities of each phase of the 
SDLC approach, based on opinions of some interviewees: 
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SDLC Phase  
Requirements  The focus in a SOA is business process; this means 
that business analysis will be very important in order 
to identify all business processes including legacy 
applications.  
Architecture & design  Because the architecture of a SOA is different, the 
technical design will be different. Design blueprints 
are necessary to be able to have an overview of all 
aspects and to be able to implement internal 
controls.  
Testing  Testing in a SOA environment is a complex process. 
All stakeholders need to be involved in the testing 
process and human testing is complex because of the 
possibility of unknown users in a SOA environment. 
Involvement of the SLAs during the tests will be 
necessary.  
Implementation  The interviewees did not mention any examples of 
differences in the implementation phase in a SOA 
environment. Most of them were sure that not many 
will change during the implementation, except that 
the technology is different.  
Maintenance  Because life cycles are short in a SOA, disposal will 
take place fast. Maintenance will be a complex 
process, as this is different from each stakeholder’s 
point of view. User management is a very complex 
process, because in a SOA there are internal and 
external users and there is a possibility that 
unknown user-access exists.  
 
Table 5-1: Changes in SDLC activities 
 
The SDLC process can also be reviewed during an IT audit. Many organizations make the 
mistake to consult an IT auditor after the implementation of a system, but the best time to 
consult such an auditor is during the development and implementation activities. The 
auditor can guide the organization through the implementation process of internal controls 
and can also advice on audit requirements. In this way gaps during the development can be 
found on time and they can act on them directly. It is more efficient to audit during the 
SDLC process than at the end of an implementation. This saves time and costs in system 
development. Most of the interviewees have stated that it is important to audit during this 
process, because it can be used as a verification tool. The interviewees have also given 
their opinion on how they would review the SDLC process. 
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5.2 More focus on people and processes in a SOA environment 
A service-oriented architecture is a new technology that is not any longer a hype. Still 
organizations underestimate the implementation of such architecture. People, processes 
and technology are three aspects that have effects on each other when one changes. In 
this case we can see that SOA is a new technology and it affects people and processes.  
 
Figure 5-2 illustrates a better understanding of how technology, people and processes are 
related, when new technology is being implemented: 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Technology, people, processes affect IT auditing 
 
5.3  SOA flexibility is audit complexity 
A service-oriented architecture creates flexibility for organizations. SOA reduces the 
technical complexity so systems can freely communicate with each other. This creates 
flexibility for the organization; they can now act fast on market changes. What 
organizations are not aware of and sometimes also auditors, is that this flexibility creates 
a complex environment for auditors. In a SOA environment the life cycles of services are 
short, because they are being changed constantly. This is why a SOA environment can be 
considered as a dynamic environment. In the audit world there is no standard that is based 
on auditing a dynamic audit environment. A dynamic audit environment has effects on the 
timing, scope and results of the audit. It makes it difficult for the auditor to set his scope 
and results, while changes occur constantly. This will be a time consuming process and it is 
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one of the challenges of an IT auditor in a SOA environment. Two interviewees mentioned 
this characteristic of a SOA environment.  
Other challenges for an IT auditor in a SOA environment are described in table 5-2. 
 
 
Challenges  
Not enough literature and 
experience in auditing SOA  
Because there is not enough literature and 
experience in auditing a SOA it is difficult to say how 
a SOA should be audited. An auditor in a SOA 
environment will have to do this on his own.  
SOA is not a monolithic 
environment  
For years auditor are used to audit a monolithic IT 
environment, i.e., one systems in one company. New 
systems are based on the internet technique and the 
standards have not been adjusted. Some 
interviewees pointed out that there is a need for 
audit standards based on architectures and 
classification of systems.  
Technical aspects in SOA  Technology is changing and so are the techniques 
that are used. The auditor will need skills and 
knowledge to be able to understand the complexity 
of technical aspects in a SOA.  
Risks  SOA is a different architecture and it will have other 
risks. There are more parties involved in the 
environment, which means that risk analysis will 
have to be done from all parties’ perspectives. The 
reduction of technical complexity, i.e., no technical 
boundaries, creates other risks in a SOA and the 
auditor must be able to identify those.  
Determining an audit scope  Because a SOA environment has a lot stakeholders 
involved, thus a lot of services, legacy applications 
and other components, determining an audit scope 
will be difficult.  
Not enough audit capacity  Auditing every service in a SOA will be a time 
consuming process and it might be considered 
impossible to audit each service. This is why the 
auditor needs to approach the environment 
differently than a traditional environment in order 
not to lack in audit capacity.  
SOA is process-oriented  Audit is still focusing on output. This will have to 
change, as SOA consists of services based on business 
processes. This means that the auditor will have to 
follow a process; how it runs and if there are no 
interruptions during transactions.  
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Service Level Agreements  SOA has SLAs, which describe the relation between 
services and stakeholders, roles and responsibilities 
of stakeholders, obligations and other information. 
The auditor must be able to understand and review 
the SLAs.  
 
Table 5-2: SOA challenges 
 
5.4  Effects of changes on IT auditing 
That SOA challenges the IT auditor is described previously. Technology is developing fast 
and there is still a monolithic audit program. IT auditing will need to change in order to be 
able to audit new IT technologies. Most of the interviewees stated that the future of IT 
auditing will be different. Changes will occur in the IT audit profession, in organizations 
and in the education for auditors. The following table 5-3 presents the changes, which will 
have effect on the future of IT auditing: 
 
Changes in IT 
auditing education  
Because technology is getting smarter and more complex it 
will be necessary for the IT auditor to have technical 
knowledge on the new techniques that will be used.  
Changes in IT 
auditing  
The effect of adjustments in IT audit education might be 
more specialties in IT auditing. Because new environments 
will be more complex it might be that an audit will be multi-
disciplined, i.e., more auditors in one audit with their own 
specialty.  
As more research will be done on, e.g., SOA and IT auditing 
there will be more literature and experience and this will 
create possibilities for auditors and profession organizations 
to think about standards or frameworks for auditing new 
technology.  
The focus on human aspects will increase, because IT 
environments are becoming complex and the auditor will also 
have to depend on the people of an organization during an 
audit.  
Rules, regulations and legislation are emerging because the 
current economic situation and also because of new 
technology. They will drive IT auditing. Through compliance 
auditing might be mandatory in some organizations.  
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 The fact that organizations will invest more in IT auditing will 
make that the added value of the IT auditor will increase. The 
IT auditor will also have to prove his abilities in new IT 
environments.  
Because organizations will be aware of the added value of IT 
auditing, the auditor will also focus more on efficiency and 
effectiveness of systems and environments. This might lead to 
more validation, i.e., auditors will also look if the right 
system is implemented and not only if the system is 
implemented well. Security will still be an important quality 
aspect as well as confidentiality, integrity and availability, 
which will need auditor’s focus.  
Changes in 
organizations  
Because of rules, regulations and legislations some companies 
will invest more in auditing and it will become more 
important. This will lead to more continuous auditing and 
monitoring.  
Another driver to continuous auditing and monitor is the drive 
of organizations to be in control. The world is changing and 
organizations can not afford any scandals so they will prove 
that they have everything in control.  
 
Table 5-3: Future directions of IT auditing 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
6.1  Main findings 
How does SOA differ from a traditional IT environment?  
SOA differs from a traditional IT environment. Not only is the architecture different, but 
also the management, processes and the roles and responsibilities of people involved are 
different. The activities within the SDLC processes are different and the life cycles of 
services are shorter, because they are being changed constantly, this results in different 
way of managing changes. At last but not least SOA also differs from a traditional IT 
environment in the way how it will be audited.  
These differences are also mentioned in the literature that is used. By doing a literature 
study, Butler [2008] describes the differences between SOA and traditional architectures 
and he also mentioned three characteristics of a SOA (process-oriented, short life cycles 
and message oriented). Haines [2007] also explained that SOA will bring changes in 
developer skills, roles, tools, processes and organization culture. The changes in SDLC 
activities are highlighted by Lewis et al. [2008].  
 
Is the SDLC process an important process for organizations and IT audit?  
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The system (software) development life cycle process is an important process through the 
development of systems. This process is important because it guides the organization 
through a project. During the SDLC process internal controls, such as internal governance 
controls, application controls, data controls, and management controls can be 
implemented. This process is being underestimated by organizations. Lewis et al. [2007] 
state that organizations have misconceptions about the development activities of SDLC 
process and that organizations believe that developing SOA is not different that traditional 
IT architecture development. With the differences in activities [Lewis et al., 2008] they 
explain that organizations must not underestimate the SDLC process in a SOA environment, 
because changes are needed in SDLC activities for an efficient and effective environment. 
 
How are technology, people and processes related to IT auditing and SOA?  
Technology, people and processes are related to each other. Service-oriented architecture 
can be seen as a new technology here and changes in technology affect the people and 
processes aspects, i.e., SOA brings changes in people and process aspects within the 
organization.  
As Haines [2007] explains SOA will have impact on the development skills, roles, tools, 
processes and organization culture. Development skills, roles, tools, and the organization 
culture are aspects where people are involved. This literature agrees on the fact that 
technology, processes and people are related to each other and that SOA as a new 
technology affects the two other aspects.  
As Butler [2008] and Hinson [2007] also mentioned, SOA will have effects on IT auditing. IT 
auditing is a process in which technology, people and processes of the auditee are 
involved.  
 
What effects does new technology have on the future of IT auditing?  
Butler [2008] has suggested some future directions for IT auditing. He also presented a 
SWOT analysis of IT auditing where some of the opportunities can be seen as future 
directions. That there are effects of changes in technologies on IT auditing is described in 
section 5.4 and this only confirms the findings in previous literature. 
 
6.2  Future research suggestions 
Future research suggestions related to this research could be:  
• Conducting a research on compliance frameworks for a SOA environment;  
• Conducting a research on how to perform an IT audit on a service consumer side or 
the service provider’s side, i.e., a SOA audit guide;  
• Conducting a research on continuous auditing and monitoring in a SOA environment.  
 
Limitations: 
• this research only discusses the reflections of auditors on the impacts of SOA on IT 
auditing. The interviewees were only questioned on the subjects that give a better 
understanding of SOA, the effects of it on IT auditing and the attention for change 
in the IT audit world; 
• this research does not include detailed technical explanations of a SOA, the SDLC 
process and of the IT auditing process. 
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6.3  Conclusions 
By comparing the data analysis with the prior literature, it can be concluded that one of 
the aspects through which SOA has impacts on IT auditing is the SDLC process. The 
differences in the SDLC activities will have an impact on the IT auditor’s activities. The 
complex audit environment in a SOA can be approached from different point of views. It 
will be difficult for the auditor to set an audit scope, to divide his audit capacity and to 
perform a risk analysis in a dynamic environment. This is the biggest challenge in a SOA 
environment for an IT auditor. The best solution for this is to have a guideline in place to 
audit dynamic IT environments. In such a guideline steps need to be defined how an 
auditor can set his scope and from which point of view the auditor can approach his audit. 
There must also be audit standards that decrease the audit risk of a not limited audit 
scope. The audit standard for a dynamic environment must explain the auditor’s roles and 
responsibilities within a dynamic environment like SOA. 
 
Another related aspect discussed in this study is the future of IT auditing. Auditors are 
aware of changes that are needed to get IT auditing aligned with future directions 
presented in this research. Auditors will have to spend more time together to discuss these 
aspects and to come with solutions for the professional organization NOREA in the 
Netherlands. These future directions must not be neglected and auditors and audit & 
control organizations must not wait for the influence from outside. This will make IT 
auditing more mature and the image of auditors will change, because their added value 
will be known. 
 
It can be concluded that SOA has indeed impact on IT auditing. IT auditing has gained its 
position in the audit world, but technology is faster than the developments within the IT 
audit profession. The main findings are based on the importance of the SDLC process and 
the complex audit environment within SOA for an IT auditor. Up till now the differences 
and similarities have been described and concluded. This study meets its relevance for IT 
auditors, by presenting an audit approach for IT auditors. The next approach is not a 
guideline; it is a recommendation that can be used for setting up a guideline. The 
approach is illustrated in figure 6-1. 
 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Horizontal-Vertical audit approach 
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A SOA environment consists of business processes, services and legacy applications. Before 
performing an audit the auditor must first set his scope by looking from whose perspective 
he will audit the SOA environment; from the service consumer’s perspective or from the 
service producer’s perspective. A risk assessment from both points of view must be 
performed. When preparing an audit the following is very important for an auditor to 
review:  
• the completeness and reliability of the information that arrives in the business 
process, i.e., information from the service producer;  
• the completeness and reliability of the information that is in the legacy system 
layer;  
• the availability and integrity of the services.  
 
By focusing on the business process, the auditor can get an overview which information 
floats through the process and from that point he can audit the related services on 
availability and integrity. To be sure whether the right services are being used the auditor 
can consult the service level agreements and he/she can audit the services in the design 
time, where the requirements are set. The design time is one of the three stages in a life 
cycle activities management. The auditor can decide whether he audits the services in 
design time, run time or change time. In design time the auditor will be able to review the 
requirements, design and testing phase of the SDLC process, in the run time he will be able 
to audit how the implementation works and on the availability of the service, and in the 
change time he will be able to audit on the service management processes.  
 
The auditor must review the services from the business process point of view as well as 
from the legacy systems layer, when using the above picture as a reference. By auditing 
the different stages with the life cycle activities, the auditor can set a scope and he can 
divide his audit capacity or he should consider the possibility of auditing each stage 
individually. The audit steps involve:  
• approaching the audit from a business process point of view, i.e., the scope will 
consists of the business processes to be audited;  
• approaching the services from the three stages: design-, run-, and change time;  
• performing a risk assessment on the business processes and services involved.  
 
By using these approaches the auditor will be able to report his findings according to 
business processes in design time, run time and change time. The auditor can identify risks 
per business process.  
The auditor will be able to review controls within different areas (IT Governance, Life 
Cycle management, IT service Delivery, Information Asset Protection and Disaster Recovery 
& Business Continuity) also in the three stages. This represents a horizontal and vertical 
audit approach. 
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